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Psychoanalysis and feminist scholarship : toward a women's studies curriculum in counseling and psychology.

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PSYCHOANALYSIS AND FEMINIST SCHOLARSHIP: TOWARD A WOMEN'S STUDIES CURRICULUM IN COUNSELING AND PSYCHOLOGY

A Dissertation Presented

By

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Dedicated to the members of the Amherst Feminist Counseling Collective with whom I worked from June 1977 through October 1978--gifted therapists, imaginative scholars, extraordinary women:

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ABSTRACT

Psychoanalysis and Feminist Scholarship: Toward A Women's Studies Curriculum in Counseling and Psychology

(September 1979)

Bonnie Smolen, M.Ed., University of Massachusetts/Amherst

Directed by: Dr. Peter H. Wagschal

In past decades we have witnessed a great upsurge in the popularity and popularization of psychotherapy and "personal growth" experiences. There has been a concomitant proliferation of training models and training sites. Though undergraduates are increasingly interested in this career area, no clearly outlined course of study exists in order to prepare students to work in the field or to go on for a graduate degree. Recent attention paid by minority groups and social theorists to the sometimes hidden political implications of psychotherapy and its assimilation into American culture suggests that an interdisciplinary curriculum would best address the needs and concerns of the students and the social problems they ultimately may be working to alleviate.

And yet there is no adequate theoretical base on which to build such an interdisciplinary program, though there have been theoretical and practical attempts, in the field of education and psychology, to effect a 'synthesis' of political and psychological theory. Perhaps most prominent of these efforts in recent years is feminist therapy, which, again has failed to adequately demarcate the interrelationships

of psychology, counseling, and political theory. Hence while this research originally intended to provide a Women's Studies curriculum as a prototype for an interdisciplinary program of study in counseling, it soon became clear that a lengthy process of conceptual clarification would have to precede program development.

The aim of this dissertation is to begin to provide the theoretical foundation for a Women's Studies major in counseling and psychology. It proposes from the outset that the theory should evolve from both political and psychological frames of reference, that is, should be interdisciplinary in nature. This goal is subsumed under two broader tasks: 1) to explore the relationships between, respectively, political and psychological theory; psychological theory and therapeutic practice; theory, therapy and political activity; and 2) to elucidate a pedagogical framework that is reflexively coherent with these concerns.

Chapter I is an in-depth exploration of the problem in two parts: first, a concrete explication of the difficulties facing students in the field of counselor education, and an examination of the ways in which present educational practices fail to meet their needs. Following that, the same themes are explored with particular reference to feminist concerns and Women's Studies curriculum. The suggestion is offered that a program built on the principles of Freudian psychoanalytic theory would best address the failures that currently pertain in counselor education, and would be most amenable to an interdisciplinary focus.

Chapter II endeavors to determine whether feminist therapy, which would appear the most likely choice for the basis of an interdisciplinary Women's Studies counseling program, can address the problems regarding

the politics/psychology nexus which were raised in Chapter I, and whether the feminist therapy alternative to psychoanalysis is truly an advance, politically or psychologically, over the Freudian theory and method.

Chapter III sets forth the psychoanalytic theory of mind in order to establish a standard by which to judge what any psychological theory has to offer to feminist political analysis and feminist pedagogy. Chapters IV and V represent an exploration and critique of the psychoanalytic theory of psychosexual development, with a dual purpose in mind: first, to provide a foundation on which to base a collaboration between feminist and Freudian theories by demarcating between essential and derivative components of the theory; and second, to demonstrate what may be forthcoming from an application of psychoanalytic principles to some of the most urgent research questions posed to feminist scholars by the women's movement.

The Conclusion takes the theoretical exploration of general psychology and psychosexual development back to the problems of feminist counselor education. The Conclusion also suggests some problems left unresolved by the research, and some areas for continued study.

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CHAPTER I

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Overview

When this research was begun several years ago, even before the focus was narrowed to Women's Studies curriculum, it appeared that it might be possible to start immediately with the task of program development. This seemed without question an exciting project: most lay and professional people with whom I had discussed the idea were stunned to discover that a counseling program for undergraduates did not already exist. The impact of this realization may be staggering: students who are interested in the "helping professions" and who, until now, have gone without training constitute a vast untapped source of clinicians and/or social change agents. Thus far, these students either have been deterred from such work altogether, or have entered the professional field with few clinical skills and an unsophisticated political understanding of social problems and their own role in social change. With the increased popularity and public acceptance of therapy, and the recent trend toward exploring the political aspects of both institutional and individual therapeutic experiences, the development of such a program would indeed be well-timed.

The project appears all the more exciting because on the surface it seems a relatively easy one to put into operation. There is no shortage of training models from which to draw, including several developed in recent years (radical therapy, feminist therapy, micro-counseling, re-evaluation counseling, and organizational development, to name a few) which already focus on "political" aspects of therapy. These latter, while they are widely divergent, may be grouped together for three reasons. First, they are unified by the adjectives they use to name and define themselves: radical, humanistic, and so forth. Second, they may be seen as a unit in terms of their nuclear organizing issues; demystification of therapy and the authority relationship through skills acquisition and peer models; attention to issues of sex, race, and class discrimination in the social services, etc. They would no doubt be open for use in an undergraduate program as they are philosophically committed to deprofessionalizing the social services and social service training. Third, they are based on similar underlying assumptions drawn from classical liberal philosophy and supported by positivist methodology.

While none of these systems identifies itself specifically as interdisciplinary, probably their proponents would see themselves as closely allied with the goals and values of this project. In the manner in which interdisciplinary organization has been recently popularized, it can be loosely understood as calling for <u>any</u> integration of psychological and political disciplines. This is exemplified by the over-use of phrases like "politics of therapy," wherein juxtaposing

"politics" and "therapy" automatically connotes interdisciplinary (or dialectical) methodology.

If an easy alliance with the proponents of current so-called radical and humanistic therapies and education were assumed, then the tasks of this project would indeed be accomplished easily: a radical approach to the tensions between theory and therapy would abandon psychological theory in favor of immediate therapeutic or political/social needs, and concentrate on developing therapeutic and social change strategies and on disseminating skills. The implications for education are clear: a "therapeutic" classroom in which learning happens mainly through self-exploration, a model which uses the students' inner experience as the primary text and stresses that inner experience, combined with skills that almost anyone can learn, constitutes adequate counselor education. This fallacy is accompanied by a general disdain for theory as being elitist and of little practical value. Such educational strategies are labeled radical largely because they represent departures from traditional classroom (blackboard and text) and formal therapy (Dr. and couch) models. The obscurity of their theoretical roots makes it difficult to assess in what other ways their advocates consider themselves to be radical, and, therefore to ascertain what is <u>meant</u> by radical.

This theoretical obscurity makes, in fact, for a very <u>un</u>easy alliance (between this project and radical therapy/humanistic education projects currently underway), if one holds to a genuine hope for politicizing the social services. Critical theorists have long since shown the politically-motivated interdisciplinary approach, as seen in

the proliferation of "politics of X" slogans, to be suspect. They are writing about the popularization of the dialectic in the New Left and its heirs, and here Paul Breines draws attention to the original impact of the "politics of therapy" phraseology.

> The meaning of the Movement's 'politics of the unpolitical' lay in its recognition that nothing in modern society is unpolitical; that every detail of daily life is saturated with and reproduces the hegemony of the ruling system; that the object of critical thought and action is 'the system' as a totality. . . its recognition that a coherent and unitary critique of modern society begins with a critique of individual existence. Thus the Movement's 'politics of the unpolitical' is not a matter of taste but a shift in the 'strategy of liberation'. . . .[1]

The analysis of the New Left echoes earlier writings of Marcuse and other critical theorists who were working with contemporary uses of the Hegelian and Marxist dialectic. Marcuse writes ". . . since the adjustment of Reason to oppressive social institutions perpetuated unfreedom, progress in freedom depends on thought becoming political."[2] And again, the caution:

> Today this dialectical mode of thought is alien to the whole established universe of discourse and action. . . . The established reality seems promising and productive enough to repel or absorb all alternatives. Thus acceptance--and even affirmation--of this reality principle appears to be the only reasonable methodological principle. Moreover, it precludes neither criticism nor change; on the contrary, insistence on the dynamic character of the status quo, on its constant 'revolutions,' is one of the strongest props for this attitude. Yet this dynamic seems to operate endlessly within the same framework of life: streamlining rather than abolishing the domination of man, both by man and the products of his labor.[3]

One major difficulty in making judgments about those current radical therapists and educators who address themselves to political concerns, is the impossibility of discerning in what relation, if any,

they stand to either the New Left or critical theory, and therefore what the term "political" itself has come to mean to them. Is the "politics of therapy" a concept already absorbed into the "daily hegemony," and if so, to what end? My questions apply not only to the ambiguity of their roots in political theory, but also to their roots in some psychological theory. Their relationship even to existentialism, no less Neo Freudianism, ego psychology, or Freudian analysis is, at best, obscure. At worst, it is denied. In the abstract, this obscurity pervades as well their connection with the major philosophical traditions in history, particularly classical liberal thought and positivist methodology. Russell Jacoby writes:

> Within psychology new theories and therapies replace old ones at an accelerating rate. In a dynamic society, Freud is too old to be a fashion, too new to be a classic. . . . The ability as well as the desire to remember atrophies. Most of the social sciences turn radically ahistorical; one hardly studies Hegel within philosophy, Freud within psychology, Marx within economics, and so on.
>
> For some, this is proof of progress and vitality. But dynamism can be perpetual motion without forward movement. Within dynamism a static moment can inhere: the structure of society.[4]

The very fact that the origins of a slogan such as the "politics of therapy" have been forgotten, that self-styled radical humanists do not know from whence their battle cries derive, vitiates the hope that the dialectical mode is anywhere preserved in them. If they do not have a substantive political theory, nor a substantive psychological theory, it is not likely that their view of relating the two will be substantive, nor that they will generate significant implications for counselor training or undergraduate education, broadly considered. Actually, we might have cause for concern even before we

look at the specifics of their conception of the relationship between politics and therapy. Jacoby states earlier, "The shift in social attention towards psychology is no accident; it testifies to a shift in the social structure itself."[5] And so it is not only the uncritical attitude towards an easy fusion of politics and therapy (as well as theory and therapy) to which we must take exception, but also the earlier error: an uncritical acceptance of the increasing popularity of psychology and therapy.

In the course of searching out the possibilities of an alliance with those currently concerned with radicalizing or politicizing therapy and education, I have asserted here that it is difficult to know how the words "radical" and "political" are being used, both generally and in the specific contexts of therapy and education. Before proposing some specific answers to these questions, it is necessary to explore one more word frequently used by those who currently consider themselves to be involved in radical therapy and education: "alternative."

Another value held by "radical" therapists and educators which would have to be taken at face value in order to proceed with this project in a simple manner is the belief that what is "alternative" in education is new and radical (and therefore good). This research itself provides yet one more alternative model of higher education. Therefore, before developing and defending a specific counselor training program for undergraduates, it is important to look more closely at what it means to offer educational alternatives within the notions of classical liberal arts education, and within the prevailing

university attitudes toward counseling.

The essence of alternative is choice between limited, differing possibilities. Yet today there seems to be no limit to the proliferation of alternative therapy systems and training models, many of which assume an automatic connection between "alternative" and "radical" or "humanistic." I do not disparage the goals behind these alternatives, or the motivations of their proponents; the achievements in the fields of humanistic education and counseling are considerable. My concern is with the ultimate failure to achieve their ends. In losing sight of the fact that there is a limit to truthful, correct possibilities, we may not so much have liberated a vast resource of ideas as we have allowed ourselves to become overwhelmed with a variety of pseudo-answers which do little more than block the salient questions. Clearly, the "alternatives" we have devised cannot possibly all be different from one another, and most certainly cannot be presenting us with genuine choices.

History shows that educational practices are not in the vanguard of social change but rather lag behind, reflecting changes already at work in society.[6] Only those who ignore history can believe the reverse. To ignore history, obviously, is to risk being manipulated by it, and to risk changing nothing at all. It likewise follows that only those who are oblivious to history can claim an ipso facto connection between the terms "alternative" and "radical"; both words take on meaning only within specific historical contexts. With all the talk today about politicizing therapy, altering education, and humanizing the social services (now often referred to as "human"

services, as if the semantic change were a structural change), it is imperative not simply to offer another allegedly political "alternative" and compete for recognition on terms which may already have precluded the possibility of choice and innovation, but rather to question the very terms on which we have been offering and accepting "alternatives."

To summarize, then, the original goal of this research had been to develop an interdisciplinary counseling curriculum for undergraduates. At first glance, the task seemed easy. Yet what started as a relatively straightforward project proved almost endlessly complex as I began to critique the alternative therapy and educational systems available as models, and to define and historically situate current so-called radical therapy and pedagogy. Some of the difficulty derives, no doubt, from a multi-disciplinary approach. However, the complexity really begins as soon as we focus on the terms: "alternative," "political," "radical," "dialectical." Clearly, these terms are bandied about far too freely--so much so that it is difficult to ascertain what they mean at all, no less as applied to therapy and pedagogy. In fact, it is extremely difficult to establish what, if anything, one has in common with people all too eager to become one's radical bedfellows.

There is fairly extensive literature establishing the need, and a preliminary set of guidelines[7] for integrating psychological theory into political theory in order to formulate correct analyses of social problems and devise effective strategies for political change. However, the literature calling for an infusion of political awareness into the

shaping of psychological and pedagogical theory is less complete, less sophisticated, and generally speaking, less correct. Of special importance in this regard is the lack of attention paid to the tension inherent in the relationship of theory to therapy, and the simplistic sacrifice of therapeutic standards to political polemic or of political standards to the polemic of instant self-realization. Can these allegedly politicized therapy and training systems and their theoretical underpinnings be evaluated by any criteria? Are they in fact dialectical, strictly defined? Or even political? Or even therapy? Is there a theory of subjectivity adequate to address all these questions? What will be the consequences of allying oneself with the spokespersons of radical/humanistic therapy and working within their confines without determining the philosophical and theoretical strains that inform their work? These questions can only be answered by returning to the basic theoretical foundations from which a definition of "radical" as well as of "therapy" may be drawn. It is from within adequately supported and theoretically comprehensive definitions that a radical counselor training program must be built.

Where one attempts to build a counseling program for undergraduates on the foundations of what exists, the foundations begin to disappear, leaving so many questions unanswered that the very justifiability of this project as an "alternative" education strategy is called into question. Therefore, let us turn to the original impetus for beginning this program--the students[8]--and look more concretely at who they are, what they're doing, and what they want, in order that a program be designed which can have genuinely radical impact for them and for society.

The Students

We, as teachers, are confronting an undergraduate student body that arrives on the college campus knowing little more than that they want "to help" people, or perhaps "work with people," and that they feel unsuited for the more structured professional possibilities in this area, such as nursing or teaching. Traditionally, this has been experienced as an altruistic rather than politically-motivated goal, although that is changing. In recent years, word has filtered back from the Peace Corps, Vista, volunteer workers, victims of the depressed economy, that there is little cause for optimism about the chance of doing any good (or even of getting a job) with merely a traditional liberal arts education and no graduate degree. Some students decide immediately to try for graduate school in psychology or social work, endure an irrelevant undergraduate major (statistics rather than counseling), and don't find out until they arrive at graduate school that even there they won't learn much about therapy. Others begin to search for meaningful undergraduate programs, knowing that they don't want graduate school, or having heard that their chances of getting in are often as slim as one in a hundred. These students discover earlier than those who follow (and those of us who followed) the graduate route, that there is really no place within the university to receive clinical training.

They find that what exists is fragmentary and incoherent at best: a smattering of courses (nowhere developed into unified curricula) in departments of psychology, sociology, education, human development, home economics, and political science, all with vague and

vaguely competing theoretical orientations and philosophical bases. As a general rule the social sciences avoid all clinical approaches, and while schools of education may embrace them, it is invariably from a non-theoretical vantage point. Even trying to put together a composite major (at this university through BDIC, Project 10, or Women's Studies, for example) will not succeed: there simply are not enough related courses. The fact that no counseling program exists for such students comes as a startling revelation to them as well as to some of us, given the enormous student interest, the decreasing likelihood that they'll get into graduate school, the urgent demand for practitioners in our increasingly social-service oriented society.

The few of us who are attempting to respond to the demand for undergraduate courses in this area tend to be housed in departments of education and human development (rather than in the social sciences). So far we have adopted mainly human relations/organizational development, skills dissemination, or existential counseling approaches, and the humanistic education or human relations laboratory teaching methods that accompany these approaches.[9] We have believed that we were responding to students' and society's needs. We have believed ourselves to be in the vanguard of social action, exploring the possibility of converting social service to social change.

History cautions against assuming that we were correct. And not just history: a closer look at the issues reveals too many contradictions and questions brushed aside and ignored. It is still unclear why, when so many disciplines claim authority over a field, none has developed it; why no set of categories has been articulated to which

any such program would need address itself, nor criteria by which it might be evaluated; why no guidelines have been set forth delimiting the possible areas of internal connection between the various disciplines. There is no consensus over even the most basic of issues. Is psychology a physical or social science? Is counseling a legitimate sub-discipline of psychology? Do the scattered courses offered now constitute a counseling program, and if they do not, should a program exist at all? With these issues in dispute it is certainly not clear why any of us would feel confident to generate allegedly improved alternatives along with theoretical systems and pedagogical models to complement them. For now, I will leave aside the crucial question of the relations between theory and method, or even the order in which one presumes they come.

Let us hold these questions in abeyance for a moment more while we follow the path of a student trying to educate herself as a counselor. In the face of the confusion and frustration resulting from this dearth of courses and major programs, students will often decide to arrange internships at nearby social service agencies, or even leave school entirely for a year to do extended counseling practica at institutions in larger metropolitan areas. Most of these students will already have had whatever coursework is available at the university, possibly a class in personality, one in abnormal psychology, and one in theories of counseling. Perhaps these students will have had a course or two in humanistic education, values clarification, an introduction to humanistic counseling, microcounseling, or a sensitivity training group. Yet out in the world they feel incompetent, guilt-ridden and

overwhelmed. (By and large they intern at some of the more gruesome institutions--in this area, Northampton State Hospital, the Belchertown State School, for example--and are rarely placed at the nice, clean, well-staffed, well-funded agencies that graduate students at least might have a chance at.) There may be some who will try out a few humanistic counseling techniques with Spanish-speaking welfare mothers, chronic schizophrenics, child abusers, retarded, violent, or autistic children, and these students will come back to the university feeling enraged as well as guilty and worthless. Until now they have been discouraged from viewing these feelings and experiences critically--their anger has been deflected or diffused, their guilt assuaged, their feelings of incompetence reassured away. In large measure, this may be due to the enormous difficulty teachers and clinicians have in facing some of those same feelings. Guilt, for instance, is only too familiar:

> This motif [masochism, self-flagellation, and often near-schizophrenia] on the part of the 'bourgeois' student radical has always been constitutive of the life of bourgeois intellectuals in general and radical intellectuals in particular, as well as of the New Left. Historically it has been grounded in conscious or unconscious recognition that within the division of labor in capitalist society intellectuals are parasites on the body of the working class, and this recognition is not without its genuine and progressive aspects.[10]

Such feelings of guilt are assuaged in the classroom with humanistic reassurances, efforts to bolster students' flagging self-esteem. They might be told to stop putting themselves down, or that they have a "pattern" of feeling over-responsible, or that we're all human beings and we're all in pain. (Some students may, at this point,

discover and become involved in Re-evaluation Counseling or Transactional Analysis, both of which are heavily relied on in humanistic education and values clarification.) Another common teacher response is to offer more instrumentalistic reassurance, as in the counseling laboratory method, and treat the issue as one of quantity: more skills, more techniques, more counseling approaches, larger bodies of clientele --families, communities, networks. Alternatively, organizational development advocates will blame "the system": methods are offered for improving administrative incompetence, always with complaints against the bureaucracy, our common enemy-cum-red-herring. Some teacher/clinicians abjure therapy and personal liberation altogether: it offers too little, too late, for too few. Therapy and therapists are seen as elitist, and there is a call for what one friend has called "downward mobility"--adopting erstwhile blue-collar ego models, moving out into the factory to work with "the people." While this appears to students as most radical, it is again only a superficial reversal, not a genuine negation.

> It is a false and alienated overcoming of one's own alienation as a 'bourgeois' student, and a suppression of the most original fact about the New Left itself: that it is not the classical breakaway intellectual vanguard whose role is to serve the impoverished but a revolt against capitalist affluence itself, a critique of capitalist abundance as an abundance of alienation. And by denying the legitimacy of the critique of his own existence, the student radical not only recapitulates his alienation (his 'untrue' existence) at a new level, but simultaneously suppresses the peculiarly explosive total critique and demands that arise out of his own alienated life.[11]

Finally we must look at the justifiability of their anger over the inadequacies of their education, both in their trade and in providing

a framework in which to understand social problems. They have not been provided with a comprehensive and unified curriculum; one which would include a theoretical foundation, carefully supervised practicum training, and some form of personal exploration that would integrate with the first two, each playing a specific, rather than interchangeable part in the educational process. Nor are there clear-cut guidelines as regards what their jobs will be, what they will need to know in order to perform them--in short what a therapist is. Rather than being helped to understand in a more complex and sophisticated way the history, meaning, and consequences of a state-supported, institutional social service system, they have been encouraged to strive at being better agents of that system, or if they are unsuccessful at learning to "negotiate the system" better, they are advised to look for another career. Without reference to the fact that it is "social relations which nourish and poison human relations,"[12] it is implied that human relations training can make a difference in the social system. They are caught up in, (and not challenged by us in this regard) an age-old understanding and acceptance of things as they are:

> Yet despite this painful consciousness of the inseparability of rationalization and the potential for domination, Weber, and other less sophisticated social theorists have stressed that there is no alternative and that our collective survival depends upon the possibilities presented by the extension of all kinds of purposive rational action systems. This thesis is too simplistic and one-sided. If we accept it we are led into a stoic acceptance of the social necessity of separating political decision from ethics, science from values, and social theory from the systematic analysis of utopian possibilities. We are all asked to see 'how much we can stand,' and admit the 'rational necessity' of the extension of centralized management strategies to more and more areas of human life.[13]

The conclusion drawn from this approach is "that social problems can be 'managed'"[14] and that anger will best serve if placed aside while we learn new management strategies. This leaves undergraduates, who will essentially be paraprofessionals, at the mercy of the better-managers-of-the-future. In the meantime, we encourage students to learn to build community in the classroom in hopes that someday they will be allowed to practice what they have learned, when "the system" becomes more humane.[15]

In every regard, then, teachers have been deflecting attention away from the critical meaning of students' personal experience: their attention is drawn towards the richness of inner experience, or away from experience altogether and focused on outer behaviors. These students have been out in the world, seeing firsthand the contradictions inherent in performing social service work in an unfree society. The most basic of these are the contradiction between what they have been taught to do and how much there is to be done, and the seemingly unbridgeable gap between social service and social change. This is happening for them at a time when they can still return to the university and question what they have seen and experienced, can perhaps find a way to integrate their rage, despair, and helplessness, while developing their understanding of meaningful work with individuals (including their own personal work towards liberation), and politically effective forms of social action. In this regard, these students are unique--the proletariat of the social service field, as it were. Those who go on to graduate school experience the "real world" much later on, and not always as intensely: they have a thicker

armor of counseling techniques to protect themselves from feeling overwhelmed or incompetent; often they see the nicer side of institutions; furthermore, graduate students have gone far enough along to be invested in their profession in ways that these younger students, with lower career aspirations, are not.

The end result of all these approaches is the dissipation of the critical and liberatory possibilities inherent in the defiance (as well as the naive altruism) of these young student/workers.

> The youth rebellion is manufactured but it is also real. Here as elsewhere the hint and praxis of liberation mixes with its denial which would alternately sell or crush it. . . .
>
> Youth remains more than the object it is made to be; that fashion [popular psychology and pop-psych pedagogy] closes in indicates the subject is getting restless. . . .
>
> Youth is more than lacking in years; rather its fidelity to the instincts of life defines the young.[16]

As teachers, then, we have a responsibility to remain faithful to the possibilities for liberation within the experiences that students bring to us. We must find ways to explore those experiences that will not trivialize in the guise of celebrating them, but will rather elucidate the political within the personal. We must help them explore the universal and social causes for joblessness and bureaucracy, for feelings of guilt and incompetence, for rage and despair. This responsibility includes a commitment to face the truth of their incompetence (and our own, if need be) and to delineate the ways in which faulty and limited education has contributed to that incompetence. The time for arbitrary defiance, for easy reassurance and warmth, has passed.

> . . . a concentration upon teaching strategy, method, and technique, however well meant, is based, first, on

> implicitly demeaning assumptions about students; second on certain empiricist and mechanistic models of mind which lie within the heart of classical liberal thought; and finally, on an instrumentalistic and therefore reductionistic understanding of the meaning of human thought.
>
> The psycho-educational strategy which emerges from these inter-related assumptions is, in the long run, self-defeating for the radical teacher who sees his or her task as the articulation and defense of a critical theoretical perspective. Instead, pop-psych pedagogy encourages. . . a strained and phoney warmth which some, in moments of bland delusion, call 'community.' The vision of human liberation which emerges from the therapeutic classroom is not so much social or political as it isindividualistic and antisocial although it appears in the guise of the former.[17]

The impact of humanistic education has been more pervasive in counseling classes than in disciplines where content is at least separate from the methods used to impart content. In counseling courses, content and method converge; they both devolve from certain assumptions about human development which have implications for a theory of learning and also a theory of social order (beginning, of course, with the social order in the classroom). The assumptions inherent in humanistic teaching strategies, as in human relations laboratories, denigrate students because they presume students' inability to work hard, to think for themselves about content matter other than their lives, and to learn except by the "how-to" method.

The effect of these strategies has been most insidious in regard to the theory of social order they assume and which is inferred in the classrooms in which they are taught. Since a concern with authoritarian modes of consciousness and authority relationships is primary in a psychology which sees itself as political, one of the speciously appealing aspects of humanistic classrooms and counseling laboratories, is their nonhierarchical structure and non-authoritarian style.[18]

However, according to an analysis based on distinctions between coercive and manipulative power,[19] "If it is possible to avoid coercion within the traditional approach, manipulation is unavoidable within the pop-psych model."[20]

Students are manipulated into glorifying their feelings, when they might be provided with a framework in which to critically evaluate their experience, their actions, and the ways in which they are acted upon. Teachers have frequently adopted 'nice-guy' attitudes, thereby abrogating our authority; we buy into the pejorative understanding of "authority," and its true meaning--power derived from knowledge and mastery--is lost. We also fail to acknowledge and work with the power that we do, in fact, wield in the classroom, thereby continuing to run the risk that we will act from our own unconscious power agendas. Finally, we do our students a grave disservice if we encourage them to hold unrealistic expectations for the future. Their 'superiors' elsewhere will not relate to them in the loving therapist role. Neither is it safe to confuse love and acceptance with learning and work, and they will surely find that out the hard way when it comes time to work.

Undergraduates trying to cope with the educational possibilities at hand want to know <u>what</u> they have to learn in order to be eligible for <u>which</u> jobs. While it would be easy to buy them off with reassuring answers, we really have no grounds on which to responsibly assert that they can be politically effective counselors. We can't even offer encouragement that they'll find jobs, nor can we speak cogently to the fact that there aren't any. Surely we have no right to propose that their incompetence can be eased with a few more skills and some self-

knowledge; surely it is equally irresponsible (and certainly reductionistic) to imply that clinical work is useless altogether.

In order to come to grips with students' concrete questions and problems, we must know precisely what clinical expectations we have of paraprofessionals, and, therefore, to what end we should train them. To establish a hierarchy of clinicians, we must begin with a base line definition: what is therapy? From this definition it is possible to draw distinctions, as well, between problems which are, and are not, appropriate to therapeutic rather than social/political intervention. We must avoid such ambiguous philosophical stands as the ones now offered which assert that therapy either can do everything, or nothing; that anyone can be a therapist but no one ought to be. Instead, we must operate from within a comprehensive theory of subjectivity, consisting of theoretical postulates adequate to the complexity of the human mind and human behavior. Within such a theory, the therapeutic relationship and the therapeutic process can be materially, rather than metaphorically, situated and defined as one agency of healing. This theory would also generate theoretical conceptions of social order which could speak materially to the relationship and tensions between the individual and society, inner and outer, private and public, formed and unformed. Ultimately, it must address the contradictions between social service and social change, in ways that are not simplistic and reductionistic (such as asserting that society is mad and the individual is glorious, especially on acid). From this foundation, we may also establish significant links between psychology and social and pedagogical theory.

Part Two: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and Social Theory

Overview

The concerns of feminist theorists have been particularly helpful in elucidating the subtle and complex problems which mandate an interdisciplinary approach to counseling curriculum. The same problems make it difficult to arrive at an adequate notion of "interdisciplinary"--one that would not merely juxtapose areas of inquiry, i.e., be multidisciplinary or parallel disciplinary, nor one that would collapse together the disciplines rather than exploring the manner in which they interrelate.

On one hand, wide-scale interest in therapy and personal growth as means to the transformation of women's lives has encouraged a large number of undergraduate women to seriously consider careers in the helping professions. Yet, on the other hand, critical interpretations of the statistics showing an already disproportionate number of women as consumers or involuntary victims of social services[21] cautions against an overly optimistic assessment of the value of therapy for feminist strategies. Interdisciplinary curricula which span psychology, history, political science, literature and the arts are required to evaluate and develop the usefulness of counseling and psychotherapy for the feminist movement.[22]

Psychology and psychotherapy may thus be seen to represent a legitimate special interest of Women's Studies. Furthermore, Women's Studies presents the advantage of already being committed to inter-

disciplinary education, however ill-defined at present, and by an explicitly political rationale. While feminist analysis may have provoked recognition of the need for an intermingling of political and psychological disciplines, it has not provided the theoretical links between the realms of discourse. Good feminism does not necessarily equate either with good therapy or good teaching. If simple analogy is not employed, little remains to guide in the working out of a more intricate and substantive relationship among our areas of concern.

Within this problem what emerges as primary is the failure in the first place to adequately define feminism. This leaves the field open to confusion and contradiction when trying to conceptualize the goals, tasks and limitations of Women's Studies in general, and of a 'feminist psychology' in particular. To speak more abstractly, it is essential to establish the internal requirements of any given theory for maintaining its coherence and explanatory power. Failure to grasp these considerations may lead to arbitrarily synthesizing different theories; the essence of a theory has then been sacrificed in order to make it harmonize with a system of explanation fundamentally different from its own.

A closer look at the relationship between the women's movement and psychotherapy may shed some light on the roots of the feminist movement's failure to define itself: the inability to define feminism is in part due to the fact that one can't define it without reference to complex psychological constructions. While this might be asserted of any political movement, it is inescapable in the case of feminism. It has long since been observed that the oppression of women is

characterized, if not by their consent, than at least by their complicity and collusion. (This observation, coupled with citations of the benefits that accrue to women from their second class status, is used in conservative camps as proof that women in fact are not oppressed at all.) By virtue of this "gentle tyranny," women come to know, perhaps more acutely than other oppressed groups, that their movement's viability depends on locating a theory of subjectivity adequate to account for their complicity. The secondary advantages of women's collusion can come to be so firmly established that they cannot be renunciated in favor of the benefits that might be reaped by an adult woman if she were to give up her role as 'victim.'

The view of human nature sufficiently complex to grasp this contradiction would have to be a cornerstone of feminist analysis. If one can sidestep such a building block in other political theories, the unique psychosocial experience of woman as victim/participator makes it impossible to do so in developing both a philosophy and a program for the women's movement. Even those marxists (at least in this country), who take the view that a theory of subjectivity is the essential link to understanding and overcoming "false consciousness" do not, by and large, obtain this knowledge in a concrete, immediate way: they will not have experienced a breaking through of false consciousness equal to what almost every woman who comes to feminism goes through to get there.

This attempt at defining the terms of the research is an early reflection of the problems attendant upon this project. While Women's

Studies provides an excellent vehicle for a discussion of the issues, quickly drawing them into stark relief, it must be pointed out that the difficulties and contradictions inherent in establishing a feminist program in counseling are not new: they have beset every attempt to bring together the theories or action strategies of politics and psychology. Political theory attempts to answer general questions about society as a whole, whereas psychology would seem to mount theories that can answer questions only about individual persons: history vs. autobiography, as it were. All attempts at synthesizing the two approaches are doomed to failure because epistemologically they are altogether different. If one insists on bringing them together, the result will be a collapse of categories, oversimplification, reductionism. These problems have plagued even those theorists who are aware of them. The further complication that feminism is not a clearly defined political movement, such as marxism, proves to be both a hindrance and a help. The failure to arrive at a viable definition helps to confirm what it is that psychology must offer to the women's movement: a theory which can speak to both the universal and particular dilemmas of women; which has an internal logic that will in the first place draw distinctions between these two categories, and will show the manner of their mutual influence.

Thus I will aim toward conceptual clarification of the relationship between feminist theory, psychology, and pedagogical strategy (with emphasis on notions of pedagogical responsibility). This effort at clarification is set within the broader context of social theory and social action generally conceived--it is not limited to feminism

and/or education. It is a primary aim of this dissertation to outline the contours of a theory of human nature which speaks to all these issues.

At minimum, such a theory must[23] 1) address the nature of human thought. What is the relation between thought and action? How do we assess motives and intentions? Are there motives other than conscious ones? What factors in development can impoverish or enhance the capacities of thought and judgment? 2) offer some conception of mind/body relationship. What are the effects on mental development, in particular on ego development, of identity being forged within a physical framework? 3) provide a catalog of human needs. Are there true and false needs? Is this a question that we can or would want to legislate, i.e., should we legitimate some needs and not others? Can we make meaningful statements about what we owe to one another based on what we need from each other? 4) delineate the relationship between a person and her social world. Is there such a thing as the autonomous individual? Are there limits to personal freedom? 5) locate mental illness within psychologically or sociologically "normal" society, and by extension, establish guidelines for the ethical stance of students of the human mind and of mental healers in relation to their subjects/patients and to society at large.

One can address these questions from a variety of philosophical vantage points. (It is also, of course, possible to begin with a preferred political gameplan and create a theory of human nature which will justify it, or vice versa.) In the classical liberal view-

point (characterized by an empiricist theory of mind and presupposing a radical mind/body split), persons are seen as empty vessels through which experiences and perceptions are filtered by the mind. Given proper nourishment the person will flower and develop; the potential of the human mind, easily equated with soul, spirit, essence, is unlimited and benign. In opposition, there are a variety of mechanistic view points, for example vulgar marxism and behavioralism, which again view human beings as passive reflectors of external phenomena, but with a more pessimistic bent--persons are totally constituted by that which acts upon them, they will not flower, they will simply be as they are made. Neither of these approaches provides a persuasive explanation of the enormous destructiveness that pervades human relations or sometimes pervades an individual's internal existence. Neither mounts a theory of consciousness--including the relation of thought to action--which can sustain a genuine notion of "consciousness raising." The classical and behavioralist theories are each unidirectional: the environment is responsible for individual and social ills. Psychoanalysis depicts persons as active agents who transform as well as are transformed by their social world; as possessing a consciousness governed by unconscious motivation and conflict and therefore capable of transcending (in the Hegelian sense) its history. The liberal and mechanistic points of view are to be rejected precisely because they fail to answer the most pressing questions asked by social theorists; worse, their structure precludes the asking of those questions.

In constructing a feminist therapeutic or pedagogy we must always be asking what is required to free women from their internalized oppression. What, in the words of Abigail Rosenthal, would lead to breaking woman's long "silence"--a silence she defines as "not the absence of reactive noise, but rather the absence of a serious discourse, employing a critical method, which would work to determine the presuppositions and constituents of women's suppression, in order to lift from them that suppression."[24] In this context, feminist scholarship must encompass a range of disciplines whose interconnections are perceived at a profoundly political depth, broad enough to break silence. A theory of human nature and of psychic change adequate to account for the manner in which emancipatory action occurs in the classroom, in the therapy session, and in the streets, has thus far eluded feminist thinkers.

Psychoanalysis,[25] which avoids these oversimplifications and sees the mind as a complex locus of conflicting forces, sees mental processes and in the end personality as the result of conflict between psychological and objective reality, sustains a framework in which one can attempt to explain that which the liberal and mechanistic viewpoints erroneously take for granted: the human subject. It is inherent in the content and method of psychoanalysis to frame one's hypotheses, and to focus one's research through a movement from the particular to the universal; each individual's development is seen as shaped through the interaction of those categories.

Nowhere is that clearer than in Freud's metapsychology

which attempts to ground the psyche in the conditions of material existence; to give meaning and substance to the psychoanalytic premise that conflict--the disjunction between mental perceptions of internal need and external reality--is central to the development of not only human mental capacities but also human morality.

Psychoanalysis, the Freudian Feminists, and Critical Theory

Presenting psychoanalysis as a potentially radical theory of human nature, one amenable to revolutionary political theory, is hardly a new venture. In recent years a handful of women writers have turned to Freud for a theory of subjectivity which would support their feminist social analysis. Juliet Mitchell (Psychoanalysis and Feminism) and Ann Foreman (Femininity as Alienation: Women and the Family in Marxism and Psychoanalysis) share a Marxist background with the critical theorists whose work is discussed below, and their efforts are plagued by similar problems; the usefulness of Mitchell's work for defining the terms of my own is further complicated by her Lacanian bias. Dorothy Dinnerstein (The Mermaid and the Minotaur) and Nancy Chodorow (The Reproduction of Mothering) have used psychoanalytic theory as a basis for exploring the social and psychological consequences of unilateral female parenting. Dinnerstein's work, however, ultimately attempts to 'correct' Freudian theory by supplementing it with the existential perspective of Simone de Beauvoir and the utopian vision of Norman O. Brown, viewpoints which are essentially incompatible with Freud's. Chodorow, on the other hand, attempts to improve on Freud's notion of psychosexual development through the addition of object relations theory,

which she fails to grasp as being riddled by the same conceptual--and therefore political--flaws as other NeoFreudian approaches. All of these women theorists have, in effect, succumbed to the same weakening of the psychoanalytic approach that was so cogently critiqued in the first place by Freud and later by the critical theorists. The end result of their work is an evisceration of the theory of the unconscious mind.

The most fully developed appropriation of psychoanalysis for the purposes of social theory was undertaken by the critical theorists of the Frankfurt school, as well as other less easily categorizable marxists such as Wilhelm Reich and Otto Fenichel.[26] Though there are significant differences in their work, these writers share the heritage of dialectical analysis, as created by Hegel and modified by Marx for the purposes of his materialist political theory.[27] They have mounted an argument sufficiently comprehensive and articulate that it need not be re-argued here. I would like merely to point out some of the essential affinities between psychoanalysis and this school of social thought, as dialectical critique remains significant within my own framework despite the serious divergences outlined below.

What psychoanalytic and dialectical methodology hold in common is the process of demystification.[28] In contrast with positivist methodology which works only with surface, observable data, they describe human experience as embedded in disjunctions between varying levels of reality which are held in relation to each other through dynamic tension. The ultimate task of critical thought is to arrive

at the reality beneath appearances, to interpret what is visible in terms of its deepest causative factors; to articulate that which was silent, to unearth hidden connections between apparently disparate elements. Hegel and Freud share a further bond in the belief that the search for self-knowledge must be intimately tied to the search for objective reality--indeed it is its most important aspect. One can only locate truth in the objective world through the arduous search for the truth about oneself. Rosenthal ties this to feminism--by implication to feminist therapy and feminist pedagogy--when she states

> If Hegel is right where he argues that wisdom, philosophy's object, may be understood to lie in human self-knowledge, then it will follow that love of wisdom--or the philosophic eros--will provide the radical motive for the liberation of women that we have been seeking. Women are henceforth seen not as exceptional cases to whom revocable favors may occasionally be granted, but as occupying a sector of silence within a humanity whose freedom to know itself may be recognized wherever it extends its ability to break such silences. In his institutionalized repressions, man [sic] becomes incomprehensible to himself. . . [29]

Despite this affinity, however, dialectical methodology as applied to the uses of psychology and psychotherapy has resulted in problems and limitations which I am reluctant to inherit. It would be distracting to go into a detailed exposition of these problems at this point;[30] for now it must suffice to flag the broad categories of error which have dead-ended this line of inquiry. It might be argued that these are ultimately pitfalls of the modern theorists, and not difficulties inherent in an application of dialectical thought to psychological theory. If so, we might expect that the hypotheses ultimately put forth from a "purely" psychological perspective would in the end prove to be dialectical. However, rescuing the dialectic

from all of its theorists since Hegel in order to apply it freshly to questions of psychological theory would be a monumental task, one far beyond the scope of this project. What is important is to develop a psychology which, through its own internal logic, meets the criteria of the dialectical stance--whether that theory is cast in Hegel's or Marx's terminology or not. Indeed, it is a major contention here that psychoanalysis can stand on its own in fulfilling those epistemological requirements, without being recast in the terminology--or the jargon--of critical theory.

The dialectic as applied by critical theorists to psychoanalysis has resulted in historicizing psychological concepts which are by definition trans-historical, (for example, Marcuse's misconstruction of the reality principle). In other words, critical theorists have often particularized universal aspects of human experience in order to make them remediable. Not only does this remove the foundations of the theory thereby collapsing whole portions of it, but also dissolves the central human conflicts on which the dynamic theory of mind rests. If these conflicts are not universal, then the explanation that psychoanalysis offers for how the psyche as we know it has come into being is no longer to the point. This is a methodological as well as a substantive issue--it entails denying the relation of universal to particular explanations within analytic theory. This denial must take place in order to make Freud harmonize with a socialist view of society in which there is eventual freedom from material want. To maintain such a viewpoint it is necessary to reject the immutability of current

'reality.' In the process, the distinction between external reality and psychological reality is lost. Regardless of the specifics of any social order, each human being must learn to distinguish between an external, objective and an internal, fantasy world. That learning can take place only within the context of his or her primary caretakers, the most important features--in some respects the only relevant features--of the external world. In the struggle to master the distinction between inner and outer, between self and other, to give up the illusion that there is only self, the capacity arises for thought and for social relatedness.

If one grasps the psychoanalytic meaning of the reality principle, then a further set of limitations is imposed on the historical malleability of objective reality: there are facets of our external world which, though they may not be absolutely fixed, must be seen as universal in that we cannot imagine them not being so and humans still growing up human. For example, the nuclear family in its varying manifestations may be an historical rather than a universal response to certain human needs, but the infant, due to relative neonatal immaturity and a protracted maturational process, will always require extended parenting. It is not possible within the framework of "dialectically orthodox" psychoanalysis to undo the fundamental internal conflicts set before each child; there are broad categories of conflict between the child and the world that can perhaps be meliorated, but can not be dissolved. This has often been brushed aside by theorists who seek a somewhat more utopian vision of the future; who believe that a reduction of want, whether material or sexual, can soften the

essentially conflictual nature of human experience. Psychoanalysis asserts, depends upon, the consideration that these conflicts are not only inevitable, they are central building blocks of the psyche that we recognize as peculiarly human. To underestimate them is to once again underestimate the force of the psychical qualities which can undermine the human community.

The second major difficulty in critical theorists' appropriation of Freudian theory is that it includes a reductionistic view of the psychoanalytic treatment process, one which enables the method to be seen as distinct from, and therefore dispensible to the theory. This distinction is drawn partly in order to jettison therapy, which, because of its 'adaptational' and 'conformist' potential, is viewed as something of an embarrassment.

Yet psychoanalysis is defined simultaneously as a cure for neurosis, a research methodology into unconscious processes, and a set of hypotheses regarding mental functioning. Once the significance of the link between theory and therapy is apprehended, it becomes clear that if the theory is in any sense revolutionary, then its method must reflect some aspect of this radical nature. The link implied here has nothing to do with Third Force psychology's tendency to equate individual with general, social improvement, nor with the Neoanalytic tendency to deny the conformism that can lurk behind cultural or environmentalist interpretations. I am alluding, rather, to the psychoanalytic move toward uncovered communication: the breaking of silence described above by Rosenthal. The relation between theory and therapy is neither simple identity nor is it utter disjunction;

critical theory's reductionism--which must amount in the end to revisionism--is not preferable to that which it critiques.

Two interrelated problems result from this erroneous assessment of the theory/therapy matrix. First, it is assumed that therapy is completely apolitical, and second, that therefore, the varieties of therapeutic experience are, for the purposes of social theory and social action, more or less interchangeable. Yet because that which is political in psychoanalysis is embedded in its method, there is indeed a political "moment" in the analytic process, and it is one that does not inhere in other forms of treatment.

Russell Jacoby has stated that while psychological theory may have important implications for political activity, therapy is apolitical. The conclusion he draws, therefore, is that it is irrelevant what form of therapy one chooses. "Individual therapy must necessarily forget the whole so as to aid its victim; how exactly it does that is, in part, irrelevant."[31] Elsewhere[32] Jacoby draws an analogy between the political aspects of medical practice and those of psychotherapy. He states that a doctor would, of necessity, treat the victim of a car accident, and that the treatment would be apolitical. One would not suggest that the doctor ignore the victim's wound and instead urge him or her to go demonstrate against the American automotive, oil, highway construction, and alcoholic beverage industries. However, Jacoby's analogy is simplistic, for medical treatment and psychotherapy are hardly parallel processes. Since analysis works with changes in consciousness, as well as with the relationship of consciousness to action, its accomplishments go far deeper than merely

curing physical symptoms. Moreover, the relationship of therapist to patient is much more complex than that of medical doctor to patient. The doctor could give the patient some literature on the social factors involved in destruction on the roads, in addition to setting a broken limb if he or she chose to. Though a patient might, in the course of psychoanalysis, make some of those connections, the analyst could never explicitly offer them; the odds are less good that it will happen, but if it does it will have entailed a more profound structural change in the consciousness of the patient.

The role that self-knowledge plays in psychoanalysis is unique precisely because of its notions of unconscious mental processes--one expects to discover a different set of hidden facts about oneself, undertakes the search with a different set of risks, and attains that self knowledge only through a somewhat extensive restructuring of one's psyche. That is to say, one comes out of a 'successful' analysis valuing the deepest kind of self-knowledge. And though there is no way to legitimately influence any other values a patient may have, radical or otherwise, though there is no way to influence whether 'political' contingencies will be drawn into the scope of the quest for truth, to value self-knowledge in the way one does in analysis will always hold the possibility of revolutionary, critical thinking.

The radical content of psychoanalysis emerges through its hypotheses of the unconscious mind. The unconscious is accessible only through the techniques of psychoanalysis, particularly through the transference, which in turn depends for its emergence and resolution on the tools of free association and interpretation. It is the inter-

pretive method which both demystifies appearances and also unearths new information--making the process both treatment and research--with which to widen our theories of the human mind.

The method is elegant in its simplicity. The analyst remains largely anonymous and the situation offers as little stimulation as possible. Whatever thoughts, feelings, and behaviors arise therefore, particularly fantasies and actions in relation to the analyst, can be attributed to past experience and internal psychic material. Archaic infantile conflicts, sexual and relational, literally come to life in the transference relationship; the analysand relives his or her original neurotic conflict in the passionate but ambivalent relationship to the analyst. Impulses, feelings, fantasies are "transferred" to the analyst, who does not engage or "gratify" them, but rather insists that the analysand appropriate them as his or her own internal psychic history. It is the task of the analyst to interpret the unconscious material which emerges in the patient's free associations and behavior in the analytic setting. Theoretically, interpretation is possible only after the most arduous work, pursuing free associations and resistances (unconscious efforts to block the treatment, primarily efforts to be gratified within, rather than to scrutinize and resolve the transference relationship) until they yield their deep unconscious determinants.

The presumption is that as the patient becomes aware of this previously unconscious material it will cease to govern his or her behavior and internal experience. As neurotic conflicts are resolved, the

analysand will have an expanded sense of autonomy and increased energy to devote to 'productive' activities.

It is precisely because psychoanalysis places such a high premium on autonomy, because influence is so explicitly ruled out, that its political content holds a place in the education of counselors. That is, if it must remain solely up to the patient whether or not the treatment abuts on political realities, then it is all the more important that the therapist create her own political framework within the therapeutic process. This can be done if the therapist views the process as part of an ongoing research endeavor, one that will build our eventual understanding of the components of critical thinking. It goes without saying that this attitude on the part of the therapist will in turn have a bearing on the course of the therapy for the patient. The point here, however, is not to create a political experience for the patient but rather to remove from the patient the burden of making a political experience happen for the therapist. This is done by creating a viable political context for the professional, independent of the patient's insights and changes. In this task, other treatment processes will not substitute for psychoanalysis, which "stands more in awe of the unconscious,"[33] and thereby becomes research as well as treatment.

While these quarrels with critical theorists' assessment of psychotherapy may seem minor by comparison with the acuteness of their theoretical work on the value of psychology for political theory and their superb critique of revisionist schools of psychology, it must be

remembered that mine is a project intimately concerned with the treatment process--even though I do not purport to train undergraduates as counselors or therapists, (obviously not analysts), but rather to assess what it is that one must begin to study in order to work in the mental health professions. Ultimately, neither critical theorists nor recent Freudian feminists offer a model on which to base a collaboration between political theory and psychoanalysis, since humanistic therapy and alternative education fail in the first place to mount a serious social critique. Thus I am left with many questions, some initial guidelines, and yet not a clear theoretical framework by which to "operationalize" the terminology of the research. What language can be used to define feminism, Women's Studies, interdisciplinary, 'political psychology'? Though I believe that the language of psychoanalysis can suffice to elucidate these terms, I am faced with the contradiction that the women's movement by and large has made Freud its arch villain. Furthermore, the existence of feminist therapy would seem to argue that there is already a model on which to base a Women's Studies counseling program, and that it is possible to proceed directly with curriculum development. Before going on to explore the basis on which to build a collaboration between psychoanalysis and feminist scholarship, therefore, I will first attempt to assess whether feminist therapy has managed to avoid those problems in politics/psychology 'synthesis' raised in this chapter. Have feminist therapists paid too high a price in terms of the quality of their theory and the viability of their therapy, for explicitly blending their political and

psychological perspectives? Does the advance over Freudian theory and method that they purport to represent really constitute a radical political and psychological venture?

C H A P T E R I I

FEMINIST THERAPY: A CRITICAL REVIEW

Overview

Feminist therapy adds the explicit political edge that the humanistic therapies lack. Juxtaposing political and psychological terms in the naming of the venture makes it, by definition, a direct attempt at a synthesis of the two disciplines. This terminological device again derives, no doubt, from the New Left's 'politics of the unpolitical' and again the heritage is not specifically acknowledged. Such historical amnesia represents the loss of intellectual links to a more complex and dynamic political theory. Here, for instance, in their own assessment of feminist therapy's eclecticism, the blandness of the approach is self evident.

> The ways in which we interact are consistent with the philosophy of many radical and humanist therapists. Like radical therapists, we advocate an intensive examination by the therapist of her own value system so that she can facilitate change rather than adjustment to existing societal norms...As humanism espouses, both therapist and client are individuals struggling to become self-actualizing. As radical therapists have noted, both therapist and client labor under the same constricting political and social system which hinders the full development of the individual as a free agent. Feminist therapy goes a step further in its detailed analysis of the effect of sex-role stereotypes on women's growth. It also seeks to facilitate awareness of and expansion beyond those externally imposed limits.[1]

The theory behind feminist therapy is vague and confusing; very little is written,[2] what's in print is theoretically weak, and there is little agreement among the authors.

> However, despite this evidence that something referred to as feminist therapy exists (at least to the extent that there are women who label themselves as feminist therapists and their work as feminist therapy), discussion of what feminist therapy is and of what feminist therapists do in practice is absent from the literature, particularly from academic and professional journals.[3]

The most general statement that might be made is that the theory and practice are organized around principles of sisterhood. There is not, unfortunately, an agreed upon definition for the cluster of concepts designated by that term, nor do feminist therapists spell out details of applying sisterhood to psychology.

> Whether an individual was a feminist who learned to conduct therapy or a therapist who identified with feminism, her feminist beliefs had an impact on her therapeutic orientation, and vice versa. In short, a meshing took place whereby feminism and therapy no longer existed as discrete parts of the individual's life but became integrated into feminist therapy.[4]

Perhaps the first problem here is the variety of meanings attributed to feminism, and the fact that feminist therapists rarely make explicit which school of thought they are drawing on. They seem not to realize that one's political and philosophical orientation will have drastic consequences for the questions which a theory will be challenged to answer, the methodology which will be deemed appropriate for locating answers, and the establishing of goals for psychotherapy.

Broadly considered, one can distinguish three separate branches of feminist literature.[5] The first, drawn from classical liberal

theory, sees society as basically sound and attempts to extend humanistic values to include women. Socialist feminism, on the other hand, locates the problematic status of women within the 'larger' context of capitalist relations of production. In the tradition of Engels,[6] first priority is given to an assault on the relations of production under the assumption that changes in women's predicament will automatically follow.[7] Lastly, there is radical feminism, which views all of society's problems as resulting from institutionalized patriarchy. In other words, all social ills can ultimately be reduced to a question of the relations between the sexes and the lower status of women. Radical feminism does not have a clear cut link to an established political theory and draws frequently on interpretive anthropological evidence. There are minor divergences among the theorists in any given classification, as well as frequent overlaps; nonetheless these three represent the basic philosophical orientations prevalent among American feminists today.

Feminism and Psychotherapy: Theoretical Considerations

If we define feminism as the need to combat sex-role stereotyping, then we have already made certain assumptions about society and its relation to the individual. In order to take a feminist stand bounded largely by the struggle against sex-role discrimination and in favor of equal rights for women, we must presume that society is basically all right but that women deserve a larger piece of the pie. Therapy becomes the process by which they achieve the "self-image" and the skills, for instance assertiveness training and sex-

uality workshops, requisite to taking their fair share. If feminism is defined as the need to alter the relations of production, then consciousness raising as to one's role in society becomes predominant in the therapeutic process -- again with an eye to developing action-oriented skills. A radical feminist approach would follow a similar line except that consciousness raising would be focused more directly on the oppressed position of women. Despite the fact that these latter two seem to mount a more serious social critique, they are finally more utopian than materialist; both espouse the possibility of a harmonious, conflict-free social order.

If our definition of feminism includes a drastic transformation of the quality of society and the individual's experience within society -- not just a partial redistribution of assets, nor a rearranging of jobs that may cover over the same old relationships between men and women, nor a simple reversal of the positions so that women are empowered and men disenfranchised--then the therapeutic stance becomes far more problematic.

The original impetus behind introducing a psychological perspective to social theory was that the marxist predictions for the development of revolutionary consciousness had failed to materialize.[8] Marx had not adequately come to grips with the subjective components of revolution -- he believed that purely external events would bring about the dissolution of "false consciousness." To now adopt a psychological vantage point in which external events are once again placed at the center and deemed sufficient to restructure political

consciousness, is to return to the political naivete that preceded the failed European revolutions of the early part of this century. Why believe that consciousness raising will do when it's called therapy what it couldn't do under its own aegis?

Psychologically this represents a return to the preFreudian vision of the mind wherein all mental phenomena are equated with that which is conscious. It presumes at best a descriptive rather than dynamic theory of the unconscious. If consciousness raising techniques are adequate to bring an idea into consciousness, then it cannot have been repressed. It may have been out of the line of attention, but not altogether out of mind. Furthermore, there is no theoretical explication of the ways in which consciousness raising might lead to deeper, characterological change. The entire problem is perceived as one of information, which Freud repeatedly demonstrates in his distinction between a descriptive and a dynamic theory of mind, begs the question entirely: internal, psychic conflict actively prevents repressed ideas from attaining consciousness.[9]

If one accepts the necessity of exploring the unconscious as a correlate of the structural changes that might lead to revolutionary consciousness, or to a level of characterological integration sufficient to undertake large scale, urgent social tasks and to build productive working communities, a therapeutic posture becomes far more elusive. The extent of the regression that may occur in the course of bringing one's psychological past into consciousness mandates a far more careful definition of the authority relationship that

develops in therapy. The capacities for responsible judgment, committed political activity, membership in a social community, become linked to the development of an autonomy which cannot simply be given over by a therapist but must be discovered and, in a sense, earned through the resolution of the relationship with the therapist. It is a mean circle of logic, but a paradox which can be wished away only at great cost. The only route to autonomy is to allow the patient to discover herself; once you create strict boundaries, there is no way to guarantee that the patient will come to espouse your political view of the world, or for that matter, any view which might be described as 'political.'

Feminist critics discovered that therapy is a value-laden process by exposing the anti-woman bias frequently embedded in the work of traditional therapists. We are in a position, therefore, to work openly with those values and challenge them. But may we not still be promulgating a complex network of our own unexamined values that represents the fabric of society? Feminists have a tendency to extricate themselves from society at large--it is manmade, not their responsibility nor reflective of who women are. However that is a naive conception, all the more so for clinicians. Where our values coincide with society's, or with our patients', we don't notice ourselves as value-influenced and don't see ourselves as influencing the therapy. It is only when we come to see ourselves as at odds with societal values that we begin to question the role of the therapist's cultural presumptions in her work. When a feminist patient seeks out a

feminist therapist, there is no such disjunction to provoke scrutiny. If a therapist's value system is not identical with society's and/or with her non-feminist patient's, how does she make her point about that and still allow full room for the development of autonomy? This is a particularly sensitive judgment, since the therapist always, to a certain degree, stands back from the patient's own assessment of what's wrong. (Regardless of egalitarian rhetoric in the more radical therapies, all therapists at minimum presume that the patient doesn't know, at least at first, what's wrong.)

> All therapists need and use some theoretical model to help them diagnose and treat their patients, and no theoretical model accepts the patient's definition of her problems as ultimately correct. Over and over again patients ask therapists to help them never to be angry, to be satisfied in self-restricting jobs, and to end their headaches and depression without disturbing their repressed anger.[10]

In actuality, it is impossible to build a counseling program based on feminist therapy -- there are as many versions of feminist therapy as there are feminist therapists. I have heard informal definitions that range from 1) a woman therapist who likes women to 2) one whose awareness of feminist issues indirectly affects her therapeutic stance in sessions; 3) one who builds therapeutic interventions around feminist political analysis; 4) one who adheres to and promulgates a strict political line in session. The mistake is that while we might mistakenly support this eclecticism in the name of sisterhood and believe that they are all feminism, we cannot possibly assert that they are all therapy. What remains to be established, here as elsewhere, are the internal links between one's political

views and one's assessment of the nature of psychology and psychotherapy.

What all of these versions of feminist therapy share in common, aside from an ambiguous commitment to sisterhood, is that they have defined themselves in opposition to that which exists, that is, in terms of what they are not. The danger, and in this case not an idle danger, is that the move to a simple opposite leaves untouched the less exposed sources of oppression.

Feminist therapy begins with a critique of current practices in professional psychology and a looser critique of the current state of psychology as a science. What's usually attacked is psychoanalysis though distinctions are not generally made between Freudian and nonFreudian schools. It is assumed that all bad therapy, whether done by psychiatrists, psychologists, or counselors is Freudian. A usual list of charges[11] covers statistics on the disproportionate number of women in treatment, and the reverse disproportion of women professionals; the equation of healthy male with healthy adult characteristics and healthy female with pathological or at least undesirable characteristics (i.e., sex-role bias in mental health assessment and diagnosis); the replication of societal disenfranchisement in the one-down position of the therapeutic situation; failure to address the 'real life' crises that typically face women, emergency or developmental, for example divorce, rape, postpartum depression, menopause, or "empty nest" syndrome.

Feminist therapy sets about correcting and/or never committing

these sins; that is its starting point and its foundation.

The critical vantage point adopted is that "The question for social workers in direct practice with women is how to apply the conviction that cultural conditioning accounts for the dilemmas of many women clients."[12] Radical therapy takes up a position essentially identical with this:

> First, we believe that people are good, and that left alone in a nurturing environment they will develop in a positive and life-promoting way. They can live in harmony and well-being with themselves, each other, and the earth. . .
>
> Second, we believe that people feel bad because they are oppressed by forces outside themselves. . .[13]

Because "It was begun, in short, out of attempts to make it <u>different from</u> something rather than attempts to create something in and of itself,"[14] what you have is a theoretical void in psychology filled in by a side array of therapeutic techniques developed from a cultural critique which has nothing <u>substantive</u> to say about the human mind. To look again at the radical therapy program

> ...the source of people's unhappiness is relationships of unequal power and resultant oppressive social conditions.[15]
>
> When people feel bad, they come to believe that there is something basically wrong with themselves and with life. We call this feeling <u>alienation.</u>[16]

There is no recognition of the fact that such terms as "power" and "alienation" are not psychological categories. This becomes clearer as radical therapy tries to explicate its own terms. The psyche and its processes of change and development are reduced to formulas which have no internal, private meaning. "Opppression plus lies plus

isolation equals alienation." "Action plus awareness plus contact equals liberation." Contact is defined as protection and support.[17]

Furthermore, the existence of feminist therapy dangerously obscures the roots of the problem it is trying to redress. It creates the illusion that feminist scholarship has made a contribution to the fields of psychology and psychotherapy and that they in turn have influenced the development of feminism. We are forced to admit that because only a political critique is offered -- and a weak one at that -- in the end neither a political nor a psychological critique has been mounted; the contributions that might be made are lost.

> None of these characteristics [of feminist therapy] taken individually distinguishes feminist therapy from all other schools, but the constellation apparently is either unique enough, or perceived as unique enough, to have created a demand.[18]

What is most unfortunate is the belief on the part of feminist therapists that the demand is being filled. Because feminist therapy cannot distinguish between different kinds of psychological theories, it cannot engage in the endeavor of theory-building which must be seen as one of the crucial tasks of a feminist psychology.

How does it happen and what are the consequences of developing a school of therapy without reference to a psychology, a theory of human mind? Firstly, it must be remembered that what psychology has come to represent is a science not so much of mind but of behaviors. While radical therapy eschews any form of psychological explanation as basically extraneous if not counterrevolutionary, liberal feminist therapists maintain loose connections to what may be informally termed

'feminist psychology,' and is generally referred to as "psychology of women." The hard science split between clinical and research psychology is thereby perpetuated, despite the fact that revolution in psychology can only be made by bringing clinical evidence back into research.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to present a full review or critique of the "psychology of women" studies.[19] In part this is because, as stated, they have only peripherally been incorporated into the literature and practice of feminist therapy. Beyond that, the term and the endeavors it represents are riddled with conceptual contradictions;

> a straightforward review must stay within (and thus to some extent affirm) the conceptual confines of an existing research tradition. (Methodological inadequacies of individual studies or inconsistencies among the results of several investigations may be noted, of course, but the underlying conceptual framework, as reflected in the formulation of problems and operationalization of terms, remains fundamentally unchallenged.)[20]

Thus the problems in a hard science approach[21] -- problems which are not neutral but rather have a political meaning of their own -- go unchallenged by the "psychology of women" research. This involves a theoretical regression to preFreudian epistemological formulations and to social theory as not yet influenced by Marx and the critical theorists.

More significantly, the "psychology of women" enterprise is compromised in its very essence. Earlier in the same essay Parlee states

> Considered as a subfield of psychology, however, the notion of a "psychology of women" seems to me to be a conceptual monstrosity. . . because it implies the need for a special set of laws and theories to account for the behavior and experience of females. (That it is the presumable "special" nature of the laws and theories and not the subject matter which prompts the "psychology of women" designation is suggested by the absence of a subfield on the "psychology of rats").[22]

Feminist therapy is only vaguely connected to a psychological theory, and at that, one which is plagued by conceptual flaws, an approach long since abandoned by radical social theorists for its conservative political thrust.

Taken in sum this lack of theory, combined with a philosophy of human nature based on environmental rather than intrapsychic factors, is most insidious for the therapeutic it engenders.

> If a theoretical orientation to therapy is defined in the traditional sense as encompassing a series of propositions and techniques, a model for problem assessment, and a training methodology, it may be concluded. . . that feminist therapy as such does not exist. . . . This suggests that feminist therapy must be understood more as part of a social movement than as a type of psychotherapy and less as a theoretical orientation in the traditional sense than as a belief system and a number of ways in which the system is put into practice.[23]

The void created by the omission of a psychological theory is filled by philosophy and social theory; philosophy becomes more important than therapy. ". . . the techniques ultimately chosen by the feminist therapist are less important to her than the shift in values that was engendered by her feminist beliefs."[24] It becomes clear that the stance in which one believes that feminist therapy can be anything is really one in which one believes that feminist therapy can be therapy at all; in which, ideally, the phenomenon of therapy disappears and there are

only politically correct belief systems for troubled persons.

The eclecticism that results from this liberal view is, if anything, the reverse of liberatory. It is not merely a dilution of the critical force of psychology and individual change, it represents its complete annihilation, not least within the academy. In the survey of feminist therapists cited above

> 33 different orientations were listed. Twenty-four of these (74 percent) can be characterized as newly developing and non-traditional in nature... a significant number of respondents did not make use of formal academic training in traditional fields such as psychology and social work to learn therapy.[25]

The Feminist Counseling Collective cited above as placing themselves in the traditions of both humanistic and radical therapy announces, "We use tools from Gestalt, transactional analysis, bioenergetics, parent effectiveness training, sensory awareness, moving family sculpture, role playing, and movement therapy."[26]

The mistaken equation between variety or quantity and quality extends beyond modes of therapy to the concept of therapy itself, which ceases to have reasonable limits and boundaries.

> Feminist therapy can be seen as the making of connections on many levels--connections between feminism and therapy, between one woman and all women, between one's personal problems and one's social awareness, between one's beliefs and what one does, and between what one does in therapy and how one lives one's life. Thus unlike most forms of therapy, feminist therapy is not merely a means to be used from time to time to alleviate stress but a way of life for the therapist and, potentially, for the client as well. Therapy becomes normalized and is connected to rather than divided from everyday life.[27] [italics mine]

This expansiveness has a most pernicious effect on the critique mounted by feminist therapy of the conditions of women's lives. One finds feminist therapists celebrating for the newly liberated woman that which lies at the core of women's oppression. Here the Feminist Counseling Collective offers its groundplan for what they call the new "feminist ego ideal":

> The new woman is centered in herself and can fulfill her own individual needs, yet remains aware of the needs of those she loves. She accepts the full range of emotions from love to anger and can express them directly, if appropriate, or sift them through her rational thinking process to choose which ones to express. She can act without embarrassment at her own initiative and aggression. . . . Hopefully the new woman will realize that her own interdependence with others extends to community and political involvement as a necessary part of being a full, responsible adult. . . .
>
> The new woman is proud of her body and the natural beauty of being alive and sensual. . . . She knows that her sexuality is within herself, so she doesn't have to wait for someone to arouse her sexually. She can satisfy her needs alone or with others in many different ways. She can be both aggressive and active, passive and receiving, without fear of behaving in an unfeminine way. . . . Since sexuality is centered in the self, the new woman prizes highly her freedom to choose the way she expresses her sexuality and her love.
>
> She may choose to marry, to be celibate, to remain single, to try a group marriage, to love monogamously with another woman or man, to live communally, to become a mother: whatever she chooses will be an expression of her own nature and her needs.
>
> In other words, the feminist ego ideal is a strong and vulnerable woman.[28]

Perpetuating the old myth of "supermom," woman is challenged to be all things to all people, challenged to find fulfillments which the structure of society has already made impossible. The final judgment of a concept as complex and elaborate as the ego ideal is that it will

be "strong and vulnerable."

It is only movement along a continuum, not in any way a conceptual leap, to arrive at the voraciously consumeristic therapeutic which can emerge when feminist therapy loses all sight of a critical analysis. The following is excerpted from the only book length treatment of feminist therapy:

> No one should be deprived of the freedom to be fully oneself with a lover. Like flying or fucking or having a baby, this is one of life's great experiences. If she cannot have this freedom with her present lover, she may want to consider a new lover.[29]
>
> Here's to fucking forever![30]
>
> One of my definitions of a "healthy" woman is a woman who is able to support herself in work that is fun for her.[31]
>
> A feminist therapist is one who supports women who want to be assertive in going after what they want in the same way men do [higher salary, dates, eg.,] . . . . Is it not far more "natural" to be joyfully free in helping oneself to the good things in life?[32]

Techniques of Feminist Therapy

The goals of feminist therapy remain remarkably similar to those of traditional therapies, if one looks at them in the abstract. (Psychoanalysis alone among the traditional therapies has succeeded in translating its goals into specific clinical terms: "Where id was there ego shall be." To the extent that feminist therapy cannot give psychological referents for its therapeutic ends, clearly it cannot share anything in common with psychoanalysis.) An average catalog of the goals of feminist therapy might read as follows:

> To construct a new definition of self--a clear and individualized standard of personal value. . . . To increase awareness of wants, alternatives, and power. . . . To consciously choose

> what response to make to the situations that exist. . . . To actively influence the course of one's life by taking action in one's own behalf. . . . To communicate honestly and clearly from a position of self-respect and self-centeredness. . . . To get to work immediately on developing areas of influence in the woman's current life situation.[33]

It remains for us to critically assess which therapeutic can best achieve these ends. To do so one must first translate them into clinical realities.

The environmentalist point of view leads to a simplistic schema of personality and development, hence to a simplistic formula for psychical change, (in particular its opinion of the role of the therapist in the treatment.). As the literature moves back and forth between humanistic and radical language[34] in its descriptions and polemic, the same set of liberal assumptions emerges, ones characterized by a focus on human interests rather than needs. This position entails a psychological theory in which mind is divorced from body, and conscious factors predominate over unconscious phenomena. Registration of intrapsychic life increasingly gives way to assessment of environmental influences, and of a particularistic rather than universal sort.

The preference for cultural interpretations, coupled with what has been loosely termed the feminist value system, mandates doing away in one sweep, with unconscious motivation, with the dynamic theory of repression, and, most important for technique, the use of the transference relationship as a therapeutic tool. This takes place in a somewhat blind, superficial fashion. In most cases, feminist therapists do not merely eschew the use of transference, they maintain (perhaps as a bit of magical thinking) that because it's bad it simply

doesn't exist. Where the concept of transference is integrated into feminist therapy it is misunderstood and therefore misused.

Other psychoanalytic techniques are likewise condemned and abandoned by virtue of their association with the negative authority connotations of the transference relationship. Here, for example, a therapist states, "I'm also noninterpretative. No way would I say. . . I know what this means and you don't."[35] In this case it is not altogether clear what she construes to be the essence of the interpretive method, simply that she sees it as an authoritarian modality. Another therapist explains,

> Sometimes women will say they're afraid of men. I used to interpret that as a totally individual thing, that the woman's own personal history alone had contributed to making her afraid--her father was punitive, and so on.[36]

The kind of "interpretative" remark they have given up making bears little if any resemblance to an interpretation in the true Freudian sense. (The criticism is noteworthy in that such remarks have increasingly passed for interpretation in psychoanalytic circles--see Chapters IV and V below.) Interpretation requires movement between conscious and unconscious levels of meaning; it requires that something heretofore unconscious be brought into conscious consideration. An interpretation can only be offered at the end of a long trail of associations generated by the analysand, who alone has the information from which it is constituted. Only the patient can verify the correctness of the interpretation--not through her conscious response but through the associations she has to it. An appeasing "yes" in response to something suggested by the analyst is never sufficient conformation for hypothesis

put forth in the course of treatment. The comments referred to above as interpretation were the therapist's speculations about some possible connections that might be drawn between her patient's past history and present problems--no more weighty than one person's partially informed opinion about the vagaries of another's life. To pose such an opinion as a form of professional knowledge or wisdom is certainly at least illusion if not deception. Still, to reject the interpretive method based on how you misunderstand the way in which in the first place it is being incorrectly used is hardly sound or advantageous.

Some of the techniques of psychoanalysis re-emerge in diluted form. In lieu of free association leading deeper into the unconscious there are a variety of ways of expanding consciousness. No explanation is offered of the way in which we may now presume certain facts to be outside of consciousness, and this piece of illogic goes unnoticed. Thus free association may reappear, newly christened "self-originating feedback," in this form:

> Keeping a journal of the significant events of the day is another technique that helps to heighten a woman's awareness of the thoughts, actions, feelings that are important reflections of who she is. Depending on the nature of her perceptual gaps, the counselor may ask her to record such categories of events as the occurrence and thoughts that accompany depression, irritation, self-recrimination, or anxiety. . .[37]

Or, for another example, the great emphasis on emoting in experiential therapies may be seen as one large elaboration of the part that abreaction plays in the resolution of psychical conflicts. (In Social Amnesia, Jacoby has treated in depth the problem of renaming and presumably reinventing psychological concepts, with particular emphasis

on its retrogressive political effects on psychology.) Through their link to the feminist value system, these bastardized Freudian techniques are subsumed under the umbrella of the truly nonanalytic battery of therapeutic interventions, where they lose all capacity to open out onto the unconscious mind.

The techniques of feminist therapy are drawn from Third Force psychology and are also modelled on diversified forms of political activity. The overarching theme seems to be the equalization of the patient-therapist relationship. Four more or less discrete activities on the part of the therapist can be isolated as contributing to this equalization: consciousness raising, support, modelling, and self-disclosure. The techniques flow into and from one another in a mutually supportive manner (i.e., modelling is supportive and raises consciousness), always referring back to the feminist value system rather than to theoretical conceptions. They are intertwined in ways that make it difficult to set forth individual techniques in logical order, therefore the discussion which follows must be somewhat repetitive and loosely structured.

Support. "Feminist therapists see themselves as being supportive to women and giving them permission to act in ways denied them. . . such as being assertive, making non stereotypical life decisions."[38] A number of problems emerge here which can be followed throughout this section on techniques. Firstly, this ostensibly liberating tactic can be shown to be, in fact, inherently demeaning to the patient in that it presumes a certain level of dysfunctionality. Secondly, there is no way to

gauge what this support will mean to the patient at the unconscious level. In fact, there is no guarantee that at her entry into therapy she has the capacity to take in such support--weak ego boundaries, a fear of engulfing or of being overwhelmed, excessive guilt, a host of psychical difficulties might prevent the patient from taking in support or might provoke her to make decisions that she is not ready to live with. There is an illusion that the patient is finally being cared for when she may be more alone than ever.

Consciousness Raising/Awareness Training. These techniques represent opposite sides of the same coin.[39] While awareness training focuses on internal experience in an individualistic, asocial manner,[40] consciousness raising directs attention to external events to the exclusion of intrapsychic factors. Though they may seem to move in opposite directions politically and psychologically, the end results are similar: a failure to unearth the concrete connections between the individual and her social world.

To return to a point made earlier, this approach to enhancing conscious functions is built on the flimsiest conception of an unconscious mind--a conception which can barely be described as psychological in nature. How and why ideas become unconscious, what this tells us about the nature of the human subject, are questions which seem never to be asked. This constitutes the supreme trivialization of Freud's most dramatic discovery, the extent and nature of self-deception.

As with support, the technique masks an essentially disrespectful and potentially manipulative direction. It is understandable

that a woman needs time, help, and a special set of circumstances to discover her unconscious motivations. But women are made to look foolish and cowardly if they need help in order to explore that which they could apprehend at any time if they chose to make a certain shift in attention. And it is manipulative to steer a patient's attention in specific directions and then treat the intervention--"making their clients more aware by asking them questions phrased to expose entrenched stereotypical assumptions that the clients have unquestioningly accepted"--[41] as a neutral one because it has to do with discovering 'neutral,' external facts.

Modelling. "Once our clients are aware of these conflicting ideals (ideal woman vs. ideal adult), we as feminist therapists attempt to make growth possible by offering a unified feminist ideal for women to model themselves upon."[42] I will leave aside considerations of what kind of standards go into the creation of this new ideal--it will suffice to say that this quote refers back to the "ideal" woman described by the Feminist Counseling Collective on p. 53. The important point, in the context of therapy, is that this technique undermines feminist concern over the undue influence that therapists may exercise over their patients. It is as if they openly state that since patients have to come out of therapy just like their therapists we might as well openly indulge in personality manipulation. But no--because the values of sisterhood can be presumed to be 'correct' in some moral sense, feminist therapists are exempt from such charges.

Once again, this technique leads towards increased dependence

rather than the reverse, and brings with dependence the possibility of its regressive nature being ignored. At best the patient remains stuck at the same level of ego development, while superficial changes may be construed as deeper structural change; at worst she may be traumatized by a relationship which weakens her defenses without having built up her ego strength by first undoing the repressions held together by those defenses.

Self-disclosure. The ubiquitous and perhaps most important innovation of the feminist therapy movement. It seems shared only by radical therapists--while the humanistic therapies, even the NeoFreudians, advocate being more 'real,' more of a person in therapy sessions, they do not by and large advocate telling stories about one's own life. Outside of feminist therapy it is agreed that the patient is paying for the opportunity to use the time for herself and does not need to pay to hear about someone else's problems.

This is another example of an allegedly liberatory, respectful therapeutic intervention being more denigrating than enhancing--it suggests that a person is in such serious straits that she can't find the ordinary interactions of life in her outside world and must be given them by the therapist. It is clear how this would foster rather than discourage undue dependence. I will quote at length on the operationalization of this technique, since it is so important and also represents the essence of the feminist style of therapy. Here are excerpts from the only article that tries to theorize about self-disclosure; it offers an inventory of three levels of "sharing":

> . . . the first is commonly used by humanist therapists and consists of sharing real feelings in the present encounter with the client. . . By getting in touch with the feelings aroused, you can identify and empathize with the woman's inner experience, helping her to feel less lonely and isolated.[41]

The criticisms here are legion--the social critique can be found elsewhere and so I will concentrate on clinical matters, with the understanding that the two are intertwined. On the simplest level, it is an unfortunate therapist who is incapable of identifying and empathizing without verbalizing her own feelings, and we must immediately be suspicious of the therapist's needs for gratification if this kind of self-disclosure is used at any time other than when crucial for the advancement of the therapy. Even if the therapist's motives were 'pure,' there would still be the possibility that the patient might experience the therapist as exploitive--wanting attention, using her time, etc.,--and yet be too dependent to verbalize those fears.

> . . . On the second level of sharing the therapist communicates her past and present conflicts. . . sharing this may again help the client feel less inadequate. . . .
>
> The third, most difficult and most important level of sharing for a feminist therapist is the openness and risk that leads to full and deep intimacy between her and her client: two adults who care about each other. . . not <u>telling</u> how one feels, as on the first level, but <u>being</u> how one feels. The therapist consciously chooses to expose herself completely.[42]

The criticisms, of course, become redundant. There are the implications of a patient having to pay for experiences that are part of real life; the possibility that she will grow dependent on this intimacy and not seek out other contacts; the possibility that she will construe the therapist's overtures as a sign that the Dr. knows no one else could like her. And to come back to the distinction between the

patient's unconscious and conscious experience during treatment, it is impossible to assess what this intimacy truly feels like to the patient. The gratification inherent in such intimacy occurs at varying levels of regression and may have a wholly other effect than that which is visible. If the patient should be precipitated into a deeper level of regression she may be too frightened (of her own impulses or the therapist's) to speak about that openly, or she may simply be too dependent on the gratification she has found in the relationship to want to give it up. Such regressions can and regularly do occur without the participation of the therapist, simply on the basis of the patient's fantasies. However, in the analytic situation there are built-in controls. For one thing, the analyst is alert to such possibilities and continually examining the patient's associations for signs of this kind of involvement--signs which eventually become grist for the therapeutic mill. For another, since the analyst will not actually have participated in building the inappropriate involvement, the chances are somewhat improved that the patient herself will eventually be able to bring up the matter without having to fear the analyst's disapproval or withdrawal. The 'impersonal' quality of the analytic setting creates altogether another order of trust and security than that which is built upon a purportedly non-hierarchical relationship--an equality which is only thinly disguised reparenting. One group of feminists describes their new version of transference, oblivious to the necessary authority relation in the parenting process:

> We agree with our colleagues that real intrapsychic growth requires dependency on the therapist, so the therapist must

> accept a parenting role. However, we find that this necessary dependency occurs just as well when the therapist is open, real, nonhierarchical. Therapists don't need to create or reinforce a hierarchical relationship to parent effectively.[43]

Feminist therapy does not perceive the intricacy of the developmental process wherein the ego only gradually acquires the capacity to mediate between internal demands and external reality. Hence, while attentive to maintaining forms that are egalitarian on the surface, feminist therapists do not give weight to the intrapsychic effects of taking on a parenting role; they do not understand that such a role must, regardless of its external appearance, be hierarchical. Conversely, psychoanalysis allows the transference to develop while forbidding the analyst the role of parent; regression on the part of the analysand can then be examined rather than acted out--in the language of psychoanalysis, can be remembered rather than repeated.[44]

The simplification of development into two stages--child vs. grown up--rather than an ongoing, arduous process, results in a flattening out of therapy. One returns to a childhood phase of anger, identification, dependence, gives the patient what she never had, and she automatically matures through that phase into adulthood; she experiences her anger, identifies with a new role model, learns to take in support and nourishment. The psychoanalytic view, wherein developmental fixation is attributed primarily to fear of internal impulses in relation to the environment, firstly, offers a more cogent explanation for the prevalence of such developmental failures. It is not that there are millions of bad mothers but that the child's needs,

as prepresented in the psyche, are insatiable; the path to maturity, given that fact, is fraught with danger. Secondly, when fixation is located within a multitude of conflicting forces, the prospect of inducing regression by replicating the circumstances under which the fixation was established is far more awesome. One cannot expect that nourishment offered to the patient will have a necessarily remedial effect on psychic scars; one cannot expect an instant transition to integrated, adult relations from childhood need to traumatic that it has split the ego.

This problem brings us to one final, extended difficulty which lies concealed within the set of techniques which makes up the feminist therapy style. For the present it can only be noted, for it is a subject which has impact on and must be looked at within the women's movement as a total phenomenon. The failure to elaborate a developmental process, and therefore to comprehend fixation and regression (within the therapeutic, or <u>any</u> setting), robs therapy of the opportunity to contribute to women developing more highly evolved relationships, and more fully integrated commitment to their social responsibilities.

A patient can transform any mode of therapy--certainly this includes analysis--into a <u>Weltanschauung</u>. However, when the therapy already partakes of a political world view, and one which precludes examining the patient/therapist relationship if it challenges that view--then the patient's primitive identification with her therapist and her primitive identification with the idea of feminism become merged. Rather than challenging some of the immature needs that may be met by affiliation with a political group, feminist therapy supports

the kind of group psychology phenomenon described by Freud[47] and most eloquently by Alexander Mitscherlich.[46] Impressive evidence has been offered by Mitscherlich and by Christopher Lasch[47] to the effect that primitive group identifications are increasingly replacing more mature object relations as the social formations of advanced capitalism encroach upon family life. It is one of therapy's major potential contributions that it can offer a structured relationship with one individual with whom conflict resolution and growth is possible, the opportunity to abandon identifications of a lower developmental order in order to embrace a more integrated, responsibly adult commitment to an idea and a community. As "sisterhood" becomes a form of transference--and countertransference--which cannot be explored and worked through, therapists relegate feminism to the same fate as other failed political movements.

Psychoanalysis and Feminist Therapy

Within psychoanalysis, as within no other theory, are concepts which give a material base to the efforts to juxtapose political and psychological projects. While other theories might support more grandiose aspirations, psychoanalysis offers the opportunity to recognize the truth of our condition and still hope to improve it. NeoFreudian and existentalist theories offer far more hope, but they do not recognize the unfreedom of the society in which personal transformation must take place--and in the end, that is no hope at all. Because Freud's assessment of the possibilities for therapy was based on the concrete formulations of his metapsychology, he was not overly optimistic.

He is often quoted as having said, "you will be convinced that much will be gained if we succeed in transforming your hysterical misery into everyday unhappiness."[48] He understood that, until everyday life was better, no amount of therapy would bring people genuine happiness. This afforded him a very sophisticated political vision--even in terms of the women's movement, which, with few exceptions, has made him its arch villain. In a letter to James Jackson Putnam, he wrote:

> I believe that your complaint that we are not able to compensate our neurotic patients for giving up their illness is quite justified. But it seems to me that this is not the fault of therapy but rather of social institutions. What would you have us do when a woman complains about her thwarted life, when, with youth gone, she notices that she has been deprived of the joy of loving for merely conventional reasons? She is quite right and we stand helpless before her, for we cannot make her young again. But the recognition of our therapeutic limitations reinforces our determination to change other social factors so that men and women shall no longer be forced into hopeless situations.
>
> Out of our therapeutic impotence must come the prophylaxis of the neuroses. The more energetically one attacks the sexual problem in such cases the more one is able to palliate. Where the conditions are not so hopeless sublimation creates new goals as soon as the repressions are lifted.[49]

The limitations of therapy in the psychoanalytic view are inextricably bound to the material base of the theory. At the core of this materialism is the analytic paradigm which supports a mind/body unity, in contradiction to the more reductionistic philosophical schools. Idealism sees human beings as self-forming, able to create their lives from "free will" and from within their intellectual capacities. The current humanistic movement shares this heritage, though "a suspect Cartesian tradition in reverse: I feel, therefore I am."[50] Behaviorism

and mechanistic social science see us as empty vessels, constituted by what has been poured into us, whether stimulus-response conditioning or bourgeois ideology. In contrast, the Freudian view grasps the human experience in its totality, accounting for desires, consciousness, and the relation of these to actions and cultural formations. Marcuse states, "Identifying the energy of the life instincts as libido meant defining their gratification in contradiction to spiritual transcendentalism: Freud's notion of happiness and freedom is eminently critical in so far as it is materialistic--protesting against the spritualization of want."[51]

The theoretical vantage point which acknowledges conflict as the basis of social relations and recognizes the social influence on individual development, affords teachers and clinicians more opportunity to work honestly and progressively with students and patients, and to survive with integrity. Until now, awareness of the contradictions between appearance and reality, theory and therapy, social service and social change, has either paralyzed professionals or been denied by them. Psychoanalysis offers an alternative. We can hardly afford to live in our ivory towers and presume that orthodox Freudian analysis would be an appropriate tool for undergraduates, or to be used in treating lower class patients in community mental health centers. However, psychoanalytic theory provides insights to these crippling contradictions, and the metapsychology of human change has important implications for applied psychology programs, for pedagogical methodology, and for working with blocks to class consciousness. The relationship

between psychoanalysis and praxis is not merely speculative. The theory specifically addresses the relationship of thought to action, and the ways in which that relationship may be developed.

As women come to see our mistreatment as not just unfair but profoundly degrading and violent--as we break the middle class myth that sexism is about unequal employment opportunities, personal inhibition and nothing more--will these theories account in some meaningful way for what has been done to us, and for our own participation in a process of violence? As women begin to scrutinize themselves, can humanism or marxism provide a foundation for the breaking of silence, the development of critical discourse; can they provide sustenance adequate to the urgent tasks of social change?

A notion of the individual as an empty vessel into which the conditions of life are poured--whether that means bourgeois ideology or learned behaviors--cannot adequately account for the complexity of even 'normal' experience; it cannot explain even the simplest dream. Certainly such a viewpoint cannot lend meaning to the mental life of those who are not making it under the strain of what our society presently imposes as normality, whether we mean by that depressed housewives or hospitalized schizophrenics. The flip side of this ideological position, wherein we are depicted as self-creating, utterly harmonious and loving creatures who would grow up all right if only our self-esteem were not so wounded as children is not <u>powerful</u> enough to account for the extremes of individual and social distress which we have all witnessed--not the experiences of the passive victim or the active oppressor. Does that version of innate, loving, harmonious

sociality make sense of Hitler? Vietnam? Wife beating? Does a child molestor suffer from alienation? Would he have grown up a nice person if mother had liked his finger paintings better? Can he have been so seriously psychologically derailed because his father worked in a factory--or owned a factory, for that matter? Does it make clear, finally, why women have taken so much abuse, largely unquestioningly, for so long?

We are searching still for a theory of subjectivity which can explain not only the violence of men but also the rather extraordinary self-deception which allows oppressed people to collude. While lying to others in the interests of self-preservation is perfectly understandable, what can motivate us to lie to ourselves when these lies allow us to continue acting against our own interests? This self-deception can be explained only if we posit that there are things <u>about ourselves</u>, not just things about what others do to us, that we must not know. As we move to explore our inner worlds more deeply we will uncover not just feelings, thoughts, memories which we have pressed out of awareness, but also impulses, urges to impermissible activity and impossible satisfaction--impulses which no mother can satisfy or make tolerable and which threaten the ties that bind society.

It is not that masochism is a learned coping pattern imposed on women from without and irrelevant to their true natures, but rather that masochism is the only psychical structure offered to women (unlike to men who are given other choices) so that they may contain their unmanageable sexuality and aggression. Masochism is hardly an irrelevant

or unnatural phenomenon--it is a psychological achievement necessary to both men and women as the foundation for the sacrifices which devolve on us to maintain our families and communities: it is what allows us to tolerate pain in a meaningful and enriching way. It is only the hyperattenuated form it has taken on in the lives of women which is not in any way 'natural.'

The significance of this emerges in one's assessment of the depth of conflict between the individual and her social world, and therefore the depth of influence one can attribute to societal demands on the psyche. The humanistic theories posit tasks for the infantile ego which are too simple to merit the awful consequences that result from the failure to master these tasks; too simple to have merited an ego in the first place. One must expect to find, as layers are peeled away in the therapeutic process, not only assertiveness, independence and loving cooperation, but also destructiveness, immature, amorphous sexuality, narcissistic psychic structures which must be mediated by the ego over a long developmental process that witnesses the creation of what Freud termed secondary process thinking and the moral capacities that make human social bonding possible. If we are not prepared to face this reality in ourselves, if we will give no voice to impulse life in our daily existence, then it will continue, unconsciously, to hold sway and govern our behavior.

For a theory which can sensitively move back and forth between the individual and the social, which will not collapse the person into a merely social, external being, nor glorify her out of all social determinants altogether, we must return to the notions of the human mind

posited by Freud in the early days of psychoanalysis.

Psychoanalysis begins with the instinct theory. It posits that conflict is the essential psychic and social condition of humanity; that our instincts and desires are inevitably in competition with external reality. This has radical implications for social theory.

> Underlying the societal organization of the human existence are basic libidinal wants and needs; highly plastic and pliable, they are shaped and utilized to 'cement' the given society. Thus, . . . the libidinal impulses and their satisfaction (and deflection) are co-ordinated with the interests of domination and thereby become a stabilizing force which binds the majority to the ruling minority. Anxiety, love, confidence, even the will to freedom and solidarity with the group to which one belongs--all come to serve the economically structured relationships of subordination.[33]

If we do not accept conflict resulting from material want as the basis of human and social development, there can be no dialectical understanding of the individual or society. Without appreciating the ego's role in mediating conflict, it will be impossible to reconstruct ourselves as actively responsible for our own emancipation, and for building emancipated social relations.

> If sexuality does not play the constitutional role which Freud attributed to it, then there is no fundamental conflict between the pleasure principle and the reality principle. . . . It was precisely because he saw in sexuality the representative of the integral pleasure principle that Freud was able to discover the common roots of the 'general' as well as neurotic unhappiness in a depth far below all individual experience, and to recognize a primary 'constitutional' repression underlying all consciously experienced and administered represssion. . . . For Freud, an enormous gulf separated real freedom and happiness from pseudo freedom and happiness, that are practiced and preached in a repressive civilization. The revisionists see no such difficulty. Since they have spiritualized freedom and happiness, they can say that 'the problem of production has been virtually solved.'[53]

All revisions of analytic theory have been centered around a rejection of the instinct theory as being too mechanistic. By and large, these changes in the theory were necessitated by problems in therapy. No doubt there were genuine problems and they have been ameliorated by the revisionist therapeutic innovations. However, that does not suffice to explain the revisions, nor does it adequately convey the consequences to the original theory. Marcuse writes, "Therapeutic findings may have motivated the theoretical reductions in the role of sexuality; but such a reduction was in any case indispensable for the revisionist philosophy."[54] While I have argued that historians have not been sufficiently sensitive to the complexity of the therapeutic process, still the essence of critical theory's objection to NeoFreudian and existential/humanist revisionism remains cogent: "This is what is crucial, that the contradiction between theory and therapy is lost, not that changes are made in the name of therapy. . . . Rather the relationship is dialectical."[55] The result of obliterating the tension between theory and therapy has been the destruction of the theory's most radical aspects and the trivialization of therapy. As the instinct theory is undermined, repression and the unconscious cease to be dynamic concepts, reflective of intrapsychic and social conflict; psychology ceases to be dialectical and no longer supports a radical interpretation of social problems and the nature of social change.

> As the repression of instinctual gratification recedes into the background and loses its decisive importance for the realization of man, the depth of societal repression is reduced. Consequently, the revisionist emphasis on the influence of 'social conditions' in the development of the

> neurotic is sociologically and psychologically far more inconsequential than Freud's neglect of these conditions. The revisionist mutilation of the instinct theory leads to the traditional devaluation of the sphere of material needs in favor of spiritual needs. Society's part in the regimentation of man is thus played down. . . . Neurosis, too, appears as an essentially moral problem, and the individual is held responsible for the failure of his self-realization.[56]

Because the unconscious, repression, and the libido theory are at the heart of the Freudian theory, and at the center of controversy within psychological disciplines I have chosen to review these concepts in depth. This controversy has been long and bitter and has resulted in a wealth of literature, much of which is plagued by ambiguity, confusion, and polemic. Once again, it is difficult to clear away the debris and see where the truth lies, or know whose interpretation to trust. The theory cannot be held primarily responsible for how it has been read, though it will be important to look for weaknesses that might support conformist misreadings. The fact that psychoanalysis has been used to justify certain conservative social analyses makes it all the more important to discriminate between its central and its interpretive elements. Reich indicated early on the manner in which conservatives might apply psychoanalysis:

> Adaptation to reality is interpreted simply as adaptation to society, which, applied in pedagogy or in the therapy of the neuroses, is unquestionably a conservative view.[57]

Yet the theory itself will demonstrate that though he participated in some such errors, "Freud's own insights into the historical character of the modifications of the impulses vitiate his equation of the reality principle with the norms of patricentic-acquisitive culture."[58]

Regardless of whether or not we choose ultimately to reject the

content of the drives as they are spelled out in analytic literature, it is crucial that we retain an understanding of the role of instinctual conflict in individual and social development. Many radical theorists have thrown out psychoanalysis altogether, seeing it as the bastion of conservative mental health care. Much of the damage done by American analysts centers around their clinging to oppressive derivative notions. Concepts such as "penis envy" have been used in therapy and literature to persuade women to conform to an oppressive reality. However, it must be reiterated that the conclusions some have drawn from Freud's sexual psychology (or from his 'pessimistic' cultural anthropology), do not touch the heart of the theory, repression and the unconscious mind.

> Even if Freud in the end justifies civilization, he has in the interim said enough about its antagonistic and repressive essence to put it in question. The reverse is true of the revisionists: whatever criticisms of society they advance are absolved by the concepts and formulations that point towards health and harmony.[59]

While the discussion of repression and the unconscious which follows is not polemical, it is surely not scientific in the empirical sense. That is to say, the research was not undertaken, nor the literature read, in a neutral fashion: to engage in a historical reading of psychological theory at this time is a profoundly political act.

C H A P T E R I I I

GENERAL PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY: REPRESSION AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

Overview

Students of psychoanalysis know it to be a theory of extraordinary complexity. As stated above, it represents a set of principles regarding mental functioning, a research methodology into the workings of the mind, and a mode of treatment for pathological phenomena. In order to fully appreciate the psychoanalytic enterprise, one must apprehend the ways in which those three aspects are inextricably linked. Psychoanalysis evolved through their interaction and it is not possible to discard any one facet, nor alter the theoretical principles by which they interrelate and mutually influence one another, without serious damage to the theory's integrity.

There is the further complexity--for any theory--of the many components that must be included in a comprehensive description and explanation of the psyche: development, personality, clinical theory, cognition, perception, memory, etc. Contemporary efforts often view these as disparate elements which need not meet the requirements of unification. Each one of these is taken on its own terms and presented as "psychology." This is particularly true in academic psychology, which tends to focus experimentally on the various cognitive aspects. There are also attempts at more comprehensive psychologies, generally

developed from varying clinical perspectives, which, again, tend to take one of these elements as a starting point and build an entire theory around it. Object relations theory, for example, attempts to provide an exhaustive explanation of psychological development through an examination of early social relationships. In general, those psychologies that were developed from the exigencies of clinical practice (NeoFreudian and existentialist), turn their attention almost exclusively to development, personality and clinical theory.

Psychoanalysis sets as a goal a unity of explanation which will be inclusive of all these mental qualities and functions. At its heart is the dynamic theory of mind, central postulates on the nature of the psyche--the origins, meaning, and function of consciousness. These precepts generate and include, but are not identical with, a theory of development and personality formation. This nonidentity is evident by the mere fact that psychoanalysis did not have a fully developed concept of personality until Freud introduced his tripartite mental organization, the id, ego, and superego. The theory of mind is built on principles which entail a certain view of development and personality but which do not require a commitment to precise developmental sequences. Those are to be evaluated only on the basis of what they can explain about how people come to be who they are, as adult men and women in private and public social relationships; they are to be hypothesized and verified only through clinical data which has been subjected to psychoanalytic interpretation. The relations between the theory of mind and, respectively, personality and development, are neither rigidly determined nor arbitrary. What is important is

to elaborate and revise the notions of personality, and the developmental sequences adduced to explain adult personality in a manner compatible with the basic framework of psychoanalysis. One must view the particular developmental story that Freud set forth in the context of that framework--what questions he was attempting to answer and at what level of abstraction he was offering explanations for the extraordinary phenomenon of consciousness. That is, one must elaborate and/or revise the picture of personality and development along lines compatible with the central ordering principles of psychoanalysis, lines equal in explanatory power with that which Freud has offered.

Yet general psychological theory is the aspect of psychoanalysis that is least studied and least well understood. NonFreudians seem completely ignorant of it; Freudian nonanalysts who have appropriated analytic theory for the purposes of social theory have often tampered with the theory for failure to appreciate its dimensions.[2] And in professional analytic circles, that level of theoretical speculation has come into high disfavor.[3]

To further complicate matters, there is the complexity and confusion which arises from the gradual evolution of psychoanalysis over such a long period of time, with no final integration of the varying pieces. In that regard, it is not always possible to know which Freud is being discussed or cited--and this is true of people who are ostensibly Freudians as well as critics who know only fragments of his work and might be expected to quote it out of context.

The effort at integrating the earlier work with the later formulations is to some extent the responsibility of the individual reader.

Many analysts interpreted the direction of Freud's late work as moving away from general psychological theory toward an exclusive focus on clinical theory, a shift which in fact the work does not support. Nonetheless, the last major revisions--the postulation of the death instinct, the structural theory of mind (id, ego, superego), and the final hypothesis of the nature and role of anxiety--have all been taken as a shift in emphasis from unconscious to conscious phenomena. Hence we have seen a growing preoccupation with ego functions--"personality" and "character"--at the expense of their underlying instinctual determinants. This move has drawn support from the fact that, at least superficially, personality and character, whether normal or abnormal, can be elucidated in terms of developmental and clinical considerations, without reference to general psychological theory. (For the nonanalytically oriented, in fact, they are discernible qualities which can simply be argued to be one way or another without reference to psychology at all: women are either passive or they are not, and one way or the other, personality qua personality can be taken to be the result of cultural influences, social learning processes, etc.).

These issues are of central importance in a discussion of the political implications of psychology and psychotherapy, which indeed must concern themselves with the form that the adult personality assumes. What factors lead to the development of autonomous rather than conformist or authoritarian traits? By what route do people arrive at what they consider to be their moral codes and how do they attain the capacity to live by those codes? What governs their ability

to accurately assess the environment in which they live and their influence and impact on that environment? Underlying any discussion of "false consciousness" is the fact and meaning of our being conscious creatures at all. It is the theory of mind that fundamentally locates the individual in society and provides the context in which a concept of personality takes on meaning. The particular story of the human infant's psychological origins and the manner in which those processes are mediated developmentally over time into the adult personality lay a complex and material foundation for our understanding of the private and social facts of human experience. The fragmentary psychic structure of the infant struggles with its instinctual inheritance and problematic environment; the struggle gives rise to consciousness and the capacity to integrate needs and aims through judgment and reasoned action.

In the case of psychology and feminism these issues underlie the controversy over Freud's theories on women. For in fact, what is argued over repeatedly is whether or not his views on female personality--and therefore the developmental sequence he proposed as leading to mature "psychological femaleness"--is scientifically accurate and philosophically acceptable. (The two questions are often treated as indistinguishable.) This debate takes place almost totally without reference to the theory of mind and its requirements for developmental theory. Freudians and nonFreudians alike argue over whether or not women do grow up as he said they do, whether they should grow up that way and whether his reasons for suggesting that particular develop-

mental path for them are "plausible." Consequently the story of female development is rescripted with a portrayal of the mature woman that is more politically palatable despite the fact that the new versions cannot account for any of the qualities (which are in fact developmental achievements) we commonly associate with maturity: sexual orientation, gender identity, moral development, the evolution of the structured and structuring ego.

If, indeed, these have been thrown into question, along with the larger issue of what relation they bear to other aspects of ego functioning, then we are urgently in need of a research methodology through which to develop and test new hypotheses. Yet research method is precisely what has been abandoned in rejecting Freud's general psychology; for it is only through the application of those highly abstract postulates that clinical inquiry comes to constitute research and can be used to build theory.

In order to evaluate and revise Freud's portrayal of female psychology (or male for that matter), we must trace the way in which developmental theory was elaborated, and in turn generated a theory of personality. The implicit connections between the basic formative components of the psyche and the complexity of adulthood must be made explicit, and the relation clarified between gender identity on the one hand, and personality or character on the other. In other words, we are attempting to assess whether or not the manner of generalizing from components of psychic development to the mainstream of one's personality is defensible, and to ascertain just how much of that

generalizing did and should take place along sex-linked lines.

Are the psychoanalytic notions of personality development compatible with the theory's basic framework? To answer this question, I will use the twin pillars of analytic theory, repression and the unconscious, as ordering concepts for a discussion of the Freudian theory of mind. While the topic suggested here, repression and the unconscious, is almost infinite within the scope of Freudian theory, the nature of the question lends itself well to focusing on two tasks of significance for the student of Freud. First, through examining these two concepts we can elucidate psychoanalysis as a dynamic theory of mind which accounts for and gives meaning to those aspects of human experience and behavior which hitherto had been inexplicable. The existence of the unconscious is the only theoretical postulate sufficient to explain neurotic symptoms, dreams, jokes, and parapraxes; one can't account for the existence of these phenomena if one continues to hold to the belief that psyche is exhaustively described by what is conscious. Furthermore, one can only describe, and not explain these phenomena unless one attributes a motive--internal conflict--as well as a quality to the unconscious. It is conflict which is at the heart of the dynamic conception, though the terms of that conflict may be seen to shift dramatically through the revisions of the theory over time. In the course of documenting psychoanalysis as a dynamic theory through the use of repression and the unconscious, it will be necessary to demonstrate their centrality to the theory and to establish that a coherent and defensible theory can be built from such concepts.

The second task is to follow the development of psychoanalytic theory as Freud revised and developed it along the lines of what he might have considered to be "dialectical orthodoxy."[4] For in whatever ways Freud or his followers may have refined the derivative conceptions of psychoanalytic theory (the etiology of the neuroses, the description and classification of the various drives, the elaboration of psychosexual development, the addition of a concept of personality, etc.), the dynamic conception of mind rests, and always will, on the disjunction between innate somatic drives and the possibilities of reality; on the management of this conflict by the agencies, conscious and unconscious, of the mind.

It is impossible, really, to separate Freud's theory from the history and method of its formulation. The factors addressed here lend themselves to an organization which devolves from this (chronological) method of investigation: Freud said of psychoanalysis that

> It has not been a matter of indifference for the course of its development or for the reception it met with that it began its work on what is, of all the contents of the mind, most foreign to the ego--on symptoms. Symptoms are derived from the repressed. . . . The path led from symptoms to the unconscious to the life of the instincts, to sexuality. . . . [5]

I propose to add to this investigative trail only the study of dreams, which along with symptoms, are the principal phenomena from which the unconscious and repression are inferred.

If we continue on Freud's path, we find that in the course of his investigations he eventually grew less concerned with the explicit

distinction between what is conscious and what is not. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to present those later developments in any but outline form: it is not genuinely possible to enter into a full exploration or even exposition of the theories of libidinal development, or of the structural theory of mind, without first tackling the Oedipus complex, which will only be discussed fully in the context of psychosexual development (Chapter IV). Yet it is important for the purpose of this discussion to illustrate some of the fundamental elaborations of the concepts of repression and the unconscious in order to demonstrate that later developments in no way implied a rejection of their centrality to the theory.

This, then, provides the two principles for the organization of the following discussion and its manner of exposition: to show how the concepts interrelate (in part along the lines of Freud's investigative method) and build a dynamic theory of mind; to use a somewhat schematic history-of-ideas approach in following the development of Freud's conceptualization of consciousness and what is unconscious in order to begin to establish principles of "dialectical orthodoxy" for the development of psychoanalysis.

Hysteria: Hypnosis to Free Association

A recapitulation of Freud's work before the emergence of psychoanalysis proper will help to locate the concepts of the unconscious mind and repression as two of its central theoretical postulates.

We may begin by looking at the influence of Charcot on Freud's work. The most significant elements here are, first, the diagnosis of hysteria which states that conversion symptoms can be connected back to ideas, and second, that hysteria can be cured through the use of words in the form of hypnotic suggestion. This "ideogenic" conception of symptom etiology was enough to challenge, in Freud's mind, the universally held belief that what is mental could be equated with what is conscious. The ideas which govern symptoms are clearly inaccessible to consciousness. Though the unconscious is a rudimentary concept at this stage, one of the central ordering principles of the theory of mind has already emerged, that of psychic determinism From the time that it became apparent that symptoms were not bizarre, meaningless phenomena, Freud was to maintain that all psychic events, no matter how seemingly inexplicable or irrational, have meaning which is determined by unconscious antecedents. Psychic determinism is not in any way related to the strict biological determinism which is often misread into psychoanalysis. Freud is not attempting a reduction of meaning to mechanism, in fact his effort is not one of simplification at all, rather the reverse. It is a juxtaposition of meanings which he strives for, an enrichment of conscious meaning by reference to unconscious roots.

Upon returning from France, Freud, together with Breuer, began to use hypnosis in their treatment of nervous disorders. The method they employed, however, was that of catharsis rather than hypnotic suggestion. The rough theory of hysteria that they put forth at this

time was that a memory of a traumatic event remained inaccessible to consciousness and that the memory governed the symptom. The cathartic method involved directing the hypnotized patient to talk his or her through memories of the traumatic event; at the end of the session, if the memory had been fully recaptured, the symptom would disappear.

As Freud encountered difficulties with hypnosis, he began to introduce free association, which was to signal the end of his belief, held concurrently with the use of the cathartic method, that "hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences."[6] With the use of free association, Freud came up against two obstacles to treatment: resistance, the refusal or inability to associate, and transference, a special form of resistance in which the patient created the neurosis anew through an irrational emotional attachment to the analyst; an attachment which became far more important than being cured. "The use of hypnosis is bound to hide this resistance; the history of psychoanalysis proper, therefore, begins with the new technique which dispenses with hypnosis."[7] This shift is critical--it is that which definitively effects the movement from a descriptive to a dynamic theory of mind, for it was no longer possible to postulate the cause of conversion hysteria as a merely accidental trauma, nor to explain its occurrence as having set in during a hypnotic trance, as Breuer does. It could no longer be deemed sufficient to simply <u>describe</u> mental events by whether they were conscious or unconscious, it was necessary now to offer a reason for certain ideas being <u>kept</u> unconscious. Resistance demonstrates that ideas are blocked from consciousness due to internal

conflicts--the patient has reasons, themselves unconscious, for limiting his or her self-knowledge.

This extraordinary fact of self-deception is perhaps the most trivialized of all Freudian ideas; the failure to grasp its significance represents the failure of all revisions of analytic theory. It is the principle which informs the theory through all its later developments, and supplies a standard of judgment by which to measure those revisions. For the theory must provide a motivation for keeping things secret from oneself, a mechanism by which such an astonishing event can take place, and a relationship between the process of self-deception, the content of the hidden material, and pathological phenomena. It will be by the exigencies of these three questions that Freud will feel continually spurred to improve his hypotheses and within the context of these three that he will contain his theory.

This clinical innovation (free association) and the resultant changes its use made in the theory are a superb example of the interrelationship between Freud's clinical and theoretical sources, essential for any understanding of the epistemological status of psychoanalysis. The descriptive conception of the unconscious mind does not account for the motive or the mechanism of self-deception; while it correlates to a certain extent with pathological phenomena, it does not explain them. The emergence of resistance in the treatment process necessitated the concept of repression, a view of the mind dynamically divided against itself. "If anyone should seek to regard the theory of repression and of resistance as assumptions instead of as results

following from psychoanalysis, I should oppose him most emphatically."[8]

The concept of repression, deduced from the results of clinical method, derives its validity from what it has the power to explain, what it can make sense of. Psychic determinism underlies what here constitutes the rudiments of the interpretive method: that the surface, to be intelligible and exhaustively explained, must be viewed in terms of its hidden determinants. Again, the interpretive method intends not to reduce one to the other but to enhance one by the other. (This remains true despite the fact that in recent times pseudo-interpretation has been used to mask some lazy and pernicious clinical work, for example the pervasiveness of the "nothing but" phenomenon--"That's nothing but hostility.")

The Emergence of Sexuality

There is one further discovery that comes with the introduction of free association, and that is the importance of sexuality in the etiology of the neuroses. At this point (around the time of the writing of the Studies on Hysteria), the notion of conversion hysteria being caused by the memory of a traumatic event was still retained; yet more and more the event turned out to be sexual in nature and to have occurred in early childhood. Thus the etiology stood as follows: an event occurs in early childhood which contains an incompatible idea, probably sexual; some form of psychic defense moves in to separate the idea from its correlated affect; this act of repression works reasonably well until puberty, when the reactivation of sexuality necessitates further repressions, resulting in compromise formations

which then manifest themselves as symptoms. They are compromises in that they fend off sexuality and do not allow it expression until it is so disguised as to appear asexual, but ultimately they do permit some satisfaction. This formulation provided the starting point for the individuation of the various neuroses, with the traumatic event in hysteria being an instance of parental seduction.

All of the data accumulated thus far was leading Freud more and more toward a preoccupation with the nature of the repressed material. It is important to bear in mind that at this point (1895-6) he had already abandoned the Scientific Project, his first attempt at constructing a comprehensive general psychology. The Project evidences Freud's growing concentration on drives as a major explanatory factor of consciousness and the unconscious mind. The motivating force behind the differentiation of the ego (ego at this time is roughly equated with conscious processes), is seen as being the need to find some relief from relenteless endogenous stimuli through the ego's mediating between innate drives and external reality.

The following picture of the infant's psychological origins emerges from the Project. Conflict is built into the instinctual inheritance of the human organism, if for no other reason than extreme neonatal immaturity and prolonged developmental process. Instinct, in the Freudian lexicon, refers to mental representations of somatic needs, not to fixed, "instinctive" patterns of behavior. Because of the human infant's inability, motor and psychic, to satisfy its needs it is subject to constant internal tension. While the infant

has neither concept of self nor concept of other, it requires concrete objects in the world for the satisfaction of its needs. At first it strives to attain release from internal tension through hallucinatory wish fulfillment. This tendency toward tension reduction Freud names the pleasure principle; the process of immediate drive discharge through hallucinatory wish fulfillment is the essence of what he terms primary process thought.

Eventually, wishful thinking being what it is, real dissatisfaction, increasing somatic tension, confront the infant with the discrepancy between hallucination and reality; the infant must begin to distinguish between internal and external. In the beginning the pleasure principle is maintained through the illusion that everything needed is contained within the organism. Gradually, as the ego is differentiated, immediate drive discharge through hallucination is abandoned in favor of delay, which gives rise to memory and thought--what Freud termed secondary process. He is suggesting that thought arises only through the discrepancy between internal psychic reality, which is at first hallucinatory, and the actual satisfactions provided by the external world. If it were possible for all a baby's needs to be satisfied immediately, we would not be thinking creatures; it is not possible, not merely because parents aren't fast enough or smart enough, but because the psychic equipment with which the infant enters the world is too fragmentary and too vulnerable. Every child must, of necessity, be subjected to these same learning tasks.

The process of development requires that another person have satisfied the infant's needs so that it can sustain memories of

satisfaction which it then endeavors to reproduce--first through hallucination and then through action guided by thought. In this regard, psychoanalysis implicates social relations at the heart of development. This is particularly important given that Freud appears to neglect the impact of external objects on early development in his assertion that for quite some time the infant has no genuine concept of "other." What psychoanalysis says, in fact, is that we are as psychologically precarious as we are, precisely because of being born both needing a concept of other, due to our dependence, and yet unable to sustain such a concept. Much of the story of early development centers around the gradual achievement of the concept of an object--a fact which has the most important implications for our adult social relations. "It is a basic contradiction between the longing for relaxation and the longing for objects which is said to be the forerunner of love and hate."[9]

If the ego does not develop through the direct influence of objects (as opposed to the Neo Freudian account), then on what basis does development proceed? Freud suggests that the ego develops along the concepts of its own body.

> Let us imagine ourselves in the situation of an almost entirely helpless living organism, as yet unoriented in the world, which is receiving stimuli in its nervous substance. This organism will very soon be in a position to make a first distinction and a first orientation. On the one hand, it will be aware of stimuli which can be avoided by muscular action (flight); these it ascribes to the external world. On the other hand, it will also be aware of stimuli against which such action is of no avail and whose character of constant pressure persists in spite of it; these stimuli are the signs of an internal world,

> the evidence of instinctual needs. The perceptual substance of the living organism will thus have found in the efficacy of its muscular activity a basis for distinguishing between an 'outside' and an 'inside.'[10]

To apply this to more advanced aspects of ego development, let us look, for example, at the way in which analytic theory depicts the infant's acquisition of a sense of self-esteem, in contrast to NeoFreudian and existential theories which presume it to be present *a priori*, unless interfered with environmentally:

> The first regulator of self-esteem is the supply of nourishment (in a broad sense) from the external world. This process operates as follows: the first longing for objects is in the nature of a longing for the removal of disturbing stimuli; satisfaction by the object does away with the longing and revives the feeling of primary narcissism or, in other words, returns self-esteem. This is possible because *at the early period, the longing for the return of omnipotence and the longing for the removal of instinctual tension are not yet differentiated from each other*.[11] [Italics mine]

In later elaborations on the nature of thought, critical thinking--judgment--is also seen to be grounded in the ego's earliest stages of development along bodily concepts. The process of negation[12] is based on one of the infant's earliest discriminating modalities, "taking in" and "spitting out," a rudimentary way of determining what is acceptable to the organism based on what it is willing to keep inside itself. Over time, the ideas attached to primitive judgments ("thing presentations") become associated with words, which will provide the subject with the distance and objectivity required to separate critical thought and action from wishful thinking.

In the *Project*, Freud attempts a neurophysiological explication of

these facets of mental functioning--not in an attempt to reduce their meaning to the workings of a machine, as has sometimes been asserted, but rather on the belief that an adequate depiction of mental processes must include both mechanism and meaning.[13] To that end, Freud provides a model wherein the shift from quantity (of psychic energy) to quality accounts for the phenomena of consciousness. He proposes different neuronal systems for primary and secondary process thinking, and attributes different motives and functions to the systems. Against the backdrop of the material realities of the mind, a framework emerges which is sufficient to capture the intricacy and meaning of complex persons in their social relationships. Freud has shifted from an effort to explain some mysterious aspects of mental functioning to the effort to explain the human subject itself: how does consciousness arise? and in respect to being governed by conscious choices rather than strict instictual ties between subject and object, what manner of creature are we? Though he will go on to offer far more elaborate theories of neurosis and of general development, Freud's theory of mind, or at least its conceptual framework, is hereby established.

Infantile Sexuality: The Libido Theory

In 1897 Freud formulated a major reconceptualization, as seen in a letter to Fliess: "The physical structures which in hysteria are subjected to repression are not properly speaking, memories. . . but impulses deriving from the primal scenes."[14] The notion of repression being instituted due to internal conflict, as representing a flight from internal danger, has finally been fully integrated into

the theory. Though Freud had been increasingly faced with the realization that his patients' early sexual traumas had been, more often than not, fictitious, he had only reluctantly abandoned the seduction theory in favor of infantile sexuality. "We have to learn that sexual instinctual impulses accompany life from birth onwards, and that it is precisely in order to fend off those instincts that the infantile ego institutes repressions."[15]

With the adoption of infantile sexuality, the dynamic theory of mind comes fully into its own; there is a dramatic gain in the theory's internal coherence and explanatory power. Self-deception only makes sense if it is one's own impulses about which it is necessary to be deluded. There is no clear advantage to not knowing about external danger, since the more one knows, the better one can mount a defense. The neurophysiological model had always attested to the fact that it was from mental representations of internal danger that the psychic mechanism took flight through repression; in the case of external danger, real flight is more efficient.

Again, clinical experience can be seen to account for a major source of theoretical speculation: once more it is the fact and specific quality of transference which provoked these revisions in the theory.

> The fact of transference appearing, although neither desired nor induced by either physician or patient, in every neurotic who comes under treatment, in its crude sexual, or affectionate, or hostile form, has always seemed to me the most irrefragable proof that the source of the propelling forces of neurosis lies in the sexual life.[16]

Infantile sexuality is of great importance both for the understanding

of neurosis and for maintaining a dynamic theory of unconscious processes--clearly these two factors are closely linked. In speaking of the diphasic onset of human sexuality, Freud directly equated the nature of sexual development with the singularly human trait of becoming neurotic. It is in large measure due to the fact that the sexual instincts are capable of displacement and substitution to such a great extent and over such a protracted period of time that neurosis is a viable adaptation pattern for human beings.

We are thus left with the following etiology of hysterical symptomology: a child experiences her early sexual impulses as incompatible and institutes some form of repression against them, refusing entry into consciousness of the ideational representations of these impulses and severing the ideas from their accompanying affects; during puberty those earlier impulses, whose ideational representations have flourished in the unconscious, become unmanageable and additional repression is required; the impulses find "substitute satisfaction" in the form of a symptom--the symptom expresses both a repressed sexual impulse and also accommodates the standards of the ego. In short: "The patient's symptoms constitute his sexual activity."[17]

The Dream Theory

It remains for us to look at one additional aspect of psychoanalytic theory and practice which is of great significance for a general theory of the unconscious and also of special importance for an understanding of the role of sexuality in symptom formation. Let us begin by looking at the manner in which Freud first came to study dreams:

> It was discovered one day that the pathological symptoms of certain neurotic patients have a sense. On this discovery the psychoanalytic method of treatment was founded. It happened in the course of this treatment that patients, instead of bringing forward their symptoms, brought forward dreams. A suspicion arose that the dreams too had a sense.[18]

From this it can be seen that dreams occupy a place in psychoanalytic epistemology similar to that of symptoms, and they afford confirmation of the principle of psychic determinism: dreams are meaningful psychic events and their meaning cannot be reduced to the neurological mechanisms by which they occur. That is, one cannot exhaust the meaning of a dream by explaining the physiological factors that occasion it--though contemporary researchers are still engaged in such endeavors.

While the dream theory can be established separately from that of the neuroses, the unconscious, and repression, it reflects back on those aspects of psychoanalytic theory significantly. Freud summarized the crucial theoretical connection between dreams and the unconscious and repression as follows: ". . . the essential characteristic and the most significant part of my dream theory--the reduction of dream distortion to an inner conflict, a kind of inward dishonesty--. . ."[19] The dream theory states that every dream is a wish fulfillment, and that the wishes are disguised. The first half of that statement reflects the significance of drives (represented in the wishes), and the second lays the groundwork for an understanding of the unconscious mental processes (the manner in which the mind creates these disguises); together they underline the role of conflict in dreaming (the motive for disguise). Dreams afforded Freud the clearest opportunity to study

the laws which govern unconscious mental operations. He stated: "The best part of what we know of these processes in the unconscious is derived from our study of the dream-work."[20] Through the dream-work (the mechanism of disguise), the latent content of the dream (the wish, which is the mental representation of an instinctual drive) is transposed into the manifest content (the disguised wish). This provided the first detailed description of primary process, and displayed the unconscious as being regulated by the pleasure principle, since it hallucinates a wish as being satisfied in order to attain immediate drive discharge (in the case of dreaming, this allows the subject to continue sleeping undisturbed), tolerates mutually contradictory ideas, has no sense of time or space, and readily condenses and displaces ideas. Freud was also able to deduce, therefore, that the mechanism of dream construction provides a model for understanding the manner in which neurotic symptoms are formed.

The significance of the dream theory derives from the fact that it provides a study of non-pathological aspects of human mental phenomena, and from the fact that the line of investigation which leads to it can be carried out independently of any of the evidence and proofs which establish the theory of symptom formation. A variety of proofs are adduced to support the thesis that a dream expresses a disguised wish: children's dreams, which express undisguised wishes; that the wishes in adult dreams can be undisguised through psychoanalytic dream interpretation; the appearance in dreams of primal symbols, whose meaning can be established independently of dream interpretation; the character of the wishes themselves--their un-

acceptable nature explains why they would be disguised. The independent verification of the dream theory lends considerable confirmation and also universal applicability to Freudian suppositions regarding the unconscious and repression.

Thus the dream theory, taken in conjunction with the Scientific Project, provides a model for mental functioning that is grounded in material reality--the necessities of the body-- yet sophisticated enough to confront the human subject on its own terms. The differentiated neuronal systems of the Project, which correspond to freely mobile (primary process) vs. bound (secondary process) psychic energy can now be seen in terms of the complex motives and functions that they serve. The pleasure principle operates at many interrelated levels of meaning and purpose: in sleep the ego withdraws its interest from the outside world and returns to hallucinatory wish fulfillment. At the simplest organismic level, dreams are the "guardians of sleep." They prevent a buildup of tension from arousing the dreamer. Yet no two people create the same dream, and only an extraordinarily complex psychic apparatus can help to account for the specific sources and meanings of any individual's dream images.

In summary, then, we see the way in which psychoanalytic theory and practice evolved: the unconscious and repression are deduced (first in the descriptive and later in the dynamic sense) from symptoms, dreams, parapraxes, transference, and resistance; in the course of developing a theory which could explain these phenomena, drives and eventually infantile sexuality were postulated. Freud had this to say

about the historical development of psychoanalytic theory:

> Among the other new factors which were added to the cathartic procedure as a result of my work, transforming it into psychoanalysis, I should mention particularly: the doctrine of repression and resistance, the recognition of infantile sexuality, and the interpreting and making use of dreams as a source of knowledge of the unconscious.[21]

The theory as formulated thus far affords the following construction of the unconscious and repression: consciousness and the unconscious are not merely descriptive terms; ideas may be strong or active and unconscious, in which case they will be inaccessible to consciousness without encountering resistances; ideas may be merely temporarily unconscious, in which case they may now be thought of as unconscious descriptively but preconscious dynamically--that is, they can enter consciousness without encountering resistance. The ego institutes acts of repression against ideational representations of impulses emanating from the unconscious which are incompatible with its task of self-preservation, the ideas remain in the unconscious, and their derivatives continue to influence development and behavior, while the ego has lost its control over them and has been to that degree impoverished of its strength. In the coming years, Freud will increasingly struggle with the implications of the fact that these two sides of the mind, each functioning according to its own set of principles, are not necessarily available to each other. In attempting to accord full meaning to conscious phenomena by interpreting them in terms of their biological substratum, he will build an increasingly complex picture of the human mind. With the passage of time, a description of the mind in terms of what can and cannot be admitted

to consciousness will fall short of what is required to describe the person in his or her total experience.

The Systematic Theory of Mind

The theory thus stated raised several questions, as did it point in certain specific directions for continued development and research. In particular, Freud was to focus over the next several years on the nature of repressed drives. This research, once again, had both clinical and theoretical sources. While the theoretical writings reflect a continuing effort to document the nature and stages of libidinal development (in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, for example), there were also a number of problematic factors in Freud's practice with which he was forced to come to grips. These involved him in an ongoing exploration of the forces, or agency, of repression. Ultimately he was to postulate the existence of the ego instincts, which had their own source of psychic energy and whose purpose it was to oppose the sexual instincts. In order to accomodate the fact of unconscious processes pertaining to the ego, Freud developed his theory of the unconscious mind from a dynamic into a systematic one. That is, if we are unable to equate the ego with consciousness, if we must admit that some ego processes are unconscious, then it is more sensible to organize the mental apparatus around general systems of functions than around the two qualities of a thought being either conscious or unconscious. Each mental system, (Preconscious, Conscious, and Unconscious) has certain qualities and properties, and operates according to its own set of laws and principles in order to

fulfill its functions and purposes.

Freud's speculations during this period culminated in the meta-psychological essays which present a detailed classification of the instincts, explicate the process of repression, and the relationship between repression and libidinal development, and formulate the systematic theory of mind.

As Freud continued in his practice, two obstacles to treatment had become more and more troublesome: the overdetermination of symptoms (that they can seemingly be traced to many different causative factors), and, more important, the refusal of a neurosis to disappear even though all its symptoms might, one-by-one, be cleared up. His attempt to develop a more adequate theory of the neuroses, one which could account for more than the symptoms (which had come to seem like merely the surface characteristics of the neurosis), is clearly reflected in his theoretical writings during the first fifteen years of the twentieth century.

By 1915, in "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," Freud was employing a fully developed language for the instincts--each of the innumerable component instincts was described in terms of its impetus, aim, object, and source. (For the purposes of psychoanalysis, only aim, the mode in which satisfaction is achieved, and object, the person or thing that affords satisfaction, remain significant.) He went on, in that article, to present his first real attempt at classification: the self-preservative or ego-instincts vs. the sexual instincts. Despite the fact that very little more was said about the

ego instincts at this point, their emergence in the theory is critical, for the reworking of the theory of the unconscious from the dynamic to the systematic conception is concurrent with this oppositional classification of the instincts. The paper goes on to trace the vicissitudes of the sexual instincts, essentially in terms of the possibilities for pathological development. Reversal, turning around upon the self, repression, and sublimation are seen as modes of defense against instinctual impulses. The first two alone are not enough to account for neurosis--they will establish fixation points that result in perverted or inverted forms of adult sexuality. To account for neurosis, Freud needed to examine repression.

This he does, most significantly in two metapsychological papers also written in 1915, entitled "Repression" and "The Unconscious." The 1915 essays offer the fullest expositions of these two central concepts and their relationship to the drives and the neuroses. Repression is now elaborated as a three-phase process. In primal repression, the ideational representations of instinctual impulses are refused entry to consciousness. This then establishes a fixation point in development--the instinct remains attached to the presentation which continues unaltered in the unconscious, sends out mental derivatives, and makes associative connections. The second phase of repression, termed repression proper, involves the derivatives of the repressed instinct-presentation, and the associative chains of thought with which it has become linked. Repression then consists merely in preventing those ideas from reaching consciousness--they are not destroyed, but rather preserved in the unconscious where they continue to flourish.

Repression, of course, does not succeed in barring all mental derivatives of the instinct-presentation from consciousness--if it did, we would never even know that it had occurred. When these derivatives attain a form sufficiently different from the original idea, they are permitted to emerge. "Neurotic symptoms, too, must have filled the condition referred to, for they are derivatives of the repressed, which has finally by means of these formations wrested from consciousness the right of way previously denied it."[22] The third phase is termed by Freud the return of the repressed: the forces of repression prove unequal to the strength of the instinctual impulses (which may be provoked by some frustration that succeeds in touching the primal repression), and that is when symptoms will form.

Freud postulated the notions of anticathexis and hypercathexis to explain economically how repression works, and how it may be reversed, that is, where the forces of repression get the psychic energy to perform their task, and what manner of psychological change is necessary to undo that. Freud stated that, ". . . in reality there is no lifting of the repression until the conscious idea, after overcoming the resistances, has united with the unconscious memory-trace."[23] It is possible to tell a person something of which he or she is not yet conscious, and though that idea might then be held in the conscious mind it will not necessarily produce any genuine change in consciousness or undo the repression that had banished the idea to the unconscious.

Freud goes on to formulate the systematic theory of mind in which the topographic aspect (referring to spatial, though not necessarily

strictly anatomical locations) of mental functioning becomes integrated with the dynamic and economic aspects: the system Ucs, primitive and ancient, consists of that which is innate and inherited as well as all that is placed there by acts of repression; the system Pcs contains all thoughts which are unconscious only descriptively, and may at any time gain access to consciousness; the system Cs, (which is more or less the equivalent of the ego), evolved from the outermost cortical layer of the brain and in most direct contact with the world, is responsible first for differentiating between internal and external, and then mediating between the two. Each system has its own rules, qualities, and functions. We then have a model in which anticathexis (repression) is seen to occur principally between the systems Pcs and Ucs. Within this framework, hypercathexis, the reversal of repression, also takes on a specific, non-metaphorical meaning.

The Metapsychology

Freud's metapsychology is a highly problematic component of his theory. There is no agreed upon definition for the term, nor is there consensus on its role in theory building. Contemporary thinkers consider it to be largely a biologistic embarassment. Yet in the context of the reading of Freud offered here, it can be defended as the epitome of that level of psychoanalytic explanation which lends itself to a radical social theory.[24]

Freud considered his metapsychology the attempt to describe psychological propositions in economic, dynamic, and topographic dimensions. In the absence of an adequate definition of metapsychology,

it appears Freud was aiming at a psychological conception which would capture what Paul Ricoeur[25] has termed the elements of "force" and "desire:" a conception which does not reduce one to the other but insists on holding several levels of explanation and description simultaneously. Marie Jahoda suggests that through the metapsychology Freud turns his attention to those questions about human nature which he considered to be most fundamental and most pressing: "the dynamics of conflict; the limitations of self-knowledge; the reducibility of meaning to mechanism; personality; development; and relation to environment."[26]

Through his continued insistence on the juxtaposition of quantitative and qualitative explanation, Freud provides, from the Project to the metapsychology, a model in which the development of a concept of reality is of necessity linked to a model of moral development; thinking emerges only through the conflictual interaction of the dependent infant with the responsible social world. The metapsychological presentation of repression offers a nonmetaphorical description of the process of self-deception which is integral to psychic survival, and consequently a nonmetaphorical description of the reversal of that process. This will be of critical importance when we come to evaluate what is required to effectuate not only a change in consciousness but a change that enhances the individual's capacities for committed political action and involvement in committed social groups.

The metapsychology also provides a framework in which to assess

the role of emotions in psychological change. In these essays Freud distinguishes very carefully between repressed ideas and "repressed" affects, stating that, in fact, there are no "repressed" affects. The affect which has been severed from its idea may suffer one of three fates: remain as it is, be suppressed or inhibited altogether, or be transformed into another charge of affect. While the manner in which repression works is that its force is directed against ideas, if it doesn't squelch the affect it will not have succeeded. Thus the fate of the affect is important for any understanding of neurotic symptoms. In conversion hysteria, for instance, the idea disappears altogether (though the area of the body in which the symptom appears may be governed by the idea), and the affect may be seen as

> an excessive innervation (in typical cases a somatic innervation), sometimes of a sensory, sometimes of a motor character, either as an excitation or as an inhibition. . . . Insofar as it is rendered possible only be means of extensive substitute formations, the repression which takes place in hysteria may be pronounced entirely unsuccessful; with reference to mastering the charge of affect, however, which is the task of repression, it generally betokens a complete success.[27]

It has never been altogether clarified what part the release of feeling, or "abreaction," will play in hypercathexis, and therefore in the therapeutic process. The relationship between abreaction and insight is of particular interest. Many of the contemporary therapies rely almost exclusively on reclamation and expression of feeling, either as the means to insight or, in the belief that insight is irrelevant, as ends in themselves. The humanistic therapies, in all their variety, tend to share this premium on expression of emotion. Psychoanalysis

distinguishes between emotions which are mature and those which are not (the latter being tied to infantile drives), as well as between modes of expression which have or have not been mediated over a developmental process. The analytic method discourages the expression of immature, unmediated affect, in that such expression is likely to satisfy the conditions of drive discharge sufficiently that it will block rather than enhance insight; coming under the sway of the pleasure principle, it reflects a wishful attachment to childish satisfactions and is incompatible with correct judgment and a concept of reality. The release of emotion, under these conditions, is seen as likely to intensify rather than undo an early fixation point precisely by gratifying the impulses behind the fixation. Under less than optimum conditions, the partial undoing of defenses required for the release of affect may have a distinctly harmful effect, leading to serious regression or even disintegration of ego strength.

Psychoanalysis is indeed not clear on the precise relation of affect and expression to insight; the psychoanalytic method requires recollecting archaic feelings and subjecting them to intellectual scrutiny, rather than "acting them out." Underlying this requirement is the belief--or at least the hope, for it is not spelled out theoretically--that the reclaimed affects and their energic force may then be integrated into the adult personality. Certainly psychoanalysis can be used as a rationalization for maintaining intellectual defenses at the expense of expressiveness and at the expense of the body, which must, after all, contain this energy in some manner. None-

theless, the metapsychology provides a conceptual framework in which to view the tension between intellect and affect, and in so doing, provides for the fuller working out of the relation between the two in the process of change. Therapies which celebrate the uncritical release of feeling may do as much to undermine change in consciousness as to enhance it.

The highly abstract metapsychological speculations are to be viewed now against the richly elaborated developmental phases of the libido (see Chapter IV) and the concurrent process of ego development; from this admixturea much richer and more coherent theory of neurosis emerges.

> Children are protected against the dangers that threaten them from the external world by the solicitude of their parents; they pay for this security by a fear of loss of love which would deliver them over helpless to the dangers of the external world. . . .the child embarks on his attempts at defence--repression--which are effective for the moment but nevertheless turn out to be psychologically inadequate when the later re-animation of sexual life brings a reinforcement to the instinctual demands which have been repudiated in the past. If this is so, it would have to be said from a biological standpoint that the ego comes to grief over the task of mastering the excitation of the early sexual period, at a time when its immaturity makes it incompetent to do so. It is in this lagging of ego development behind libidinal development that we see the essential precondition of neurosis.[28]

The revisions in psychoanalysis which come after the metapsychological papers do not fundamentally alter the theory of repression and the unconscious; they will be presented here only in order to give an over all perspective of the growth of the theory and also because these changes have at times been misconstrued as constituting a rejection of the central significance and force of the

unconscious and repression.

The Death Instinct

Beyond the Pleasure Principle entails a major reclassification of the instincts, and also forms a central building block of what is to become Freud's next view of the organization of the psyche. Here, as so often before, the theory was reworked in order to accommodate certain phenomena emerging within Freud's clinical practice. Specifically, Freud sought a way to explain the phenomenon of repetition compulsion, particularly as it occurred in the veterans of World War I who returned suffering from traumatic nervous disorders. What, he asked, could be presumed to account for the compulsion to return to experiences which could not in any way be described as affording pleasure? Furthermore, earlier work on narcissism had led him to the conclusion that both the sexual and ego instincts were libidinal in origin--that is, they drew their energy from the same source. They might often be in conflict, but structurally they were not oppositional. Hence, some other force had to be postulated in order to maintain the instinctual dualism at the heart of the dynamic point of view. The overarching dualism is now seen as life against death rather than as a conflict between the sexual and ego instincts.

This late reclassification of the instincts provides a more coherent ontological theory concerning the primary driving forces of human motivation, and can account for phenomena which the pleasure principle cannot. The new theory represents a major step forward in explanatory power, yet also leaves a problematic legacy in its wake,

particularly in its application to clinical practice (and through that indirect connection, to research and general theory development). While the death instinct is essentially a biological concept, not verifiable through psychoanalytic evidence (or any psychological evidence for that matter), its derivative, the destructive drive, is a manifest, observable entity. The death instinct remains highly controversial within psychoanalytic circles, but innate destructiveness was a concept which practitioners were quick to adopt. (In general it might be said that the death instinct and the destructive drive have both been accepted or rejected more for their moral implications than on grounds of scientific validity; this was certainly true in the area of clinical practice.)

> The old theories could not be directly applied to the phenomena; the latter had first to be analyzed, i.e., their unconscious meaning had to be investigated. But classifications such as "erotic" or "destructive" could be applied directly to the raw material of observation, without any previous analytic work of distilling and refining (or with a bare minimum of it): they could be applied. . . according to physiognomic rather than psychoanalytic criteria, i.e., judging from outward appearance rather than from the meaning they yield to analytic study. It is easy to say that a patient is hostile, much easier than, e.g., the reconstruction of an unconscious fantasy from transference behavior.[29] [Italics mine]

The trend toward easy characterizations rather than arduous grappling with unconscious instinctual material which begins here will be compounded by the next major revision in analytic theory, the shift from the systematic to the structural conception of mind.

The Structural Theory

The final theoretical revision of major importance (within the

scope of this paper, that is--there is also the later work on anxiety which is, in other contexts, extremely important) is Freud's modulation of the systematic into the structural theory. Here he postulates three discrete agencies of the mind, the famous trio id, ego, and superego. The agencies are each seen as having many various functions, processes, and qualities, including that of being conscious or unconscious.

The following quote shows that, by the time Freud had culminated his work explicating the unconscious, the term had ceased to hold the same significance for him:

> It would put an end to all misunderstandings if, from now on, in describing the various kinds of mental acts we were to pay no attention to whether they were conscious or unconscious, but, when classifying and correlating them, inquired only to which instincts and aims they were related, how they were composed and to which of the systems in the mind that are superimposed one upon another they belonged.[30]

The systematic conceptualization had been devised primarily as a result of investigating repressed drives, and the resultant awareness that aspects of the ego were unconscious. From here Freud was led more and more to explore the agency of repression, and it was this exploration, coupled with the need to account for exceedingly destructive guilt feelings in his patients that motivated the shift from the systematic to the structural conceptualization. The structural theory again represents an impressive step forward in the explanatory power of psychoanalysis. For the first time Freud has put forth a theory of the whole person, rather than one that accounts for mental qualities and events. In the earliest years he was entirely preoccupied with

unconscious processes; during the period that followed he gradually turned his attention to consciousness. Finally the inexplicable phenomenon of relentless feelings of guilt which he encountered in his practice (and had been extremely concerned with from the time of the writing of Beyond the Pleasure Principle) forces him to adopt a vantage point from which he can look at the totality of a person's motives.

> Freud proposes that personality should be regarded as a habitual mixture of purposes to which human actions are geared: satisfying needs of the organism [id], meeting internalized standards [superego], and relating to the external world, its demands and opportunities [ego].[31]

In adopting this point of view, it seems almost inevitable that he will describe the mind in terms of structures--the cumulative and enduring results of a tenuous and only abstractly predictable development--rather than in terms of processes, which are by definition less grounded in historical context.

The id is described essentially as was the system Ucs. The two major changes consist in the addition of the superego, and in the richness and complexity of the ego as it is now presented. In The Ego and the Id

> the ego is introduced as a coherent organization of mental processes (p. 15) which arises from identifications with abandoned objects (pp. 36 ff.), is organized primarily around the system perception-conscious (pp. 27-8), but also includes the structures which are responsible for resistances and are unconscious (in the same sense as the Id is, pp. 16-18), has neutral energies at its disposal (pp. 61-63), and can transform the energies of instinctual drives into energies of its own (pp. 64-5).[32]

The superego is introduced (though it had been hinted at earlier, generally referred to as the ego ideal, in, for instance, the essay

"On Narcissism") as a separate agency which had been differentiated out of the ego and with the specific task of observing and passing judgment on the ego. It is described as the inheritor of the Oedipus complex (in the form of parental introjects to enforce the incest taboo), and as representing the conscience.

The adoption of the structural theory brought serious and often unexamined problems along with its explanatory advances, in much the same manner as did the introduction of the death instinct. The structural theory provided another easy way out for clinicians--another support for offering global characterizations of a patient's "personality" rather than staying with the tortuous process of investigating unconscious processes. It is possible to interpret the structural theory--in clinical terms--as indicating a shift in the goal of treatment from expanded self-knowledge to a smoother, more functionally adaptive relationship among the mental agencies, and between the patient and his or her social world. This was not Freud's intention. His final formulation of the aims of therapeutic treatment--"Where Id was there Ego shall be"--clearly locates self-knowledge at the center of the process of reducing conflict among the provinces of the mind and among the varied motives and aims of the total person. Nonetheless, the structural theory provided, for those who wanted it, a more finite set of answers by which to define health than could a doctrine which had no answers other than to assert that pursuit of the truth about oneself counted above all else.

In the abstract, then, Freud's theory of personality (the relations among id, ego, and superego) is not normative. Yet it is with the introduction of the concept of personality that even he begins to generalize about the outcome of "normal" psychological adulthood--ground on which until then he had feared to tread. Albeit with serious reservations, he takes the context that personality theory begins to provide for viewing the early stages of libidinal development and speculates on the differentiation of female from male personality. From the very beginning the discussion is fraught with ambiguity, for the term personality seems clearly to convey more than an abstract set of principles governing the relations among the mental provinces. The word rapidly begins to blend its psychoanalytic with its popular meaning--and though probably everyone understands what is being referred to in the notion of "personality," few people could actually offer a definition. Consequently, Freud is moving in territory that is both psychoanalytic and not, with no set of theoretical principles governing that movement, nor even making those discriminations. It is not at all clear, for instance, on what theoretical grounds he arrives at the conclusion that because narcissism and masochism are prevalent psychic phenomena in the little girl's development, they then enter the mainstream of her adult personality and become acceptable normative characterizations of her style, mode of perception, object relations, and general orientation toward life.

This process of generalization begins with the shift to the structural theory: examination of conscious and unconscious mental

processes does not lead to distinctions between the sexes; examination of repressed content may point up some differences but does not suggest a framework within which to theorize about those differences. Once one begins to view early development, and the repressed material of that early development as being ultimately intertwined with the motives, purposes, and aims of the whole person, concepts such as masochism, narcissism, and passivity may be construed to transcend their meaning as psychic constructs and attain normative value as they are generalized into the adult personality. One does not necessarily stop at saying that there is a high incidence of masochistic fantasy in oedipal girls; even Freud, against his own cautions, goes on to suggest that the "normal" female personality is more masochistic.[33]

In fact, on close scrutiny, it becomes apparent that the theory of psychosexual differentiation is built almost entirely upon the structural theory. It is differences in the process of superego formation, in turn dependent upon differences in the oedipal experience of boys and girls, which lays the groundwork for the alternate pictures of personality development painted for men and women. It appeared that the structural theory finally provided Freud with a framework in which to view the development of the whole person; that it established the links between a basic conception of the nature of the human mind, the phases of libidinal development, and the emergence of an integrated personality from that developmental process. Yet those who came after Freud lost the links between those facets of psychoanalysis and it remains to be seen whether their error derives in part

from Freud's legacy--whether in fact, the connections Freud made between psychosexual development and personality were correct and whether those connections are compatible with his theory of mind. How, indeed, does one generalize from qualities and processes present in everyone's psychic development, to normative presumptions about the way those processes enter the mainstream of personality? To what extent is it possible or theoretically logical to make those generalizations along the lines of gender? What theoretical steps are involved in the process by which Freud came to a view of the female personality as passive, narcissistic, and masochistic, and is that process defensible? In what ways have successive generations drawn upon Freud's late work to build a value-laden psychology of "normal" personality rather than a psychology and a clinical method dedicated to the discovery of truth, whatever it may be?

To explore these questions, the next two chapters will examine in detail the theory of psychosexual development, and the manner in which a theory of personality was extrapolated from it. I will focus particularly on the Oedipus complex, which is the nucleus of Freud's theory of personality (and of his notions on moral development, which are often ambiguously intertwined with gender-linked notions of personality development), in hopes of making explicit and evaluating the connection between psychosexual developmental theory and the formulation of a theory of personality. It is the aim of the next two chapters to disentangle from Freud's own work and the writings which came after his, material and method which are not, strictly speaking, psychoanalytic.

CHAPTER IV

THE THEORY OF PSYCHOSEXUAL DEVELOPMENT

Overview

From the outset, Freud's theory of mind presumes a genetic point of view. Because of the lessening of "instinctive," biologically determined behavior patterns, human beings are to be viewed in terms of how they become who they are. The components of adult personality are not inscribed onto the infant psyche, awaiting only nourishment and time for maturation. At every turning point the nonidentity between internal, psychic reality and external, objective reality will spur the infant's ego development. Freud locates infantile sexual drives at the center of this motivating conflict, and posits a series of developmental tasks and crises endemic to the concurrent, but not coincidental, maturation of the ego and the sexual instincts.

The Oedipal conflict is axial among those tasks and crises, and lays the foundation for the emergence of the adult psyche: it is a period during which childhood passion is left behind, gender identity and sexual orientation are established, the superego is formed,

> and the structured and structuring ego as well; for only then, on the strength of its new identifications and the desexualized energy now available to it for sublimated activity, does the ego begin to function as an organized, independent, and influential agency.[1]

It is also this picture of the different resolution of the Oedipus Complex in boys and girls, and the impact of that resolution on superego

development, that provides the starting point for Freud's speculations on female personality.

In order to understand the explanatory enterprise inherent in Freud's evocation of the Oedipal constellation, it is necessary to view it in the context of his theory of libidinal development as a whole. Taken out of that context, concepts such as penis envy and castration anxiety indeed become meaningless, or even foolish. Critics of Freud have reworked the Oedipal conflict (or discarded it) in order to make childhood development compatible with a preferred view of adulthood, particularly with reference to an assessment of gender differences. yet to rewrite the Oedipal complex with an eye only to what comes after it and not before is to essentially eviscerate Freud's conceptual framework for understanding how men and women come into being. Conversely, but with the same result, object relations theorists shift the emphasis to what comes before (i.e., from Oedipal to preoedipal factors), at the expense of accounting for how those early developments must then be mediated before the person is fully formed. In contrast, psychoanalysis poses the question of human sexuality in such a manner as to expose its very roots.

> . . . how does a newborn baby, who must certainly not be credited with having a psychological representation of his sexual equipment, but who has a bi-sexual psychological potential, develop a psychological identity as a man or a woman? The question so formulated indicates immediately that Freud conceived of the process not as a foregone conclusion, not as the inevitable unfolding of maturation, but as an active interplay between the child and varying sequences of external events; hence a process beset by difficulties whose mastery or mere endurance determines the type of sexual identification which is ultimately achieved.[2]

In order to elucidate the criteria by which to evaluate and revise Freud's account of the Oedipal conflict and the gender related personality traits he presumed to emerge from its resolution, I will first present a summary of his basic notions on libidinal development. It will then be possible to discern in what manner he saw this crisis in libidinal development as contributing to the physical achievements which are integral to adulthood.

In following Freud's developmental account it is important to remember that by sexuality he means all sensuous strivings, from the very beginnings of life; and that adult sexuality is what it is only by virtue of how it comes into being. Sexual instincts, as all instincts, straddle biological and psychological categories--instincts are mental representations of somatic drives. For Freud there is no sexuality that is not psychosexual. Furthermore, Freud's libido theory is not pansexual, as readers often misconstrue it ot be because of its emphasis on sexuality. The importance of sexuality derives from its conflict with other trends--in the early theory with the ego instincts and later on with the death instinct. The complexity of human life, of "abnormalities" in development, derives from the necessity of mediating instinctual impulses over a long period of time and through the agency of the immature ego, whose nature and development in turn depend on its role in the mediating process. Sexuality plays the specific role that it does by virtue of its peculiar qualities--its antiquity, its imperiousness, its plasticity, and its proneness to maldevelopment or fixations."[3] That is, it is present from the earliest moments, does not tolerate much frustration, readily undergoes trans-

formation into other psychic trends, and the transformative process has a close connection to pathological phenomena.

The Erotogenic Zones

As pointed out earlier, Freud describes the instincts in terms of impetus, source, aim, and object. He turns his attention to aim and object, relegating the study of source and impetus to biology. Adult sexuality is a synthesis of component, partial instincts--infantile eroticizations of parts of the body, along with the paired instinctual modalities (each containing an active and a passive side: looking and being looked at, touching and being touched, inflicting and accepting pain. The paired instincts "exist separate from sexuality and are united with it as they are instruments of satisfaction."[4]) All of these components must be integrated into adult sexuality over the extended and tenuous developmental process; adult sexual experience is multi-layered and resonates against infantile satisfactions and strivings which have been transcended and subsumed in the final psychosexual organization. Both the aim and the object of libidinal strivings are mediated over this long developmental cycle, not identically or simultaneously, and both are subject to a variety of fixations and developmental failures.

This last point is particularly significant, as the Freudian account of early ego development relies on an elaboration of aim over object, and all culturalist revisions, particularly current object relations theory, substitute the role of the object as pivotal from the beginning. The Freudian viewpoint assumes that no development happens without objects, but goes on to state that in the beginning the infant

psyche does not have a concept of the object. Early ego development occurs, therefore, primarily under the aegis of the vicissitudes of sexual aims. Since psychoanalysis implicitly locates the object at the center of the infant's development, object relations really adds nothing to the Freudian account. By substituting one aspect of psychic development for the complex totality, object relations theory offers a seriously diminished explanation of the origins of the ego--that which it is so at pains to establish. This argument will become clearer as we trace below the stages of psychosexual and ego development, beginning with the history of sexual aims, and continuing our examination with a look at the changes in the role of the sexual object.

Psychoanalysis views the process of libidinal development through the concept of an erotogenic zone--the familiar Freudian categories of oral, anal, phallic, and genital. (It is through the last two that the role of the object will truly move into the foregound, as the child enters the Oedipal conflict.) Like other popularized aspects of Freudian psychology, the stages of libidinal organization have been highly trivialized and they have entered common parlance as a rather simplistic typology.

The erotogenic zones are established through association with an important bodily function, for example the mouth via the feeding process. The satisfaction of the somatic function is experienced as pleasurable and an independent need to re-experience that pleasure sets in. The sexual instinct attaches itself to the survival function and then becomes separate from it: the aim is sucking, as distinct from feeding. To underline this point again, though the instinct can be

gratified only through an object with whom the infant is involved, the young ego does not know this.

> . . . though any instinct can be satisfied only through an external agency, this initially in no way enters into the internal representation of the instinct of the concept under which the instinct is brought.[5]

Internal representation of an instinctual object is a later psychic acquisition, achieved through its own slow and primitive developmental process. The fact that early experience and memories will be psychically reworked in terms of later identifications with, and introjections of objects, does not alter this truth.

In a 1915 revision of the Three Essays, the theory of the erotogenic zones is elaborated under the notion of libidinal organization. A complex of factors--fantasies, aims, instinctual vicissitudes, etc.--are seen as moving through developmental phases under the dominance of a specific erotogenic zone. With this relatively late revision of the libido theory,

> sexuality is now neatly characterized as a linear progression moving through the various pregenital organizations of the libido--the oral, the anal, the phallic, in that order--and culminating in the genital organization. For any reader with a general acquaintance with Freud, it must come as something of a shock to learn how late it was that Freud came to weld together the two themes which had been with him for many years--the complex history of human sexuality, and the erotogenic zones-- so that the former could be divided up into stages by reference to the latter.[6]

Early Object Relations

How does the object enter into the earliest psychic representations? Initially, as stated above, the infant's psychosexual experience does not involve an object: the stage of autoerotism. The infant endeavors to satisfy sexual aims through its own body, and perceives

them as so satisfied regardless of the presence of an object. The infant subsequently becomes attached to the person or persons who fulfill vital physiological needs and are thereby instruments of sexual gratification as well. "The first objects of sexual longing, like sexuality itself, supervene on the infant's dependence on the mother as the source of food and comfort."[7] This object attachment is quite primitive in that, again, the ego has no concept of itself or of an object but rather experiences itself as if boundaryless, merged with the environment. The path to object choice is therefore slow and complicated.

Before object choice proper becomes possible the infant will move from autoerotism to a phase of primary narcissism. There is still no psychic representation of an external object, but the ego begins to have a concept of itself and to take itself as its own object. Psychic functioning is regulated by the pleasure principle. The primitive "pleasure ego" perceives all goodness as within the organism, and all badness or unpleasure as emanating from without. Though it does not admit of object choice, narcissism does provide the foundation and possibility for the first form of object choice--identification. It is only after primary narcissism has been somewhat mediated, when sexual aims are further evolved and there has been a concomitant development of the ego in respect to delay, judgment, and general secondary process functioning, that object choice proper becomes possible.

With weaning and toilet training, the child's developmental tasks are becoming increasingly social. The phases of the libido take on more structured detail: teething transforms oral incorporative

sexuality to oral cannibalistic. Later, concurrent with the exaggeration of sadistic impulses found during the dominance of anal sexual aims, the infant first develops "consideration for the object."

The "Phallic" Libidinal Organization

Eventually, children enter into the period of infantile sexuality which Freud termed "phallic." The designation is, in and of itself, problematic--to use it is to already land oneself in the midst of the controversy over Freud's supposed phallocentric bias. In the most straightforward sense, "phallic" implised that the erotogenic zone under which sexual aims are satisfied during this period is concentrated in the genital organs. Furthermore, during this period, children recognize only one genital organ--the penis. The first distinction they make between the sexes is that of phallic vs. castrated. However, the assumptions which underlie Freud's notion of "phallic primacy" and therefore his assessment of clitoral and vaginal sexuality have almost impossibly entangled implications, particularly as he revises the libido theory and the Oedipus complex in accordance with the structural theory of mind and begins to speculate on male and female personality.

The important characteristic of libido in Freud's phallic stage is that its aims are satisfied through highly "active" sexuality. Freud appears at this point to begin equating masculine with active and feminine with passive, despite the fact that he has explicitly warned against making this assumption.

> One might consider characterizing femininity psychologically as giving preference to passive aims. This is not, of course, the same things as passivity. . . . It is perhaps the case that

> in a woman, on the basis of her share in the sexual function, a preference for passive behavior is carried over into her life to a greater or lesser extent, in proportion to the limits, restricted or far-reaching within which her sexual life thus serves as a model. But we must beware in this of underestimating the influence of social customs, which similarly force women into passive situations. All this is still far from being cleared up.[8]

In choosing to name this period of the emergence of active sexuality by a term commonly associated with the masculine genital organ, Freud ignores his own caveat. His equation of active with masculine will have serious consequences for his assessment of gender differences.

Until entry into the phallic phase, the development of the boy and girl are seen as identical--sexual aims up to this point will not have made a contribution to the ego's concept of itself as gendered.

> And this is so not because the male mouth is interchangeable with the female mouth, or the male anus interchangeable with the female anus, or the male phallus, i.e., penis, interchangeable with the female phallus, i.e., clitoris--which is anyhow obviously not true--but because through all three phases the function of the dominant organ is represented in the same way in the two sexes.[9]

Because of Freud's implicit, and by his own terms mistaken, equation of masculine with active, he sees that identity not as neutral--boys and girls are alike--but as skewed--girls are like boys. Following Jeanne Lample-de Groot,[10] when he takes the position that male and female development do not progress through the Oedipus complex as simple mirror opposites, he adopts the notion that "the little girl is a little man."[11] The implications of this theoretical position and its problems for Freud's developmental account will be spelled out below. For immediate purposes, it is important to maintain some distinction between what Freud has to say about the development of sexual aims at this stage, and the valuations that his terminology may be seen to assign.

In the debate over the connotative--and even the denotative--implications of the term "phallic," the significance of this developmental period is often obscured. Since the Oedipal period is so much concerned with object relations, it is easy to lose sight of questions pertaining to sexual aim. The debate focuses on aim only long enough to argue whether or not "phallic" is adequate to describe female as well as male experience--and at that, attempts to answer the question often fail on grounds that have little to do with the vicissitudes of sexual aims. Hence the internal relation between the evolution of sexual aims and object relations is lost. As a result, revisionist theories eliminate the biological substratum from their account--they efface the sexual component of "psychosexual." The Oedipus complex then becomes a purely social phenomenon. Marcuse was an early critic of this trend:

> . . . The Oedipus wish is the eternal infantile desire for the archetype of freedom--freedom from want. . . if the child desired only impermissible security and not impermissible pleasure, the Oedipus complex would indeed represent an essentially educational problem. As such it can be treated without exposing the instinctual danger zones of society.[12]

The criticism is not merely academic. Freud has constructed a paradigm wherein psychosexual development moves forward of necessity through its own internal tensions as they interact with social factors, and in so doing acts as catalyst to the developing ego. A depiction of phallic or Oedipal development which relies solely on social and relational factors, to the exclusion of the child's own urgent sexual aims, cannot account for the forward movement of sexuality nor for the necessity of the ego's attaining its new synthesizing capacities.

The resolution of the Oedipal crisis is very much a story of object relations. The phallic period represents the peak of infantile sexuality. Though the end result will be a radical transformation of the child's object relations, it is important to remember that in the Freudian paradigm these changes are initiated at the behest of new instinctual urgings, and not vice versa. It is the attempt to satisfy phallic sexual aims--impulses which will grow increasingly threatening in the child's object world--that brings the child into a crisis in social relations. The Oedipus complex will confront the child inevitably with the fact of gender difference; the need to assign meaning to morphological sex difference occurs in the context of that crisis in social relations and its resolution will make the most substantial contribution to the development in the ego of the concept of gender.

The Oedipus Complex

The story is by now familiar even to lay people, and certainly to students and scholars of Freud, though again it is never safe to assume that the concepts have been grasped in the context of Freud's explanatory enterprise as a whole. Writers on the subject seem often not to remember, for example, that it is infantile sexuality that is in question in Oedipal fantasies,[13] and that the phenomenon in its totality happens largely unconsciously. There are critics who pointlessly argue that they don't remember thinking any such thing. There are apologists who are at pains to defend childhood Oedipal theories as plausible, when in fact unconscious fantasies need not be held accountable to the criterion of plausibility. For theoretical purposes they need only be demonstrated as universally or inevitably occurring: if

they help to make sense of human sexual development they need not, as it were, "make sense."

The first task, then, is to recapitulate here the Oedipal drama as Freud described it for the girl and boy. Following that it will be possible to arrive at an understanding of what aspects of development he is purporting to account for and how he uses the Oedipal conflict as an explanatory device. In so doing we may be able to begin to see where it is possible to separate the specific content that he imparts to the Oedipus complex from its abstract role in the developmental schema.

The boy moves gradually from the anal libidinal organization into the phallic, as he becomes increasingly preoccupied (via fantasy and masturbation) with his penis as an organ of pleasure. His sexual needs of the mother intensify with this more active sexuality and he becomes jealous and possessive.

"For the small boy the penis as a source of pleasure becomes a highly valued possession."[14] With his curiosity and attention turned toward this valued possession he is bound to make the discovery that some people--including his mother and sisters--do not have one. Thus the phallic libidinal organization instigates two phenomena: a jealous and possessive object relationship with the mother, and the discovery of morphological sex differences. These two dramatic psychical events occur more or less simultaneously, and inevitably become intertwined in meaning: how one stands in relation to desired objects has something to do with which sex one is, and that is determined (at least in some major part) by which kind of genital organ

one possesses. (In Freud's view it is determined more simply by whether or not one has a penis. There is as yet no clinical evidence on fantasies for either sex regarding the absence, in boys, of a vagina or clitoris, though it is difficult to say what the failure to collect such data may mean. Regardless of the possible existence of fantasies, it is my contention, argued below, that the absent penis will make its own impact on children of both sexes.) Because jealousy and possessiveness are integral to this stage of ego differentiation, it seems inevitable that some form of evaluation will be attached to sex differences. This is not to imply a specific extent to which jealousy figures into Oedipal conflict, nor that the evaluations that currently seem to hold sway are universal, nor that the specific gender roles that at present form the backdrop for the child's assessments need enter into the valuing system in the way that they now do. The Freudian model does assert, however, that all of these are crucial ingredients of the Oedipal crisis: jealousy, possessiveness, the discovery of gender differences and the attempt to give meaning to those differences.

It is no doubt true that the Oedipal constellation would take on different contours and possibilities for resolution if we were to alter our typical family structure--for instance if fathers were to assume primary caretaking responsibilities. However, the child's Oedipal preoccupation with gender difference and with mother vs. father is not historically constituted--it cannot be undone by an alteration of typical sex-roles. Though it is not possible from this vantage point to gauge what part role expectations play in the concept of gender identity, it is certainly the case that, at the very least, the Oedipal child sees role in reproduction as an essential element.

The questions 'Who am I in my masculinity?/Who am I in my femininity?' are answered partly in relation to the questions, who is mother?/ who is father?/ How do I stand in relation to the two of them?' And though some of the Oedipal triangle can be reduced to mother vs. non-mother rather than mother vs. father (hence female vs. male), it remains the case that a preoccupation with sex difference is becoming paramount because it bears so importantly on the dominant organ of pleasure. If we also remember that the ego develops along bodily concepts, then we must understand that the little boy is highly identified with and narcissistically invested in his penis.

> For the child, then, sexual difference is something other than a mere anatomical fact: it is a profound enigma that leads it to radically question and re-structure its life. The fact of sexual difference confronts the child with a radical lack in what had hitherto been the self-sufficiency of its phallic narcissism.[15]

Each child must learn this lesson for him or herself. And at this juncture it is impossible to guess whether the tasks set before the ego in respect to gender difference would be more or less complicated for a child raised in a setting other than the traditional nuclear family.[16]

As Freud said, "Childish love has no bounds but also no aim. It is doomed to disappointment."[17] The boy may increasingly desire sensual/sexual contact with his mother and it may be of a "phallic" (active) nature, but he does not desire nor is he capable of a mature sexual relationship. He is trapped in the seemingly ubiquitous contradiction that ensues from having an intensely sexual constitution from birth which then takes twelve years or so to achieve maturity

(that is, to achieve expression through fully integrated sexual aims and within a developed, whole-object relationship). As Freud said,

> It is my belief that, however strange it may sound, we must reckon with the possibility that something in the nature of the Triebe itself is unfavorable to the realization of complete satisfaction.[18]

During the Oedipal period the boy is brought face to face with this fact of human existence as he accepts the truth of his sexual incompleteness/inadequacy and is forced to relinquish sole ownership of the object of his sexual desires.

What he believes then, is that those who do not possess a penis did so once and had it taken away. He fears that he will suffer the same fate (castration anxiety) and his fear is intensified by his own projected destructive fantasies. To safeguard his valued organ of pleasure, he must abandon his hostile competitive feelings toward his father as rival and begin to turn to him as the stronger, "the better protector."[19] By identifying with the father he not only gets to keep his penis, in the bargain he is also permitted to retain some object attachment to his mother, though clearly not on the same terms as before.

It seems possible that one of Freud's serious errors in the account he gives of male development is to overestimate the thoroughness of the boy's renunciation of this, his first, most passionate attachment. In the later revisions of psychoanalysis Freud further exaggerates this when he incorporates his account of the boy's Oedipal resolution into his theory of supergo formation. Freud now describes castration anxiety as so overwhelming a force in the young boy's life

that his Oedpius complex is

> not simply repressed, it is literally smashed to pieces by the shock of threatened castration. Its libidinal cathexes are abandoned, desexualized and in part sublimated; its objects are incorporated into the ego where they form the nucleus of the super-ego and give that new structure its characteristic qualities. In normal, or it is better to say, ideal cases, the Oedipus complex exists no longer, even in the unconscious; the super-ego becomes its heir.[20]

Since the fear of his father is based partly on his own projected hostile feelings which the boy then perceives as directed back toward himself, the superego is often far more stringent than parental standards might warrant. The boy binds his aggression against the father by turning it inward toward himself.

As Jahoda points out, the castration complex has led to "the resolution of that part of the Oedipal complex which produces hostility to the father. . . "[21] Nowhere does Freud discuss what becomes of hostile feelings toward the mother for having frustrated or disappointed the boy, nor even for her role as rival for the father's affections (the negative Oedipus complex). It seems almost inescapable that some of what we see as enormous ambivalence on the part of men toward women, and particularly the hostility expressed in exploitation and devaluation, must find its roots in the only partial resolution of the boy's Oedipal feelings--that which Freud thinks has totally "dissolved." It cannot be a simple matter for the child to abandon his fantasies of mother as omnipotent and come to see her as inferior; on the most basic level he has been so deeply identified with her that it is a blow to his own narcissism to see her as weak and inferior. If indeed he makes restitution for that narcissistic blow by transferring his

al ɜgiance to his father, still it seems unlikely that the tie to the mo ıer as an all-powerful figure can be so swiftly and so cleanly br ɛen. The path to identification with the father and the acquisition of ı masculine identity may be somewhat clear, but the fate of the bo 's identification with his mother--the mother/female in himself--is ıurky at best.

In Freud's account, then, the following accomplishments emerge fr ı a 'successful' resolution of the Oedipus complex in boys: a se ɜe of masculine identity (though as stated above, this may be at th expense of total ego development, if, as I surmise, the masculine id ıtification entails thenceforth splitting off female elements from th ego); heterosexual orientation; a strong superego (though Freud so ɜtimes describes it as strong and at other times as overly harsh in ɜuch a way as to ultimately undermine the morality which it endeavors to ıphold); the abandonment of childish passionate but unsatisfiable love fo the mother.

And the little girl? As indicated earlier, Freud's original view wa that female development exactly paralleled male--she felt toward fa ıer precisely as he did in relation to mother. Lampl-de Groot's re ɔrt of two instances of a negative Oedipal complex in women--a pa ɜionate attachment to the mother and sense of rivalry with the father--ca ɜed him to revise that view,[22] and left him with the problem of ex laining the shift of the girl's attachment from mother to father, an of her sexuality from active (clitoral) to passive (vaginal). (It me its underscoring from the outset that the first of these two is a qu ɜtion which any revised account also must address.)

As we recall, development up until the phallic period has been identical for the boy and girl. Even to the extent that they may have been treated differently, that does not yet enter their internal self-representation as gender difference; the ego is ungendered. The girl enters the phallic period under the dominance of clitoral sensation. Through her preoccupation with this organ (again, expressed through fantasy and masturbation) she will discover, as did he, that what boys have is different--visible, manipulable, "bigger and within her concrete, perception-bound cognitive limits, better for all she knows."[23] She, too, must come up with an explanation for the difference and is also likely, in the process, to view the difference in terms of comparative value. We can only guess (beyond the data available from clinical sources) by what criteria the boy and girl make their evaluations. Differences in size, position in urination, whom it makes you like and from whom it sets you apart as being different, are all possible ingredients. Freud says, and not altogether convincingly, that the little girl "makes her decision in a flash."[24] Culturalist accounts, on the other hand, assert that it is the child's perception of male social privilege, based on differences in role, which leads both boys and girls to assess maleness as superior. Though the culturalist account falls short for the reasons that it always falls short--that it depicts the process as unidirectional, with no active participation or mediation on the part of the child; that it fails to explain in the first place why culture is the way it is, and has, in this instance, granted privileged roles to men and not women--still the question remains a thorny one. Neither theory has much to say

about what might constitute the components of self-concept. What part might gender role play in a total concept of gender identity?; what part of a general sense of identity is constituted by gender?; what part by role? The culturalist point of view would seem to imply that gender identity is totally constituted by role, and all but equates identity with gender identity. While psychoanalysis would assert that gender identity is but one aspect of total ego functioning, Freud is ambiguous on the question of what part it plays. He never makes a clear distinction between gender identity and gender role, despite the fact that role considerations clearly enter into his thinking, particularly regarding woman's role as childbearer (which in turn he does not distinguish from child rearer.

However you choose to read it, the clinical evidence indicates that the young girl emerges from her confrontation with gender difference with a sense of herself as inferior. Drawing restitution for this narcissistic wound from the knowledge that she is, after all, more "like" mother than her brother is, is not altogether to the point. At this stage what she wants is not so much to be like mother as to possess mother. In that regard, the identification with mother that forms part of the resolution of the girl's Oedipus complex may imply regression to earlier defenses based on an ego structure still more prone to psychic boundarylessness and merger. The point I am making is different from Freud's suggestion in his later years (much emphasized by other theorists, orthodox and revisionist alike) that the girl never altogether leaves her preoedipal object relational world. I am proposing, rather, that the dimensions of her struggle with phallic,

active sexuality within the context of the Oedipal complex tend to force her to abandon her path forward and regress back to preoedipal identification with mother. One way, albeit a more primitive way, to have mother is to be like her, to internalize her.

The traditional account calls for the little girl to abandon her affectionate and sexual ties to her mother. She blames her penisless mother for her own missing organ, and from then on her relationship with her will be characterized by ambivalence and hotility. While the castration complex signifies the end of the Oedipal complex for boys, it ushers it in for girls. Up until now, she has been passionately and exclusively attached to mother. It is the discovery of morphological sex differences that will draw her into the inevitable triangle, involving her with her father and setting her up in rivalry with her mother. "In contrast to the boy where oedipal attachment to the mother precedes the castration complex, her passionate oedipal attachment follows the 'discovery' of her castration and the accompanying feelings of envy and resentment against her fate as a female."[25] What emerges from the castration trauma for the girl is penis envy, and it is out of this envy that she turns to her father. First she seeks her father's penis for herself, and subsequently this changes into the ("passive") desire for a baby by him that will substitute for the missing penis. In order to accomplish this shift to her father as object choice she must identify with her underprivileged mother (though she feels ambivalent and resentful toward her, and though identification with mother at this point may involve regression rather than resolution) and abandon her object

attachment to her. Clearly a far more complicated situation than that which faces the boy--which makes, in the end, for poorer odds at a good resolution.

Because, Freud continues, women have so much less to lose, they do not develop as strong a superego as do men.

> In girls, the motive for the demolition of the Oedipus complex is lacking. . . Thus the Oedipus complex escapes the fate which it meets with in boys: it may be slowly abandoned or dealt with by repression, or its effects may persist far into women's normal mental life.[26]

From this assumption, along with Freud's belief in the prevalence of envy in the girl's early experience, he deduces an interlocking set of characteristics that must develop in her "personality." She will be more narcissistic, over-compensating for her genital inferiority. She will have less sense of justice, owing to the interference of her envious feelings. Because of her more poorly developed superego she will be intellectually weaker (having less capacity for distance and objectivity), develop less of a tendency to sublimation, and be less concerned with social issues and matters of principle. The package, as it evolves for women, is based on three interrelated mental trends--passivity, masochism, and narcissism.

It is around this catalog of derogatory personality characteristics that the debate over Freud's theories on women will center. Over time theorists and critics have become concerned not with the nature of the female Oedipal experience but with the personality which presumably must result from its resolution. And this despite the fact that the theoretical constructs regarding the relationship between the components of the Oedipal complex and the formation of personality are

vague and often contradictory. In hopes of clearing away some of the resulting confusion and obscurity, let us go back and take a critical look at what Freud has to say about the vicissitudes of sexual aims and object choice during this developmental phase. If, in the next chapter, we endeavor to discern what in Freud's Oedipal account is not essential or inevitable, it remains here for us to isolate that which is universal and therefore must be retained in any alternative account. To do this we must once again focus on sexual aims as they evolve during the stage of phallic sexuality.

A Critical Review

In discussing the transformation of sexual aims during the Oedipal period we must ask how the phallic libidinal organization is transcended and subsumed in the genital organization. Though there is agreement on little else, there seems to be consensus on the fact that this transformation entails a rather momentous change in the role played by objects: autoerotism and genital sexuality proper are mutually exclusive. If we hold to the view that it is the urgency of sexual aims that will provoke a reorganization of object relationships and not the reverse, can we accept Freud's account of the manner in which this happens?

Karen Horney was the first to say no,[27] and she was supported in this by Ernest Jones[28] and in part by Otto Fenichel.[29] What she takes issue with, in her earliest essay, is the notion of phallic primacy,i.e., that the little girl is essentially masculine in her strivings and therefore requires a dramatic psychic motivation for the

shift from mother to father and active to passive sexuality. Horney contends, contra Freud, that no explanation is required for that transition: female sexuality has its own counterpart to the innate heterosexuality she incorrectly perceives Freud as ascribing to boys. In her account, the girl turns to her father out of innate heterosexual strivings spurred by early vaginal sensations. As critics of Horney have pointed out,[30] her position is far more biologistic than Freud's. She endeavors to equalize what she believes is an asymmetry in Freud's description of the differences between male and female development. Misreading his description of the boy's somewhat more straightforward path to genital heterosexuality, she reduces it to a biologically fixed developmental pattern, rather than a hard won and probably only partially successful psychical achievement; then she endeavors to offer the same account for the girl. She is positing that woman as well as man is born and not made, whereas Freud had asserted the opposite for both. Moreover, as Nancy Chodorow points out

> . . . the Horney-Jones-Klein account does not follow what I take to be a fundamental rule of psychoanalytic evidence, that it comes out of clinical experience. It relies on a biological hypothesis of natural heterosexual drives which psychoanalysts have no way of testing or supporting with clinical or observational methods, and it has no explanation for how or why these drives should come to the fore when they are claimed to do so.[31] [Italics mine.]

The little boy is not innately heterosexual, he is, perhaps circumstantially, matrisexual--and so is the little girl. It is an open question how mutable that circumstance is. Until very recently, early as well as extended childcare was inevitably provided exclusively by women. There is as yet only speculation[32] and not clinical research

on the possibility and implications of altering, at any point in the child's development, our system of unilateral female parenting. At present it is impossible to predict what impact such changes in the child's early object world would make on the content of Oedipal fantasies or the opportunities for varied Oedipal resolutions. It must be reiterated, however, that these considerations can in no way obviate the fundamental tasks of the Oedipal period--including the attainment of a sense of gender identity and sexual orientation. Re-arranging the personnel in the Oedipal triangle, whether that means men as primary parents or couples that are homosexual, does not alter the fact that sexuality is a psychological achievement--the integration of psychic and somatic experience--and not a biological fact.

For all the flaws in Horney's alternative, her concerns stand to be reckoned with. As Chodorow explains

> In Freud's account a girl/woman never does come to be heterosexual, that is to want heterosexual intercourse for itself. She first wants a penis narcissistically (as her own body organ), turns to her father (develops a heterosexual orientation) because he will give her one, and then comes to want a baby from him as an alternate narcissistic extension (substitute for the penis she can never have). Nowhere in this account does she want sex for anything except reproduction and the restitution of her narcissistic wound.[33]

In other words, following her resolution of the Oedipal conflict, the little girl has no explicitly sexual aims. It is only through her desire for a baby as substitute for the missing penis, and not because it is initiated by her developing phallic sexual aims, "that she attends to the vaginal sensations that are stirring and forms the sexual aim of being penetrated."[34] As Wollheim points out, this roundabout account

of penis envy leading to vaginal (passive/masochistic) sexuality is hardly consistent with Freud's paradigm of psychosexual development. While Freud's account explains how such a thing might come about, and may even be an accurate description of many women, contemporary as well as Victorian, it is hardly plausible (given his own understanding of the importance of sexuality) as an ideal picture of the nature of female sexuality.

The question has not been dealt with to this day. Horney's later work abandons this line of inquiry in favor of a general culturalist critique of the Freudian libido theory. The point was debated in analytic circles[35] from 1924 until the mid 1930's, when Freud, with the help of Helene Deutsch[36] and Lampl-de Groot, appears to have successfully quashed the entire question. When the controversy is revived years later, the entire question of the outcome of female sexual aims appears to be lost beneath the furor over object relations and the nature of female ego development and personality. No one has resurfaced the issue of how she thenceforth goes about attaining satisfaction for her sexual aims. Freud has subsumed her sexual aims (which he describes as essentially passive) under her "passive personality." Astonishingly, he has given narcissistic restitution priority over sexual gratification. The little boy makes a painful bargain to protect himself from narcissistic danger (castration), but he does not altogether abandon his sexuality. Freud depicts the girl's ideal developmental path as entailing a total sacrifice, a thorough renunciation of sexuality for its own sake.

Yet abandoning phallic primacy is an altogether problematic solution to the enigma of female sexuality. Freud's insistence on those interpretive elements which he derived from his notion of phallic primacy and then wove into a picture of female personality may indeed represent "the most dogmatic stand of his career."[37] Certainly he is on shakier ground here in terms of reliable psychoanalytic evidence; certainly his logic is less persuasive, and his theoretical approach less consistent with psychoanalytic principles. Yet on the other hand

> Is one simply to forget that Freud increasingly stressed the importance of phallic primacy to his theory in spite of the criticism of his followers? If one is not inclined either to forget the constancy with which Freud maintained this position or to explain it away as one more example of authoritarian, patriarchal rigidity or male chauvinism, then perhaps it deserves renewed consideration.
>
> What is at issue is important. If one denies phallic primacy then it seems one must also deny--or radically revise, as Jones attempted to do--the theory of the castration complex. But in that case what remains of the Oedipus complex? Can it still function as the principal underpinning of psychoanalytic theory?[38]

Thus if we concede that the Oedipus complex is a universal and necessary experience in child development, then we must also be willing to concede that the phallus--and castration threat--play some central role for both sexes. Though we may not agree with Freud's conclusions regarding the impact of castration anxiety on girls (or on boys for that matter), the psychoanalytic account of psychosexual development requires us to reckon with the fact that the girl's discovery of her lack of penis is an integral component of her sexuality.

> Castration poses essentially the same question to men and to women. It is the absent phallus that secretly and multifariously haunts our desires for power and dependence and

> implies that we, men and women alike, are fundamentally in question in ways that are the same as well as different.[39]

If we abandon the psychoanalytic paradigm, and with it the Oedipus complex, then in essence we are left with no theoretical framework that can make sense of human sexuality at all, certainly not of the development of sexual identity and sexual orientation. Jahoda underscores for us the unique and radical nature of Freud's perspective:

> His model of psychological sex differentiation in childhood, however, is on a different plane, precisely because its major premise is a-historical, namely the coexistence in the early years of a human being of a vast repertoire of emotion with a limited scope of cognitive ability. . . .In addition, the categories of thought which Freud brings to bear on this situation are important whatever the historical situation. What are these categories?
>
> First there is the recognition of the fundamental unity of body and mind: the discovery of ones own body which inevitably has different results for each sex and leads to concept and theory formation in the child. . . Second . . . passion, tamed and untamed, is the subject of his thought, not stimulus and response.[40]

It is striking that for women Freud ceases to locate passion at the center of his questioning. Freud's surprising lack of curiosity extended beyond his easy acceptance of the girl's renunciation of her mother, and of her immediate devaluation of her genital organ; it is most dramatically at work in his easy acceptance of her renunciation of clitoral, active sexuality. If he asks too few questions about the impact of castration anxiety and penis envy on her assessment of her own worth and her relation to her mother, he asks no questions at all about their impact on her active sexual strivings.

If we do not cut off the line of questioning where Freud did, then a whole new realm of sexual devlopment opens up for exploration,

particularly with regard to mother/son and father/daughter object relations. We have already seen what may result from excluding maternal contributions to male ego development; if the father's contribution to female sexual and ego development is not merely as conduit to vaginal sexuality, then what role might he play? What have been the consequences to female development of fathers not having been allowed a full role in their daughters' development?; of daughters feeling compelled to deny identifications, other than envious ones, with their fathers?

An alternate account of female psychosexual development requires us not so much to challenge the notion of phallic primacy, but to explore more rigorously the fate of the little girl's phallic sexuality, in particular clitoral sexuality--to fill out in greater detail the story of her active sexuality's traumatic encounter with the fantasy that she lacks the proper organ to express and fulfill that sexuality. And if an alternate account also creates the need for a new set of hypotheses regarding men and women's attainment of the desire and capacity for parenting, so much the better, for the old account could hardly be said to do justice to that most central of human experiences.

CHAPTER V

PERSONALITY THEORY AND FEMALE PSYCHOLOGY

Overview

We have seen how psychoanalysis slowly evolved from a theory which could account for mental qualities into one which endeavored to grasp the total person. The theory developed through the two interrelated sources of its own internal inadequacies and problems in clinical practice. Research on narcissism, guilt, aggression, repetition compulsion, and the properties of neurosis beyond its symptoms, led Freud not only to give increased weight to the ego in his later writings, but also to locate the ego within a more complex mental organization, serving both the id and the superego. The relations among these three agencies of the mind--how one deals with biological needs, the world, and one's 'conscience'--are the ingredients for Freud's concept of personality.

Over the same extended period of time, Freud elaborated the picture of human sexuality, and ultimately integrated a variety of themes--sexual development, object choice, and gender identity--into his conception of the adult personality. The need for a theoretical vantage point on the whole person may seem quite obvious from where we now stand, but the pieces of this puzzle came together quite slowly, with extensive revisions along the way. It was very late in the history of psychoanalysis before Freud fully understood that it was

necessary to relate the conscious- or unconscious-ness of mental events to the complex aims, motives, purposes, and needs of the person within his or her environmental context.

The increased importance of the ego combined with other factors to dramatically change the face of psychoanalytic theory and practice after Freud's death. Ego psychology has come to d minate the theoretical scene, while traditional analysis of neurotic symptoms gave way to analysis of 'character.'[1] Both of these developments are drawn from trends in Freud's late work and some of the problems in current usage can be traced to ambiguities and inconsistencies in Freud's theoretical writings on these subjects. His work on personality is fragmentary at best, and not always compatible with his own explanatory framework. Since Freud did not fully integrate these later formulations with the main body of his theory, there was more opportunity for error on the part of those who followed him. In some cases, those who attempted to document subject matter that Freud had only begun to explore were taken as speaking for Freud himself. (Helene Deutsch's writings on female psychology, for example, are largely responsible for the popularization of Freudian views on "femininity" in this country.)

In essence, the focus on observable, conscious factors, which is an inevitable concomitant of ego psychology, almost invites a reductionistic stance (though it certainly doesn't necessitate it). If one seeks an escape from that which Freud always knew was most radical and threatening in psychoanalysis--the unconscious mind and the libido theory--one can more easily find it after the introduction of the

concept of personality. It becomes possible to hold on to physiognomic descriptions and explanations without reference to hidden psychic determinants; since one still comes up with a picture of the psyche that is familiarly human, in the sense that we can recognize ourselves in such descriptions, it is tempting to do away with levels of explanation that are more difficult and more unpleasant. It is possible, for instance, to recognize oneself as obsessed with guilt, to explore what that feels like, and to discover how that might serve some "neurotic" purpose, without then tying that sense of guilt to its instinctual underpinnings. In theory and in practice, hypotheses--certainly interpretations--regarding the ego are easier and more comfortable. They refer to that which feels familiar and to what we are used to recognizing as constitutive of our humanity. To the extent that such hypotheses or interpretations touch on unconscious material, that material is likely to be less repressed, less alien to integrated ego functioning, than interpretations that touch on id impulses.[2]

Yet Freud's theory clearly specifies that the ego must be seen against the backdrop of the vicissitudes of psychosexual development if it is to remain a meaningful construct. It is not possible to sustain the dynamic theory of mind unless the ego is drawn in relation to instinctual forces, and, in turn, the superego is seen as closely tied to the id. By what path, then, has personality come to be increasingly equated with ego? And what are the consequences of this distortion for our current reading and application of Freud's notion of female psychology?

Personality and Character

Two separate trends in Freud's work were drawn on as the shift was made from symptom neurosis and a focus on unconscious phenomena to character neurosis and psyche as defined by ego functions: the structural theory with its concept of personality and psychoanalytic characterology. "Personality" (Personlichkeit) and "character" (Charakter) are not well defined terms even in Freud's own work, and they are far less well articulated as currently used. Freud himself only intermittently distinguished between the two conceptually,[3] and it seems that they have come to be used almost interchangeably. Not only have they merged into one hazy, undefined concept, but their common, popular meanings have colored the position they occupy in psychological theory and practice. The result has been both a flattening out and a distortion of the notion of personality. For where personality would appear to imply dynamic relations among the agencies of the mind, character is more purely a function of the ego; and the moral connotations of character have little, if any, place in psychoanalysis.

Freud introduced characterology in his 1908 essay "Character and Anal Erotism." In this paper he begins to discuss the manner in which defenses against instinctual impulse become chronic and are thereby integrated into the overall structure and nature of the ego. Contained in this idea is the foundation for a typology of character with reference to the particular instinctual impulse being defended against--oral, anal, phallic.

As the instinct theory is deepened and expanded, the typology takes on some of the richness of the complex libidinal organizations, with their typical modes of defense as well as developmentally specific instinctual impulses. For Freud, however, typologies were never enormously useful: they are far too simplistic to encompass the infinite variety of forms which he encountered. "Types are crude pictures. . . easily drawn, invariably overlapping and difficult to prove or disprove."[4] It is in some respects difficult to understand why the oral-anal-phallic typology has captured the lay public's interest to the extent that it has, since, taken separately from the rest of psychoanalytic theory, it becomes a somewhat flat, unimaginative screen through which to view one's history. As such, it is also rather unpersuasive, which may account for some of the scorn to which psychoanalysis is sometimes subjected. Regardless of its limitations, the notion of a "character type" has become a central component of current diagnostic practice.[5] The "types" have by now vastly proliferated (besides oral, anal and phallic there are passive, compulsive, hysterical, schizoid--virtually limitless "types"), and "type" has become a designation of both personality and character. Yet ultimately, "organization of these types into a meaningful classification has remained elusive."[6]

While the construction of diagnostic typologies is certainly influenced by Freud's early work on characterology, it is more directly connected to his later usage of the term.[7] Within the context of his clinical practice, he came to be increasingly concerned with character as an aspect of resistance to treatment, that is, with 'character

defenses.' Fenichel describes this shift in treatment:

> Thus it was the necessity for analyzing the resistance which in practice started psychoanalytic ego psychology. Moreover, in this way two other things were discovered: first, that certain attitudes of the patient's which always recurred when similar instinctual dangers were mobilized served the purpose of resistances, and second that not only was that purpose fulfilled by them in the psychoanalytic treatment, but that the same behavior patterns were also used by the patient in his ordinary life, either to prevent his expressions of certain instincts or to prevent his becoming aware of them. This discovery opened the way to the first "psychoanalysis of character"--that is to the analysis of the purpose and historical genesis of certain characterological attitudes as repressions.[8]

The inordinate difficulty in overcoming these defenses, their intractability, occasioned an innovation in technique "which consisted in denoting as the most important task of analysis the overcoming of resistances, in place of the direct interpretation of the patient's symptoms."[9] Whereas symptoms mask specific (if overdetermined) unconscious material, character is a more diffuse, chronic, attribute of the ego. It expresses itself more in form than in content, for example, more in the attitude which the patient typically adopts toward the analyst than in the content of what he or she says.

Though character neurosis has superseded symptom neurosis as the primary diagnostic category, the same problems with definition pertain.

> The term 'character neurosis' has achieved currency in contemporary psychoanalytical usage without ever having been given a very exact usage.
>
> That the notion remains so ill-defined is no doubt due to the fact that it raises not only <u>nosographical</u> problems (what are the specific attributes of character neurosis?) but also both <u>psychological</u> questions regarding the origin, basis and function of character and the <u>technical</u> question of what place ought to be given to the analysis of so-called 'character' defenses.[10]

Given this preliminary account of character as it takes shape within the treatment process, we still have no consensus on what precisely is meant by the term. Gerald Blum, commenting on the plethora of not very specific definitions says

> . . . we gather only that character is somehow a function of the ego, related in some way to the social environment. Even the gross point of whether it is synonymous with all ego functioning (Fenichel) or simply one among a long list of functions (Hartmann) remains controversial. In view of this hazy state of affairs it appears futile to question the distinction between character and the equally vague concept of personality. Academic psychology's offering clouds the issue still further by way of. . . two alternative definitions of character: 1) the ethical or moral aspect of personality; and 2) the conative aspect of personality without any ethical or moral evaluation.[11] [Italics mine.]

Hypotheses regarding the formation of character are equally contradictory. Some writers cite preoedipal experience, primarily oral and anal, as decisive, and others turn to Oedipal phenomena as the nucleus of character. (Again, in this instance, Freud is of little help, for he suggests both of those possibilities and furthermore, he suggests this in essays where he too seems not to be discriminating between personality and character.) The resolution of the Oedipal complex is where we might reasonably expect personality and character to overlap, to become intertwined: the chronic defenses of the ego in the phallic period will have a strong impact on the emerging relationships between id, ego, and superego. However, it is not possible to understand the relationship between character formation and personality unless we can understand them on their own terms.

Symptoms, Character Neuroses, and Secondary Gain

The shift in technique from analysis of symptoms to analysis of character is accompanied historically by the alleged disappearance of symptom neurosis. (I say "alleged" with some caution. I am aware that the rarity of symptom neurosis is almost universally accepted. However, I find neither the statistical nor the clinical arguments persuasive.[12] I think it far more likely that symptom neurosis is more prevalent than suspected--still largely affecting women in the form of certain of the eating disorders--and is currently either misdiagnosed or undiagnosed altogether.) In an essay entitled "Psychoanalysis and Character," Fenichel documents the historical transition:

> . . . it is an interesting fact that the neuroses themselves, which the analyst had to deal with, have changed. We began today with the statement that in the classical neurosis a continuous personality was disturbed at certain points by inappropriate actions, impulses, or thoughts. In modern neuroses that is no longer the case. Here the personality does not appear to be uniform, but open, torn, or deformed, and in any case so involved in the illness that one cannot say at what point the "personality" ends and the "symptom" begins.[13]

This apparent transformation in the nature of neurosis will present the same temptation as did the incorporation of the aggressive drive and the structural theory into clinical practice. One can eschew 'deeper' interpretations in favor of superficial comments; one can offer, or imply, prescriptions based on some presumption of the 'well-adjusted' personality.

This tendency is further underscored by the increased importance character neurosis lends to what Freud termed the "secondary gains"[14] of neurosis. The primary gain of neurosis is always, in the abstract,

the avoidance of unpleasure. The motivation for the repression is flight from internal tension; it may represent an adaptation to external reality, but that need not be the case. Secondary gain is not originally a component of the neurosis (or the neurotic defense)--it is an advantage in relation to the environment that develops once the defense has been adopted.[15] "The adjective implies that the prospect of such gain was not a motive for the formation of the neurosis in the first place but that once the neurosis had been formed, the secondary gain provided an additional motive to hang on to it.[16]

The desire to continue to exploit secondary gains forms an important aspect of resistance, the sine qua non of character neurosis and analysis of character. Symptom neurosis rarely achieves as effective an exploitation of the environment as does characterological defense structure; symptoms offer the advantages of illness, but beyond that they are bizarre, ego alien occurrences which do not smooth one's way in the world. Their chief value lies in the ability to ward off unpleasure--the primary gain--while still affording an acceptable, because highly disguised, instinctual discharge. As such they remain more intimately tied to deep unconscious material.

Secondary gains are incorporated into the defensive functions of the ego much as are character resistances which become absorbed into the overall structure, and are perceived as integral, even acceptable parts of the self. They are easily rationalized as "just the way I am," if noticed at all.

> The integration of neurotic tendencies into the ego means the feeling of alienation so characteristic for the psychoneuroses, is gone, and that these tendencies assume a function in the service of self-preservative and self-expansive goals; they are now part and parcel of what one feels to be oneself. . . . to which one is now bound by the secondary gains which they impart.[17]

It may even be that the motive of secondary gain is part of the mechanism for establishing defensive character traits. This is, of course, a purely speculative point--but the role of secondary gain in neurosis and in general personality development and character formation is not a minor question. Secondary gains are accrued at the cultural level, and as such represent an important intersection of the individual with society (albeit mediated through early family experience); they make a direct cultural contribution to character and personality. The Neo-Freudians, led by Adler, built a psychology almost exclusively on the precept of secondary gain: the neurosis as a utilitarian arrangement between the ego and external reality. In dismissing intrapsychic factors, they effaced the dynamic theory of mind and substituted an exclusively cultural and therefore inadequate explanation of consciousness.

Freudian psychoanalysis maintains a distinction between primary and secondary gain. It does not see repression and the unconscious as the ego's fictions, necessary in a harsh environment and dispensable in a more graceful reality. Rather, it ". . . assumes a genuine unconscious, and it considers represssion a universal phenomenon."[18] While psychoanalysis maintains the distinction between primary and secondary gain, it is not a point that is much pursued. The tension between the primary and secondary gains of repression may provide a significant window on the relationship between intrapsychic and cultural factors in

character and personality--that is, between the universal and the historically specific, particularistic influences on human development.

The focus on the ego, resistance, and secondary gain, it can be readily seen, treads dangerously close to the Alderian stance which Freud had denounced years earlier. Unless we take pains to maintain the ties between character defenses and what they defend against, between the ego, the superego, and the id, we end up with no dynamic theory of mind, or of pathology. And many factors--clinical applications of the structural theory and the model of personality, clinical interpretations of the death instinct and innate aggressive drives, the disappearance of symptom neurosis--are mitigating against the maintenance of those ties. The end result is an etiology of neurosis that is more moral than psychological, more culturalist than Freudian.

> In Adler's view neurosis is an arrangement motivated by the ego; it comes very close to being a lie, a fraud, and the understanding of a neurosis is the uncovering of its secret purpose, hence an unmasking.[19]

Pathology, then, represents an unsuccessful adjustment to society, and treatment becomes a process of re-education. To underscore this point once again, such a therapeutic stance presumes a model to which we encourage people to adapt--presumes that we know all we need to know about mental "health," and can confidently set about curing people. This is in direct contradiction to the analytic ethos (regardless of whether or not this ethos has been fulfilled in relation to women) that each case, each fragment of unconscious material, is a new mystery which presents a fresh opportunity to explore the unknown reaches of the mind.

"Femininity," or, "My dear, you're just being hysterical."

Finally, what has all this to do with women anyway? Why belabor the point to this extent in an essay on female psychology? The answer is, paradoxically, both simple and complex. It is important for the simple reason that it is not female psychology that is being researched and debated, it is female personality and character--and they are barely psychological categories these days. The complexity derives from the fact that so many different historical trends combined to obscure the real issues at the heart of the question of sexual psychology (male and female). Female psychology ceased to be debated in psychoanalytic circles for several decades, and when the issue re-surfaced, it was in the context of a psychology more concerned with personality and characterological factors than with the unconscious mind.

Of course these historical developments bear equally on men and women in many respects. It is clearly detrimental to men to enter a treatment process in which conformity and adaptation are more the rule than not; it is equally damaging to have psychology hold up a model of masculinity which requires excessive sacrifice and ego impoverishment while masquerading as superior or privileged. However, when one remembers the norm that is being held up to which women are encouraged, or even pressured, to adapt, the insidious oppressive effects on women stand out more clearly. This is not to belittle the impact on the male psyche -- and physical health--which may ultimately be traced to conforming to a traditional and psychoanalytic picture of masculinity.

Indeed the distinction between the oppressed and the oppressor is not clearly so clear in the psychological realm as it is in the objective, social world. However, even in purely psychological terms, a case can be made for the fact that while both men and women are required to make excessive psychological sacrifices, men have more access to the social benefits which in the first place merit those sacrifices. And this remains true, at least insofar as privilege is divided by sex, across class and racial lines; clearly some privilege is assigned not by sex, but by class and color.

The weakening of the interpretive method, which often goes along with the shift in treatment to diagnosis and analysis of characterological pathology rather than interpretation of symptoms, completes a vicious circle. It ought to have been new data, drawn from the psychoanalytic process--interpretations of dreams, symptoms, and especially the transference--that were used to refute or confirm Freud's hypotheses regarding female psychosexual development and female personality. Yet in place of research, psychoanalysis became a vehicle for re-education and social adjustment.

Perhaps most reprehensible is the way in which the new approach was used to justify the barely veiled slander contained in the diagnostic category invented for hysterical personality/character. It is a loose collection of pejoratives, some of which even contradict each other. The rubric was used to cover everything that might be deemed unfortunate or unpleasant in a woman's personality (loosely termed, i.e., her external demeanor), and so it had to include descriptors for both passive

and weak as well as aggressive and flamboyant. The inconsistency is smoothed out, deus ex machina, by subdividing hysteria into categories--hysterical personality, hysteroid personality, hysterical character, etc., and differences in style are traced etiologically to an earlier or later developmental onset.[20] At this juncture there has been a complete and unacknowledged elimination of the psychological components of personality and character in favor of moral and/or physiognomic components. One can make moral judgments about an hysterical woman in a way that one cannot evaluate an hysterical symptom. The blurring of primary and secondary gains conveniently allows the exploitive, manipulative aspects of the hysterical syndrome to be incorporated into a theory of personality and character. It is interesting to note, in passing, that Freud explicitly refused to draw any direct correlation between hysterical symptoms and hysterical personality.[21]

We began in the first place with a weak theoretical framework (the problems in Freud's theories of Oedipal resolution and phallic sexuality) from which to generate a theory of personality or character. Through proliferation of the terms, accompanied by a flattening out and distortion of their meanings, we end up with a framework which is, in itself, indefensible--which is not, in effect, psychoanalytic. The problem applies equally whether one is employing that framework to confirm or disconfirm Freud's theories on women.

For decades now we have been debating the nature of the female personality, the female character, and something even more amorphous called "femininity." This last would appear to be definable as

'psychological femaleness,' and is, one can only suppose, a composite of personality, character, psychosexual profile, and perhaps a soupçon of mystery. Are women passive or not? Narcissistic? Masochistic? Hysterical? These words are used increasingly as external descriptors, not as reflections of women's internal experience, and with reference to their popular and not their psychological meaning. The entire debate is in some respects bogus because it is based on the fraudulent categories of personality and character.

Critics are at pains to demonstrate that female personality/character is not passive, envious, masochistic, etc. Defenders of Freud scrupulously marshall clinical proof that indeed women do have a preponderance of masochistic fantasies--which is beside the point since as yet we have not established the theoretical link between fantasy and personality or character formation. Sometimes Freudians attempt to gather theoretical proof, from the theory of psychosexual development, that the well-adjusted female personality ought to be passive and masochistic. More commonly, if questioned, analysts will agree that Freud's theories on psychosexual development can't really stand as they are, and then they drop the question.

If we don't know what personality and character represent, nor what goes into their formation, surely there is little point in debating whether or not they are gendered or how they become gendered. Even if we were to presume, with the "orthodox" Freudians, that it is the little girl's developmental task to attain "passive" sexual aims, we are still in no position to state that she therefore has a passive "personality." And the controversy has raged not around her sexual aims, which indeed

make a major contribution to the ego's concept of gender, but around her personality or character--which in turn may or may not be the same as her ego.

No one has yet proved that personality and character--in the psychological or the popular sense--are gendered at all, nor in what manner they might be. Analysts are on very tenuous ground trying to defend a position in which "personality style" or "character traits" are sex-linked. On the other hand, because anti-Freudians do not distinguish between ego and personality, when they argue for an androgynous personality, they eradicate the concept of the gendered ego. It may conceivably be arguable (and this is not to argue the point one way or the other) that the female ego's attitude toward itself, the world, and the superego need not be any more passive than the male's; it is not conceivable to posit the mature ego's concept of itself as ungendered. An adult who does not know that he or she belongs to one of the sexes (or at least isn't very uncomfortable without that certainty) seems an unimaginable creature. Inequities in the value and privileges we currently ascribe to the sexes cannot be rectified by wishfully undoing the distinction between them. As Wollheim points out,[22] if the ego is a bodily ego, then it is a sexual ego; if it is sexual, then at some point, whether we accept the specifics of Freud's account or not, the ego is also a gendered ego. If we hypothesize a nonsexual, or a nongendered ego, then we can no longer employ the Freudian paradigm to explain the genesis and maturation of the ego.

Having attempted to clear away the debris that has collected around Freud's already problematic legacy regarding "femininity," and a general psychology of personality and character, let us return once again to the specifics of Freud's account. In Chapter IV we began to isolate some of the problems and limitations of his psychosexual schema; it is time now to turn to a critique of the female personality he deduced from that schema and a critique of the process by which he arrived at those normative conclusions. If indeed Freud's theory of the resolution of phallic sexuality is as tenuous as it appears to be, and if we don't summon up male chauvinism or Victorianism as explanation for his error, then perhaps the particular picture of female personality/character which he endeavors to justify through his Oedipal account may offer a clue to where he went wrong.

Female Personality--Some Alternate Possibilities

Freud chose to build a theory of personality--and moral development--which hinges on the asymmetry between male and female Oedipal resolution. Masculine morality is synonymous with male moral superiority--it does not have a theoretical base separate from the one which prescribes female moral and intellectual inferiority. (In this regard, Freud was the first to blur the moral and conative aspects of personality and character.) That is, the asymmetry in morality is built in to the process of attaining a sense of gender identity and heterosexual orientation; all of those collapse if one does, as the theory now stands. If you dispute the fact that men are superior to women, you no longer have a theory for how men and women learn about

gender differences. (This alone seems enough to undermine the plausibility and usefulness of the theory.)

If indeed moral traits and ego capacities are gender linked, must the relationship between morality and gender be as Freud described it? Here it becomes important to bear in mind that we are disputing Freud from two separate vantage points. Given his account of early psychosexual development, it is possible to draw different conclusions regarding personality formation, particularly with regard to sex-linked traits? In addition, and in the first place, to what extent can we accept his depiction of female psychosexual development as correct? Because I believe that the inconsistencies in his portrayal of female personality will shed some light on the flaws in his theory of female sexuality, I will explore that area first.

In keeping with the asymmetrical nature of Freud's formulation, the problem with his assessment of personality is twofold: an idealization of male development alongside an underestimation of female achievements. Jahoda outlines the two for us:

> Accepting Freud's construction of childhood events as reasonable, and remaining on a Freudian basis, are there not other, equally plausible deductions possible? Would not men, overcompensating for their early castration fears, develop excessive vanity with regard to their maleness? If the little girl learns early in life that one can exist, has to exist, without owning everything in sight, would she not overcompensate this painful discovery by becoming generous, making a virtue out of necessity?[23]

Kay Tooley, in one of a very few articles on male psychosexual development, re-evaluates the idealized picture of the boy's Oedipal struggles and possibilities, particularly with regard to the effects of castration anxiety on ego development and superego formation.

> By adulthood, the penis carries such a heavy responsibility for the whole range of self-esteem and pleasure possibilities that its functioning is a source of great anxiety for men. Any negative feedback from the environment may trigger impotence. . . . This disproportionate anger, evoked by small and inevitable life insults constitutes a constant problem, even a danger, for the man. Should a co-worker get his promotion (and even though other gratifying work possibilities remain), the man is not just momentarily discouraged, but is 'emasculated'. . . . If a neighbor runs the lawnmower over his daffodils, the man hasn't lost a few flowers that were going to fade in a week anyway; he has been 'castrated.' If another car cuts in front of him on the expressway, it is not a fleeting, not even a dangerous fleeting annoyance; it's a major operation--a castration.[24]

Roy Schafer concurs with her speculations that castration anxiety may have less beneficial effects on male development than Freud supposed.

> Whatever the castration anxiety of men might have to do with superego structuralization, typically that anxiety is so unresolved, so persistent, and so intense that it continuously incites men to violate conventional morality. When Freud cautioned against overestimating the degree of true superego formation of people in general, he must have meant men in particular.[25]

And on the other side of this question, a number of these writers have explored the possible positive effects of a girl's prolonged preoedipal experience and delayed onset of Oedipal crisis.[26]

> If the little girl's Oedipal complex occurs later than that of the boy, as Freud plausibly suggests, that is at a stage of greater cognitive and verbal ability, would she not be more open to remaining in touch with her unconscious and be more capable of empathy? Again, on the assumption of a later oedipal experience would she not, more than a boy, retain the marvellous childhood advantage of managing to combine sexuality and tenderness and therefore be less likely to develop sadistic brutality?[27]

Nancy Chodorow, exploring an alternate interpretation of the girl's less thorough resolution of her Oedipal complex, suggests an enriched internal emotional life as one possible effect:

> . . . girls grow up with more ongoing preoccupations with both internalized object-relationships and with external relationships as well. These ongoing preoccupations in a girl grow especially not of her early relationship to her mother. They consist in an ambivalent struggle for a sense of separateness and independence from her mother and emotional, if not erotic, bisexual oscillation between mother and father--between preoccupation with "mother-child" issues and "male-female" issues.[28]

Chodorow goes on to speculate on the possible effects of his impoverished inner, emotional world, on the boy's ego development and superego formation.

> Denial of sense of connectedness and isolation of affect may be more characteristic of masculine development and may produce a more rigid and punitive superego, whereas female development, in which internal and external object-relations and affects connected to these are not so repressed, may lead to a superego more open to persuasion and the judgments of others, that is, not so independent of its emotional origins.[29]

In this vein, Tooley suggests we take another look at the traditional way that men and women assess one another's moral values: "Women have always been mystified by male willingness to bloody each other over incidents that seem trivial, while men have been incensed because women do not seem to give a comparable damn about 'the principle of the thing' ('deficient superego')."[30]

Roy Schafer offers us a way to look at the apparent difference in male and female moral and ego development, insofar as it is linked to the superego. He reads Freud's account as implying that men have "more" superego than women and takes issue with the illogic, in terms of psychoanalytic propositions, of such a notion.

> But, taken as a whole, differences between men and women in ego functioning are qualitative, corresponding to <u>modes</u> of functioning rather than <u>amounts</u>. Contrary to

> Freud, there can be no final authority on the question of whether one mode of functioning is superior to another, for the question makes sense only in the context of values.[31]

Schafer's point brings into focus the fact that the relationship between superego formation, ego development, and gender identity is in a more general sense problematic. Some of the difficulty comes down to the elusive distinction between a strong superego and one that is overly harsh. To say that men are a priori more firm morally and more highly developed intellectually because of a 'stronger' superego is almost self-contradictory. When you consider, as pointed out above, the extent to which anxiety enters into the establishing a boy's superego, it is difficult not to be suspicious of the supposed 'strength' in question. The overly stringent superego

> may be subversive of people's achievements, their love and even their moral codes, for like any harsh and arbitrary authority, it continuously incites rebellion, hatred, and self-destructiveness. . . . Whatever superego does contribute toward eventual morality requires considerable tempering before that morality can be secured, and certainly superego cannot temper itself; it cannot achieve its own independence of its emotional origins.
>
> It follows that Freud may have drawn exactly the wrong conclusion from his theory. . . . If, on account of her different constellations of castration concerns, a girl does not develop the implacable superego that a boy does, then at least in this respect she might be better suited than a boy to develop a moral code that is enlightened, realistic, and consistently committed to some conventional form of civilized interaction among people.[32]

Since Freud's comments on the female superego are so sparse it is impossible to know much of what he believed to be the motivation of its genesis or the contents of its identifications. In the absence

of both the threat (castration anxiety) and the bribery (narcissistic identification with father's genital superiority) of the boy's Oedipus complex, what motivates a woman to develop a superego at all?

Clearly Freud's accounts of moral and ego development are tenuous in the same respects as his mapping of phallic sexual development. And yet, the Oedipal phenomenon serves as the underpinning for Freud's developmental paradigm; without it we have no theoretical explanation for attaining a sense of gender identity, sexual orientation, moral code, or integrative ego capacities. In order to retain what is essential in his account, and to more clearly demarcate what an alternate, or amplified, account would have to provide, let us try to discern more concretely where he went wrong. What are the themes which thread through the apparently disparate inconsistencies of his notion of female personality, and how do they reflect back on his theory of psychosexual development?

A Critical Appraisal

In all the problems one encounters in Freud's theories on women and men, perhaps most striking--for it is so uncharacteristic--is the inescapable impression that he has seriously oversimplified human experience. Certainly the idealization of male and devaluation of female Oedipal resolution represents a restricted view of both the possibilities and actualities of psychosexual development. What lies at the center of this reductionism is Freud's underestimation of preoedipal experience--for boys as well as for girls.

While most theorists, including Freud in his last works,[33] turn to preoedipal object relations for solutions to some of the questions about the girl's Oedipal struggles, none has consistently applied this insight to male development. Dorothy Dinnerstein's compelling evocation of childhood in The Mermaid and the Minotaur comes closest to exploring the little boy's early ties to his mother, but her vantage point is only intermittently psychoanalytic in any strict sense. Given that female inferiority is predicated on male superiority, revision of the theory of female personality hinges on finding a set of constructs which more adequately account for both male and female development.

Furthermore, to the extent that preoedipal factors are used to round out the girl's early history, they threaten to introduce an oversimplification all their own. To assign principal significance in the resolution of female sexuality to preoedipal factors is once again to beg the question of phallic sexuality for the little girl. If we trap her in unresolvable preoedipal tangles, (i.e., arrest her development at that stage), then we do not have to account for further developments in her sexuality. Freud, too, succumbs to this easy way out, despite his insistence that, though early factors contribute to the form of the Oedipus complex, (i.e., envy of the breast or womb as predeterminants of penis envy), the crisis in phallic sexuality and the entry into triangular object relations stand on their own to form a central developmental crisis, a major turning point in the child's life. It is as if Freud's unwillingness to deal with the complexity and intensity of the boy's attachment to his mother makes him willing to

eternally abandon the little girl to that matrix of feeling.

Freud's idealization of male ego and superego development rests on the thoroughness with which the little boy is presumed to abandon his Oedipal passion for mother. In this conflict, his passion suddenly appears to put up not much of a fight. Freud, who fought a lifelong battle for the recognition of that passion, did not, in the end, give it full weight.

> That Freud was not prepared to think about mothers very far is. . . evident from how little he said directly about them and about relationships with them, and, correspondingly, how little he said about how they appear in the transference, the resistance and the formation of the ego and superego systems. . . . Consequently Freud dealt with the feminine trends in men chiefly in terms of the two factors of castration and passive homosexuality. . . . It seems that he knew the father and the castrate in himself and other men but not the mother and the woman.[34]

Wollheim, in discussing similar issues, links this blind spot in relation to women to "Freud's inability to accept in practice what he never tired of proclaiming in theory: mankind's essential bisexuality."[35] And indeed, while Freud had difficulty accepting bisexuality in men, he discounted it altogether in women. In "Analysis Terminable and Interminable" he declares that treatment "is most difficult when trying to persuade a woman to abandon her wish for a penis or convince a man that passive attitudes are sometimes indispensable."[36] That is, women must, at all costs, be dissuaded from psychological bisexuality, while men must be cajoled to embrace it.

Implicit in Freud's parallel, if asymmetrical, construction here is the notion that feminine is to be equated with passive and masculine with active. Now Freud had explicitly argued against this equation in

the New Introductory Lecture entitled "Femininity." Once again, however, it appears that Freud was not able to maintain allegiance to his own, most difficult (i.e., ego alien) precepts. On closer scrutiny, in fact, it appears that the distinction between active and passive is at the heart of Freud's account of Oedipal resolution, and that his distortion of their meaning--his inability to hold to a psychoanalytic conception of activity and passivity--is at the heart of the failure in his account of psychosexual development. The necessity of imputing to girls the achievement of passive, vaginal sexuality causes Freud to stretch the logical limits of his theory beyond what they can bear. It is in service of the little girl's predestined (due to her procreative role) route to passive sexuality that Freud must ascribe to penis envy the significance that he does, and that he becomes willing to provide a nonsexual account of how the girl's sexuality develops through the phallic period.

Furthermore, following Schafer, I would have to add that a truly psychoanalytic understanding of the terms active and passive seriously undermines their viability as descriptors of mental events at all; no psychic phenomenon is purely active or passive. In the first place, though instinctual aims may be passive, by virtue of attaining satisfaction through the subject being acted upon rather than acting, instinctual drives themselves are by definition active: the overall sexual experience cannot be summed up as simply passive. In the second place, one must not forget the regularity with which the instinctual drives undergo transformation back and forth between active and passive, nor the universal unconscious identification which

links the two. The masochist is both beating and being beaten. In the third place, one cannot presume that a preponderance of passive aim results in a passive ego--in relation to id, superego, or environment. For the ego is, by definition, actively synthesizing, implementing instinctual drives as well as warding them off. (This remains true whether the subjective experience, i.e., the ego's concept of itself, is one of passivity.) In the fourth place, it follows that one cannot speak of purely passive object relations, for the ego, consciously and unconsciously, actively structures relationships, even if the subject appears to be weak, helpless, or dependent.

Schafer summarizes the way these problems in definition may affect the picture of female personality which Freud sketched:

> . . . when Freud generalized about women's passivity, he neglected such factors as unconscious identification with the partner in a significant relationship. These are factors which he had been the very one to establish through his psychoanalytic method. . . . Freud repeatedly demonstrated how extraordinarily subtle and complex the interweaving of passive and active themes can be in any one person's life, from which it follows that one-sided or simple characterizations of any significant project as active or passive hardly make sense, once one knows a given person and situation well enough. Yet Freud was not deterred from generalizing on the basis of such simple characterizations.[36]

To hold active/passive as a central organizing concept will inevitably result in an oversimplified account of psychosexual development. The active/passive opposition undermines rather than enhances the concept of bisexuality; limits rather than opens up the range of identifications, projections, and introjections--in relation to both mother and father--we would expect to encounter during the Oedipal period; and tends to imply that sexual aim, and therefore gender identity, is determined by

procreative role (which in turn determines social role).

What does seem clear is that severing the unconscious link between active and passive is central to the oversimplification in Freud's account of sexual and ego development. The experiencing of active vs. passive instinctual aims in relation to the parents is a key component of the Oedipus complex. The vicissitudes of sexual instinct in relation to activity and passivity are certainly tied to the development of the ego and to the ego's concept of itself. The Freudian account, however, does not make full enough use of the complex, bisexual identifications, introjections, and projections that accompany the turbulence of this developmental era. And, to come full circle, this failure is linked with Freud's general neglect of the role of the mother in the Oedipal resolution.

To complete the picture, it is necessary to point out that Freud shortchanged mothers not only in his simplified description of the child's dilemma, but also in his relative disinterest in their own subjective experience. In the developmental account he provides for the little girl he inextricably links her eventual motherhood with passive sexuality and passive personality--despite the fact that he argues, again in the New Introductory Lectures, against circumscribing maternal responsibilities within a passive modality. Penis envy seems hardly adequate to convey the richness and complexity of the desire for a child, though we hold to Freud's view that procreative impulses are not inborn but acquired. And penis envy is certainly not sufficient to account for the acquisition in women of the psychological capacity

to mother.

It would appear that Freud's assessment of the role of motherhood influenced his understanding of the nature of female sexuality; once he had linked women's sexuality with passivity the notorious depiction of female personality and character was all but inevitable. Now Freud did not by any means invent this portrait of female personality. The female ego <u>does</u> often have a concept of itself as passive; women <u>do</u> often adopt passive modes of behavior and relationship. However, where we would have expected Freud to explore the pervasive conflicts both men and women have around active/passive trends, suddenly he closes off the discussion with the presumption of female passivity. Assuming passivity as normatively tied to female sexuality and refusing to consider its defensive properties, Freud closes off the possibility of tracing passive--or active--self-concept as a secondary gain of pathological defenses.

> In the world of adult relation there are many circumstances over which one has no control and against which one cannot prevail, but the definition of oneself in these circumstances as passive and helpless (or as prevailing and in control) is an individual choice based on preferred forms of defense, self-consolation, self-punishment, and so forth.[37]

Freud fails to consider the role that cultural advantage may play in the male/female division of the properties of activity and passivity, despite his avowal that "we must beware in this of underestimating the influence of social customs, which similarly force women into passive situations."

In this distortion of the meaning of activity and passivity lies the beginning of an amplified account of psychosexual development--an

amplified Freudian account. For it cannot be stressed too strongly that regardless of the negative interpretations Freud put forth of the female character, regardless of certain limitations in his developmental account, there is nothing inherently denigrating to women in his overall paradigm of psychosexual development. If we interpret the rather strict division of activity/passivity along sex-linked lines as defensive--as highly conflictual and unresolved--a whole range of unexplored unconscious material opens up.

> The modern analyst has to recognize [the woman's] role not as passivity, but as a desperate form of activity--a drastic inhibition required to play this inactivated part. . . . Yet although Freud the clinician was ever alert to the many forms unconscious activity takes in the lives of women, Freud the theoretician, when dealing with the development of sexual identity, named this inhibition passivity and made it the crux of femininity.[38]

An open-ended perspective on active/passive instinctual trends gives renewed life to the psychoanalytic concept of bisexuality; offers the possibility of reinstating clitoral sexuality and reassessing the properties of vaginal sexuality as they are developed from the phallic through the genital phases; necessitates increased attention to the integration of aggressive as well as sexual drives in accounting for psychosexual development (and this last is perhaps the most seriously neglected aspect of sex-linked differences in male and female development, given the role that violence plays in men's and women's lives). This new vantage point would challenge our traditional understanding of both the external, role-related behaviors and internal subjective experience of motherhood, and would also return the child's psychical experience of mother to the center of Oedipal struggle,

gender identity, and moral development. Paradoxically, disrupting the equation between "mother" and "passive" not only gives renewed importance to motherhood, it also lends support to the possibility of women being less tied to mothering than a traditional account would. A less rigid perspective on activity/passivity would also generate a more complex understanding of male development and pathology than what we now have. It would provide a framework in which to re-view the actualities of male and female achievements (moral and intellectual) and it would open up a far wider range of accomplishments and sublimations to which both men and women might normatively aspire.

Most importantly, this shift in focus is essentially compatible with the fundamental principles and method of psychoanalysis. In Wollheim's terms

> . . . if this kind of account of feminine sexual development would presuppose much more working over of the constitutive elements than Freud himself proposes in his official account, it exhibits the same general theoretical features as the latter. For it is still an account which bases itself on no more than biological considerations and how they are internally represented, and which is at the same time strong enough to sustain a theory of ego development.[39]

C H A P T E R V I

CONCLUSION: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND FEMINIST SCHOLARSHIP

Thus far, the opportunities present in educating young counselor/activists have been lost. Students have been encouraged to believe in the miracles of increased quantity (whether of skills, clients, humanism, or personal growth); or to espouse a therapy more political than psychological and therefore not therapy at all; or to disbelieve in therapy altogether and to engage in other forms of social action.

Sisterhood can work insidiously in the classroom as well as in the therapy session. It is reflected in a preference for nonhierarchical structures, equalization of student-teacher relations, an emphasis on sharing what is known rather than exploring what is unknown. This completes a circle, returning to the humanistic matrix which has already proved to be of questionable value to an education leading to critical thinking. The humanistic style is lent further validity in marxist circles for its superficial amenability with socialist forms--ownership of the means of production, demystification of "class" relations, reappropriation of personal power.

Because of her particular vulnerability to the "impostor complex," the undergraduate woman may find counselor education built on humanistic psychology, mechanistic marxism, or even feminist therapy to subvert rather than enhance her development as a feminist and as a mental health

professional. It is a shaky self-confidence which emerges from such mutual admiration as may pass for education in the humanistic mode. Real or imagined failures may be the result of women graduating without having mastered the skills and discipline of scholarship, perhaps unable to conceptualize clearly and argue persuasively on the issues of their professional domain.

It is in Women's Studies that popular psychology can be shown most clearly to undermine the goals of feminism. It may be the case, as one critic has argued, that women are now drawn to psychology in the first place because "socialization" has cultivated their feeling capacities while stunting development of other competencies.

> Women, in a sense, already are too expressive. Their "innate" emotionalism and expressiveness lie at the core of the very stereotypes they now wish to overturn. So the emphasis on feelings could backfire, locking women even more completely into the circumscribed pattern from which they seek escape.[1]

An education which underscores this imbalance perpetuates, rather than elucidates, the roots of women's oppression.

Regardless of whether educators and students have thus far opted for humanistic, laboratory, or feminist/radical therapy

> In each case the failure is threefold: 1) failure to understand the existing system as one of intentions, and destructive intensions, rather than institutions, behavior or styles; 2) failure to understand the full range of what it means to be a person and thus the systematic destruction of the person; and 3) failure to understand activity, political work, the self, in terms of process.[2]

Such understanding must begin with ourselves, as teachers and clinicians. This will entail a willingness to view our own experiences in the world, in our practices, our training and especially in academic life, with a more critical eye.

This dissertation represents a beginning of that re-examination--an attempt to look at current educational and psychological practices and to see them in the context of the theories on which they are built. This exploration has, of necessity, gone far afield from its original starting point--counselor education--in its pursuit of the theoretical roots of a sound pedagogical strategy. The search for a theory of mind which could speak to the interface of feminism and psychology led to psychoanalysis. Since Freudian theory has traditionally been anathema to feminists, it then became necessary to demonstrate that the theoretical paradigm is not unsympathetic to women--to critique those specific content areas which indeed are biased and damaging. In the process, a number of areas were highlighted which contribute to an understanding of the direction in which Women's Studies must move with regards to counseling and psychology.

How then may it be possible to tie together the disparate themes raised throughout? How may we bring a theoretical exploration of general psychology and of psychosexual development back to bear on the problems inherent in teaching counseling in a Women's Studies program? In other words, what are the internal links between psychoanalysis and social theory--in particular, feminism--which can be used to structure a pedagogical approach?

In the Introduction I suggested that the failure of the women's movement to produce a viable definition of feminism has undermined both Women's Studies curriculum and feminist therapy. I also argued that a complex theory of subectivity was an essential requirement for an adequate definition of feminism. (Furthermore, given the particular

angle of its social criticism, feminism must focus more attention than other political analyses might on sexual identity as a central aspect of subjectivity, and of our social formations.) It may be useful, in this light, to return to the five elements set forth in the Introduction as constituting the rudiments of a theory of human nature: the nature of thought and the relation between thought and action; a concept of mind/body relationship; an assessment of human needs; the relation of individual to society; and the ethical responsibilities of psychological theorists and mental healers. These themes have implicitly threaded throughout the exposition of the previous chapters. At all points I have endeavored to demonstrate that the psychoanalytic theory of subjectivity (including its basic notions of psychosexual development), as seen through its address to these five criteria, can offer to feminism a radical social analysis. Freud provides a mode of understanding and a critique of the internal experience of men and women, the relations between the sexes, the transformation of personal relations to social structures, in turn the influence of society on individual development, and finally, the transmission and institutionalization of personal and social relations across generations.

It is beyond the scope of this research to make a definitive statement about the extent to which a psychological theory can serve as the basis for a political theory. Still, a notion of feminism which aims at a radical transformation of society requires this complex depiction of human nature, with its internal links to political theory, in order to project a reasonable and viable agenda for social change.

Women's Studies represents one arm of that endeavor, and a program in counseling and psychology would confront the problem on several fronts.

In my view, the purpose of a Women's Studies program is to situate a liberal arts education in a context which will enhance the powers of feminist political analysis in order to alter the quality of students' life experience and to prepare them to work more effectively to transform their social world. An educational program can address these problems in many ways. The most significant of these are:

1. To redress the historical imbalance in women's education by rediscovering neglected women artists and theorists and by focusing on areas within the traditional academic disciplines that illumine the problematic aspects of women's social existence.
2. To begin to clarify the relationship between feminist theory and action in order to prepare students for meaningful activity outside the university. "Action" in this context refers to both political work and to career/employment; indeed, the possibility of overlap between those two remains problematic and in need of clarification, in the field of counseling as elsewhere.
3. To provide a setting in which women students can explore the issues around working together as a committed political group.
4. To examine the internal connections between academic disciplines in order to make explicit the political content in seemingly "neutral" areas of discourse.
5. To work toward a definition of "research" which is more compatible with feminist theory; to establish feminist scholarship, particularly

feminist research and theory development, as a priority within the academy and within the women's movement.

It is perhaps the task of highlighting a theory of moral and ethical values which can serve as a focus through which to integrate the variety of issues under discussion here: political theory, pedagogical responsibility, psychological theory, the role of the healing professions, the personal and social experience--or mere endurance--of gender and all that pertains to gender difference. It is in fact the differing vantage points of psychology and political philosophy on the genesis of a theory of moral and ethical values that is the heart of the contradiction between political and psychological endeavors. And the debate over which school of psychology is most value-influenced or which school's Weltanschauung is most appropriate for a given political analysis, has been, until now, the basis of the choice of theory to be used for program development, political or pedagogical.

The question becomes then, what does the psychoanalytic theory of moral development, which in turn forms the ethical base of its treatment methodology, have to offer to feminism and feminist education? In fact, the ethical stance which informs psychoanalysis is the source of its great contribution to political theory and at the same time its most serious problematic for political activity. For psychoanalysis does not, in theory or practice, profess a Weltanschauung.[3] This restraint straddles the line between a commitment to ethical responsibility and a position of theoretical and practical amorality.

I would like here to juxtapose feminist education with three different and interrelated areas of morality and ethics within psychoanalysis: its theory of moral development, its position vis-a-vis society's valuation of abnormal vs. normal, the ethics of its treatment method.

Psychoanalysis holds that the genesis of morality lies in the early parent-child relationship. "The origin of value then is the need of the helpless met by the constant fulfillment of the trustworthy."[4] As opposed to theories which believe persons to be innately moral, or conversely, believe person's morality to be controlled solely by social institutions such as church or state, psychoanalysis sees morality and ethics as inevitable but only developmentally acquired achievements.

> In the light of psychoanalysis, moral valuation and moral conduct are necessary attributes of "natural" man. To have firmly established this, not only in the form of apercus but through painstaking and systematic observations and in the form of a well-reasoned theory is perhaps the most important contribution Freud has made to the study of moral behavior.[5]

The nature of our psychic and biological apparatus requires and provides the possibility for this achievement, yet it remains a process that each individual must undergo to enter the human community and partake of "culture." As Erikson puts it:

> The ethical core which is built into all of us phylogenetically must evolve in each of us ontogenetically--that is, through the mediation of the generational process."[6]

Now clearly the origins of morality--the genesis in each of us of the concepts "good" and "bad," "ought" and "ought not"--is an important consideration for any political theory. Because the social

arrangements between men and women are so often cooperative, the oppression of women so often denied by members of both sexes, hypotheses regarding moral valuations and moral conduct represent an essential component of feminist theory. By what route do we come to differentially value men and women? Psychoanalysis locates this process within the universal, early instinctual struggles of the child and states that "the transmitting mechanism of value is the child's identification with the adult generation."[7] This dialectical hypothesis affords a perspective which may both explicate and at the same time critique the development of cultural values, whereas "intellectual constructions of ethical systems which neglect the psychological forces that actually determine moral behavior are likely to impede both the stability and the power of these systems."[8] It is well known that Freud believed the civilizing process exacted too high a price in the form of instinctual renunciations.[9] Yet the Freudian theory of moral development does not go nearly as far as it might in its critique of society, and in certain ways a feminist analysis may serve as a corrective.

As set forth in Chapters III, IV, and V, the primary period for the acquisition of moral standards is during the resolution of the Oedipal complex. I argued in Chapters IV and V that Freud's theory of psychosexual development is built on a presumption of asymmetry between men's and women's moral capacities. As a result of this presumption, the theoretical constructs regarding both psychosexual and moral development are highly flawed. The presumption of male moral superiority would appear to be traceable in the first place to a de-

fensive assessment of the "typical" masculine moral sensibility as highly evolved, when in fact there are persuasive interpretations which argue that it is arrested at the anal and phallic developmental levels.[10] This alternative viewpoint may contribute to our understanding of why the superego has remained such a confused concept in analytic literature. Does superego contribute to morality or undermine it? Erikson suggests a distinction between morality and ethical values which may clarify the problem:

> The first requirement for a psychoanalytic study of moral values and ethics, then, is the epigenetic point of view. . . . Developmentally speaking, we must, then, differentiate between an earlier, moral conscience and a later ethical sense. What psychoanalysis graphically calls our super-ego. . . is the ready recipient of prohibitions driven into us in childhood by frowning faces and mortal threats, if not beaten into us by physical punishment--and this even before we can possibly understand the meaning of it all. In later life this remains our most moralistic side. . . .
>
> Morality and ethics thus must evolve in each person in a step-by-step development through ever differentiated and insightful stages. Even as each earlier stage lives on in all the later ones, each later stage can represent a re-integration of all earlier ones on a higher level. But this also implies a continuing and inexorable dynamic conflict between the earlier and most primitive, and the later, more mature values in each person--and in all communities.[11]

While I would quarrel strongly with his emphasis on external influence over conflicted internal fantasy as the source of the superego's harshness, Erikson's distinction between the moral and the ethical remains provocative. As I suggested above, it may well be that the theory of psychosexual development which requires that unequal moral powers be attributed to men and women is what stands in the way of psychoanalysis evolving not only a theory of moral values but also

one of integrated ethical standards. In this regard psychoanalysis and feminism stand to make important contributions to one another in further theoretical developments. An ongoing attempt to clarify society's mode of valuation stands as an integral aspect of feminist scholarship and therefore of Women's Studies.

In the specific context of feminist counselor education, the significance of this issue deepens. For here we must scrutinize the attitude which teachers adopt and encourage in students regarding the position of mental healers vis-a-vis culture and its prevailing values. One of Freud's great contributions to the science of psychology--an inevitable corollary of his theory of the unconscious mind --was to securely locate psychopathology on a continuum with "normality." Erikson underscores this when he states that, "Patients, in other words, are those members of a given society who--for a variety of etiological reasons--are most inactivated by inner conflicts shared by all."[12] This 'dialectical' approach stands in contradistinction to unidirectional theories which see patients as inherently defective (the conservative viewpoint), or as having suffered from extraordinary social deprivations and abuse--outside the range of what society generally inflicts (the liberal viewpoint).

The Freudian perspective on normality/abnormality represents the second moral or ethical aspect of psychoanalysis which I would like to consider.

> It then appears that some of the dominant neuroses and psychoses of any given period of history contain an inverted revolt against the values of the existing order; and that we, the mental healers, by taking the dominant

> symptoms seriously (rather than decrying, suppressing, or punishing them), accept some validity in that challenge. In establishing diagnostic and prognostic criteria. . . and in postulating an etiology and prescribing a cure for their symptoms, a new therapeutic style also postulates what seems normative and essential in human nature; and it helps to prescribe what men [sic] owe to each other and what they must avoid doing to each other. Whatever the healing professions advocate, then, is always part of a central struggle of their times and whether "avowed" or not, become ethical intervention.[13]

Again, psychoanalysis and feminism have much to offer one another, where Freudian theory provides an ethical posture and feminist analysis adds a lens through which to shape diagnosis of women's suffering. To name but a few examples, this might include a re-examination of the painful inhibition that has been heretofore diagnosed as "normal" female passivity; a serious and compassionate assessment of the sometimes spurious diagnosis of hysterical personality; a willingness to recognize the paralyzing and destructive effects of the eating disorders, rapidly becoming <u>the</u> female symptom, though considered a legitimate diagnostic category only in extreme and "bizarre" cases.

Ethical problems in psychological diagnosis and assessment reflect back on the first set of issues raised, that is, the genesis of moral values.

> If we do not recognize, if we deny in ourselves, the psychological nature of moral valuation, not only distortions of our authentic codes and directions will result, but also the picture of the reality we evaluate will be often distorted--in our case the picture of what we empirically know about the characteristics of what we call healthy and sick.[14]

And for clarification of the psychological distortions of what is designated healthy and sick in men and women, we must turn once again to problems which have thus far been built into the theory of psychosexual development.

If, as feminists and therapists, we accept these ethical responsibilities, then we also take on a range of responsibilities--and problems--in the teaching of counseling.

> For we cannot claim any more merely to heal clients in offices and clinics, and to enlighten students and readers, without directly intervening in the process by which values are formed and transmitted in society. Rather than deny this fact, we had better find the proper frameworks for teaching the tenets of psychoanalysis both in the context of clinical training and in that of humanist enlightenment. To search in each framework for a style which enlarges and trains ethical consciousness even as it reveals the workings of the unconscious. . .15

Students of the mind, particularly those who claim to locate psychology within a broader view of culture as a whole, must recognize the commitment to, and develop the capacity for an avowal of their moral valuations and an awareness of the route by which they came to hold those values. While psychoanalysis cannot provide a Weltanschauung, its ethos includes a rigorous examination of individuals' and society's moral values and ability to live up to them. Perhaps one of the major problems this research raises and cannot yet solve is the manner in which the tools of psychoanalytic insight can be extrapolated from the treatment process and applied in the classroom or within a political community. Chapter I critiques the place that self-exploration has come to occupy in the academy. Though self-knowledge is, by my own terms, a crucial aspect of feminist education in the healing arts, a definition of the role that it may productively play in a university setting remains elusive. And though consciousness raising may indeed mean little without an adequate notion of the unconscious (as I argued in Chapters II and III), the introduction of

techniques which touch on unconscious phenomena in a political rather than a therapeutic setting remains a delicate and a highly problematic project.

The subject of self-knowledge brings me to the third and final aspect of psychoanalysis and moral values to be discussed here, and that is the ethical principles implicit in its approach to treatment. Following on what has just been discussed, this is a difficult topic since a model for applying the method outside of advanced clinical training and the actual treatment setting hasn't been and may never be developed. Yet the principles in question are central to the evolution, in individuals and in groups, of politically and ethically enlightened consciousness; though the application of method remains elusive, the application of principles cannot be abandoned.

Psychoanalysis aims at the enhanced autonomy of the individual, achieved through expanded self-knowledge which is accompanied by resolution of unconscious instinctual conflict. "Where Id was, there Ego shall be." However, there is no simple, clear cut link between increased integration of the ego functions and enhanced moral stature. Psychoanalysis has of course been criticized, and in many instances (particularly since Freud's death and particularly in this country), rightly so, for failing to live up to its own ethical fiat. Its inability and/or reluctance to arbitrate the relationship between "health" and morality may pose an even more serious limitation on its usefulness for political theory.

> . . .it is obvious that there are many neurotics who are "highly moral" and many, sometimes the same ones, who are

> socially useful, while there are many "healthy" people who are neither the one nor the other--contrary to the expectations of the representatives of a health ethics.[16]

Beyond the tension between "health" and morality, it is also true that conflict-free, "rational action can be used in the service of both morally positively and morally negatively valued aims."[17]

This presents another potential intersection of psychology and social theory. Firstly, an application of feminist analysis may clarify the notion of "health," where health and rationality appear to coincide. For instance, many theorists, in critiquing male ego development, reflected a different picture of rationality in relation to the other ego functions, particularly repressed or split off aspects of the ego which might mediate "objective," "rational" considerations through other, perhaps affect-influenced psychic experiences. And secondly, a historical analysis is bound to bring the entire question of mental health into relativistic perspective.

Though we inevitably encounter limits as to the extent that psychoanalytically achieved self-knowledge abuts on moral questions, or the extent to which increased energies available to the ego will be directed toward the community, still these same limits protect the possibility of the deep psychic changes which may make possible a new order of social relations. The psychoanalytic limits may be easier to live with than at first seems possible; easier to live with, once again, than the boundless but empty promise of liberal utopianism.

> To say that it is a long way from the clarification of ethical principles to moral conduct is to state the obvious. But I should think that a clear and systematic awareness of actual moral motivations could affect moral action, too. Furthermore, a truer insight into the

> inner implications of an action will often lead to a re-grouping of motivations--even without a change in the balance between a person's moral and other motivations having taken place. The point is that even without any surrender, or alteration, of the moral codes, this deeper insight will often of necessity lead to changes in the field of their application to moral action.[18]

If the specific techniques of psychoanalysis--interpretation of the transference relationship as a route to resolution of infantile instinctual conflict--proves of limited applicability, it may be the hermeneutic principle in itself that is to be profitably extrapolated from the psychoanalytic method. The interpretive method and the theory of the unconscious mind are inextricable. The commitment to revealing successive layers of meaning, to demystification of life's surface appearance, is tied to the analytic belief that we have barely begun to discover the workings of the mind, barely begun to understand the question of gender identity and the relations between the sexes. A perspective informed by both psychoanalysis and feminist social theory can help to determine what is to be studied now and how; that is, it can help to establish the priorities for continued research, and to establish a mode of scholarship that is appropriate to the issues under consideration.

Women's Studies presents the opportunity for interdisciplinary education in the highest sense, not merely multi- or parallel disciplinary, not remedial education for a neglected minority. It can present a truly cohesive examination of our social formations and their political underpinnings. As such, it stands to mount a radical critique that cuts across lines of race, class, and sex. Feminist education which takes seriously its ethical and political responsibilities is both intensely personal and inherently social, an education which leads not

only to knowledge and enlightenment but also to reform and finally to revolution.

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER I

[1]Paul Breines, "From Guru to Spectre: Marcuse and the Implosion of the Movement," in Paul Breines (ed.), Critical Interruptions, p. 18.

[2]Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p. xiii.

[3]Ibid., p. vii.

[4]Russell Jacoby, Social Amnesia, p. xvii.

[5]Ibid., p. xvii.

[6]See, for example, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America.

[7]I am referring principally to the work of the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School. See, for instance, Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, Five Lectures, Eros and Civilization; Max Horkheimer, "Authority and the Family" in Critical Theory. See also the earlier works of Wilhelm Reich, especially Sex-Pol and The Mass Psychology of Fascism. I am referring as well to some of their contemporary American disciples such as Russell Jacoby, Social Amnesia, and Paul Breines (ed.), Critical Interruptions.

[8]The following section is based on my experience teaching undergraduate courses in counseling, general advising, and supervising undergraduate practica and independent study in the Departments of Education, Human Development and Women's Studies at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA. Preliminary research has not revealed data significant enough to preclude tentative generalization from experience garnered at the University.

[9]I will not critique behaviorist or clinical psychology programs further because they make no claim to be concerned with political issues in psychological theory and practice, which is the explicit concern of this research.

[10]Breines, p. 12.

[11]Ibid., p. 21.

[12]Jacoby, Social Amnesia, p. xvii.

[13]Trent Schroyer, The Critique of Domination, p. 22.

[14]Ibid.

[15]Worse yet, students may be deluded into believing that personal growth equals social change. A notion popular in the human potential movement is that every time you do something nice for yourself you make the world a little better.

[16]Russell Jacoby, "Reversals and Lost Meanings," in Critical Interruptions, pp. 65-66.

[17]Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Social Relations of the Classroom: A Moral and Political Perspective," Telos, 27 (Spring 1976), p. 97.

[18]The same appeal exists in the collective-based training models of feminist therapy and Re-evaluation Counseling.

[19]See Elshtain, "Social Relations," pp. 99-100. See also footnote 9, most of which is reproduced here: "On the distinctions between coercion, manipulation, and persuasion see William E. Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Co., 1974), Chapter 3, 'Power and Responsibility,' pp. 85-138. In a manipulative as opposed to a coercive situation it is 'harder to grasp the role played by the manipulator' (p. 98). Coercion is moraly (sic) preferably to manipulation. Although there is a moral presumption against both coercion and manipulation, in the case of coercion the coerced individual knows who to hold responsible."

[20]Elshtain, "Social Relations," p. 99.

[21]See, for example, Phyllis Chesler, Women and Madness; Ann Seiden, "Overview: Research on the Psychology of Women," American Journal of Psychiatry, 133:10 (October 1976), pp. 1111-1123.

[22]Seiden, p. 1118.

[23]This inventory is indebted to an analysis by Jean Bethke Elshtain, personal communication.

[24]Abigail Rosenthal, "Feminism Without Contradictions," Monist, 57 (January 1973), p. 28.

[25]Unless otherwise stated, psychoanalysis throughout refers exclusively to the theoretical writings of Sigmund Freud.

[26]See for example, Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination; Wilhelm Reich, Sex-Pol and The Mass Psychology of Fascism: Otto Fenichel, Collected Papers, Volumes I and II. See also footnote 7 above.

[27]See George Lichtheim, Marxism, for a discussion of the relation between Hegel and Marx.

[28]For an excellent discussion of this issue see Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Interpretation.

[29]Rosenthal, p. 41.

[30]See, for a detailed discussion, James Johnson, "Instinct Theory and Its Vicissitudes" (unpublished paper), University of Massachusetts; Sidney Lipshires, "A Civilization Without Discontent: Marcuse vs. Freud," The Psychoanalytic Review, 6, (1973).

[31]Jacoby, Social Amnesia, p. 66 and pp. 139-142.

[32]Ibid., pp. 139-142.

[33]Robert Waelder, Basic Theory of Psychoanalysis, p. 93.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER II

[1]Feminist Counseling Collective, "Feminist Psychotherapy," Social Policy, 6 (September/October 1975), p. 58.

[2]Much of the literature is to be found in social work journals rather than clinical psychology publications.

[3]Susan Thomas, "Theory and Practice in Feminist Therapy," Social Work, 22 (November 1977), p. 447.

[4]Ibid., p. 449.

[5]See Zillah Eisenstein, "Connections Between Class and Sex," for an alternate, more detailed breakdown--which retains, nonetheless, the same framework outlined herein.

[6]Frederick Engels, The Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State.

[7]See Foreman, Femininity as Alienation, for an example of a socialist-feminist critique of Engels.

[8]See Jay, The Dialectical Imagination; Lichtheim, Marxism.

[9]See, for example, Freud, "The Unconscious," or "Repression," SE, Vol. XIV.

[10]Barbara Stevens, "The Psychotherapist and Women's Liberation," Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice, 11 (Spring 1974), p. 5.

[11]See, Carol Barrett, et al., "Implications of Women's Liberation and the Future of Psychotherapy," Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice, 11 (Spring 1974); also Seiden; op. cit.; Phyllis Chesler, Women and Madness.

[12]Sharon Berlin, "Better Work with Women Clients," Social Work, 21 (November 1976), p. 492.

[13]Hogie Wyckoff, Solving Women's Problems, p. 12.

[14]Thomas, p. 453.

[15]Wyckoff, p. 13.

[16]Ibid., pp. 14-16.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Seiden, p. 1117.

[19]For an exhaustive review see Julia Sherman, On The Psychology of Women.

[20]Mary Parlee, "Psychology," Signs, 1 (1), p. 121.

[21]See Max Horkheimer, "Traditional and Critical Theory," in Critical Theory.

[22]Parlee, p. 120.

[23]Thomas, p. 452.

[24]Ibid., p. 453.

[25]Ibid., p. 448.

[26]Feminist Counseling Collective, p. 60.

[27]Thomas, p. 453.

[28]Feminist Counseling Collective, p. 57.

[29]Elizabeth Friar Williams, Notes of a Feminist Therapist, p. 24.

[30]Ibid., p. 75.

[31]Ibid., p. 23.

[32]Ibid., p. 20.

[33]Berlin, pp. 493-497.

[34]See the discussion on p. 40 of this chapter.

[35]Thomas, p. 450.

[36]Ibid., p. 452.

[37]Berlin, p. 497.

[38]Thomas, p. 449.

[39]See Jacoby, Social Amnesia.

[40]See footnote 19, Chapter I, on the distinction between manipulation and coercion.

[41]Feminist Counseling Collective, pp. 57-58.

[42]Ibid., pp. 59-60.

[43]Ibid., p. 59.

[44]See Freud, "Remembering, Repeating, and Working-through," SE, Vol. XXII.

[45]Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, SE, Vol. XVII.

[46]Alexander Mitscherlich, Society Without the Father.

[47]Christopher Lasch, Haven in a Heartless World.

[48]Sigmund Freud, quoted in Jacoby, Social Amnesia, p. 122.

[49]Freud, quoted in James Jackson Putnam and Psychoanalysis, ed. Nathan G. Hale, Jr., pp. 91-92.

[50]Jacoby, Social Amnesia, p. 104.

[51]Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 250.

[52]Ibid., p. 220.

[53]Ibid., p. 224.

[54]Ibid., pp. 245-246.

[55]Jacoby, Social Amnesia, p. 121.

[56]Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 242.

[57]Wilhelm Reich, Sex-Pol, p. 19.

[58]Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 221.

[59]Jacoby, Social Amnesia, p. 26.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER III

[1]See Harry Guntrip, Psychoanalytic Theory, Therapy, and the Self, for a discussion of object relations theory, including its critical view of Freud.

[2]See, for example, Richard Wollheim's review of Juliet Mitchell's Psychoanalysis and Feminism, New Left Review, 93, (September/October 1975).

[3]See discussions of this issue in Heinz Hartmann et al., "The Function of Theory in Psychoanalysis"; Joel Kovel, "Words and Things"; Marie Jahoda, Freud and the Dilemmas of Psychology.

[4]Jacoby, Social Amnesia, p. 12.

[5]Freud, "The Dissection of the Psychical Personality," SE, Vol. XXII, p. 57.

[6]Freud, quoted in Wollheim, Sigmund Freud, p. 12.

[7]Freud, The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement, SE, Vol. XIV, p. 16.

[8]Ibid., pp. 16-17.

[9]Gerald Blum, Psychoanalytic Theories of Personality, p. 34.

[10]Freud, "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," SE, Vol. XIV, p. 119.

[11]Blum, pp. 34-35.

[12]Freud, "Negation," SE, Vol. XIX.

[13]See Robert C. Solomon, "Freud's Neurological Theory of Mind," in Richard Wollheim (ed.), Freud.

[14]Freud, as quoted in Wollheim, Sigmund Freud, p. 27.

[15]Freud, The Question of Lay Analysis, SE, Vol. XX, p. 209.

[16]Freud, History of the Psychoanalytic Movement, SE, p. 12.

[17]Freud, as quoted in Wollheim, Sigmund Freud, p. 88.

[18]Freud, Ibid., p. 74.

[19]Freud, "The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement," p. 20.

[20]Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, SE, Vol. XVIII, p. 34.

[21]Freud, The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement, p. 15.

[22]Freud, "Repression," SE, Vol. XIV, p.150.

[23]Freud, "The Unconscious," SE, Vol. XIV, pp. 175-176.

[24]See Jahoda, op. cit.; Kovel, op. cit.; Freud, "Repression."

[25]Ricoeur, Freud and Interpretation.

[26]Jahoda, p. 112.

[27]Freud, "Repression," p. 156.

[28]Freud, An Outline of Psycho Analysis, SE, Vol. XXIII, p. 200.

[29]Waelder, pp. 133-134.

[30]Freud, "The Unconscious," p. 176.

[31]Jahoda, p. 68.

[32]David Rapaport, "A Historical Survey of Psychoanalytic Ego Psychology," p. 5.

[33]Freud, "On the Economic Significance of Masochism," SE, Vol. XIX.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER IV

[1]Roy Schafer, "Some Problems with Freud's Psychology of Women," Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 22, p. 473.

[2]Jahoda, p. 75.

[3]Wollheim, Sigmund Freud, p. 133.

[4]Ibid., p. 122.

[5]Ibid., p. 121.

[6]Ibid., p. 124.

[7]Ibid., p. 125.

[8]Freud, "Femininity," SE, Vol. XXXII, p. 115.

[9]Wollheim, review of Juliet Mitchell's Psychoanalysis and Feminism, p. 65.

[10]See the discussion in Zenia Odes Fliegel, "Feminine Psychosexual Development in Freudian Theory," Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 42 (1973), on the interrelationship between Freud's, Lampl-de Groot's, and Deutsch's early articles on female sexuality.

[11]Freud, "Femininity," SE, Vol. XXII, p. 118.

[12]Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 221.

[13]Jahoda, p. 76, also pp. 78-79.

[14]Ibid., p. 80.

[15]Thomas Ewens, "Female Sexuality and the Role of the Phallus," Psychoanalytic Review, 63 (1976), p. 630.

[16]Jahoda, p. 88.

[17]Freud, quoted in Jahoda, p. 80.

[18]Freud, "On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love," SE, Vol, XI, pp. 188-189.

[19]Jahoda, p. 81.

[20]Freud, "Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinctions Between the Sexes," SE, Vol. XIX, p. 257.

[21]Jahoda, p. 81.

[22]Lampl-de Groot, "The Evolution of the Oedipus Complex in Women," in Robert Fliess (ed.), The Psychoanalytic Reader, and Freud, "Female Sexuality," SE, Vol. XXI.

[23]Jahoda, p. 82.

[24]See Dorothy Dinnerstein, The Mermaid and the Minotaur, and Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering, for discussions on the significance of dinstinguishing between childbearing and childrearing.

[25]Jahoda, p. 82.

[26]Freud, "Psychical Consequences," p. 257.

[27]Karen Horney, "On the Genesis of the Castration Complex in Women," International Journal of Psychoanalysis, V, pp. 50-65.

[28]Ernest Jones, "The Early Development of Female Sexuality," in Fliess, op. cit.

[29]Otto Fenichel, "The Pregenital Antecedents of the Oedipus Complex," Collected Papers, Vol. II.

[30]See, for example, Ewens, op. cit., and Chodorow, op. cit.

[31]Chodorow, p. 117.

[32]See, for example, Chodorow, Dinnerstein, and Harriet Lerner, "Early Origins of Envy and Devaluation of Women," Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 38, (November 1974).

[33]Chodorow, p. 116.

[34]Wollheim, review of Juliet Mitchell, p. 66.

[35]See Fliegel, "Feminine Psychosexual Development," and Ewens, "Female Sexuality."

[36]Helene Deutsch, "The Significance of Masochism in the Mental Life of Women," and "On Female Homosexuality," in Fliess, op. cit.

[37]Fliegel, p. 407.

[38]Ewens, pp. 624-625.

[39]Ibid., p. 636.

[40]Jahoda, p. 91.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER V

[1]Not to be confused with Reichian "character analysis."

[2]Wilhelm, Reich, "On Character Analysis," p. 142.

[3]Freud, "The Dissection of the Psychical Personality," SE, Vol. XXII, contains the only major use of the term "personality;" it is used to designate the structural theory of mind, that is, the relation between id, ego, and superego. There are numerous references to character, in terms of formation, traits, defenses, and analysis, though little in-depth treatment, and no effort at synthesis. The principal references are: "Character and Anal Erotism," SE, Vol. IX; "The Disposition of Obsessional Neurosis," SE, Vol. XII; "Some Character Types Met with in Psycho-Analytic Work," SE, Vol. XIV; "On Transformations of Instinct as Exemplified in Anal Erotism," SE, Vol. XVII; The Ego and the Id (Chapter III), SE, Vol. XIX; "Libidinal Types," SE, Vol. XXI; "Anxiety and Instinctual Life," SE, Vol. XX.

[4]Blum, p. 186.

[5]La Planche and Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis, p. 69.

[6]Blum, p. 159.

[7]See the lengthy discussion in Freud, "Analysis Terminable and Interminable," SE, Vol. XXIII; also Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, SE, Vol. XX, pp. 157, 159, 164.

[8]Fenichel, "Psychoanalysis of Character," Collected Papers, Vol. II, p. 201.

[9]Reich, "On Character Analysis," in Fliess (ed.), The Psychoanalytical Reader, p. 130.

[10]La Planche and Pontalis, p. 69.

[11]Blum, p. 159.

[12]See the discussion by Lydia Temoshok and C. Clifford Attkisson, "Hysteria and Hysterical Structures," in Mardi Horowitz (ed.), Hysterical Personality, for evidence which questions the disappearance of conversion hysteria.

[13]Fenichel, "Psychoanalysis of Character," p. 201.

[14]See Freud, "Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria," SE, Vol. VII, p. 43 and n; for a more detailed discussion of Freud's thoughts on secondary gain, see Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, Chapter III.

[15]See the discussion in La Planche and Pontalis, pp. 183-184, on the distinction between libidinal, self-preservative, and narcissistic satisfaction as a means of discriminating between primary and secondary gain.

[16]Waelder, p. 74.

[17]Ibid., p. 201.

[18]Ibid., p. 76.

[19]Ibid.

[20]See Alan Krohn, Hysteria: The Elusive Neurosis, and Temoshok and Attkisson for conflicting definitions of the many forms of hysteria, and reviews of the literature regarding the manner in which the varying differential diagnoses were established (for example, oedipal vs. preoedipal, genital vs. oral, the "good" vs. the "florid" hysteric, etc.).

[21]See Helen Block Lewis, Psychic War In Men and Women; also Temoshok and Attkisson, pp. 158-159.

[22]Wollheim, review of Juliet Mitchell, p. 65.

[23]Jahoda, p. 86.

[24]Kay Tooley, "'Johnny I Hardly Knew Ye': Toward Revision of the Theory of Male Psychosexual Development," American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 47 (April 1977), p. 191.

[25]Schafer, "Some Problems," p. 464.

[26]In contrast to Freud, none of the theorists cited in the discussion below offers analytic data in support of his or her speculations. (It must be added that this is as well a limitation in my own research.)

[27]Jahoda, p. 86.

[28]Chodorow, p. 168.

[29]Ibid., p. 169.

[30]Tooley, p. 191.

[31]Schafer, "Some Problems," pp. 466-467.

[32]Ibid., pp. 465-466.

[33]Freud, "Female Sexuality."

[34]Schafer, "Some Problems," p. 482.

[35]Wollheim, review of Juliet Mitchell, p. 65; see also Schafer, "Some Problems," p. 477.

[36]Schafer, "Some Problems," p. 481.

[37]Schafer, "On the Theoretical and Technical Conceptualization of Activity and Passivity," Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 37, p. 183.

[38]Schafer, "Some Problems," p. 482.

[39]Wollheim, review of Juliet Mitchell, p. 64.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER VI

[1]Edwin Schur, The Awareness Trap, p. 129.

[2]Shierry Weber, "Individualization as Praxis," in Paul Breines (ed.), Critical Interruptions.

[3]Freud, "On the Question of a Weltanschauung," SE, Vol. XXII.

[4]Rudolph Ekstein, "Psychoanalysis and Education as Allies in the Acquisition of Moral Values and Virtues in the Service of Freedom and Peace," International Review of Psycho-Analysis, 3 (1966), p. 399.

[5]Heinz Hartmann, Psychoanalysis and Moral Values, p. 25.

[6]Erik Erickson, "Psychoanalysis: Adjustment of Freedom?" in Life History and the Historical Moment, p. 261.

[7]Ekstein, p. 399.

[8]Hartmann, Moral Values, p. 45.

[9]See Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, SE, Vol. XXI.

[10]See the discussion in Waelder, especially p. 138, on the libidinization of aggressive drives.

[11]Erikson, pp. 261-262.

[12]Ibid., p. 253.

[13]Ibid., pp. 252-253.

[14]Hartmann, Moral Values, pp. 72-73.

[15]Erikson, p. 252.

[16]Hartmann, Moral Values, p. 67.

[17]Ibid., p. 70.

[18]Ibid., p. 95.

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